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Abstract 
The History of Workforce Policy and Planning in British Nursing, 1939-1960. 
This thesis examines the government's tripartite approach to workforce policy and 
planning in British nursing from 1939 until 1960. Emerging histories have placed 
emphasis on the ministries and their effect upon the development of nursing. However, 
there remains no examination of their distinctive and interrelated roles in managing 
nursing workforce policy and planning, This thesis examines the contribution of three of 
these ministries from initial workforce involvement in the early 1940s, through to the 
1950s and the advent of the Committee on Senior Nursing Staff Structure (the Salmon 
Report). It concludes that three distinct roles emerged from each of the ministries. The 
Ministry of Labour and National Service (MLNS) dealt with nurse recruitment, the 
Ministry of Health addressed retention through conditions of service, while the Colonial 
Office represented replenishment. Such division of ministerial roles and any limited 
collaboration, however, did not appear to be a part of any conscious workforce policy. 
The thesis argues that although the Ministry of Health and the MLNS viewed nursing as 
less prestigious than a traditional profession, strategies appealing to nurses' aspirations 
were used to promote a sense of professional value in an occupation of many 
countervailing tensions. Nursing appeared to occupy its own unique space between 
professions and industrial labour. 
i 
The post-war management of the nursing workforce emerges as a highly reactive policy, 
focusing upon diverse groups for recruitment. It covered the use of part-time nurses to fit 
into the social expectations of post-war women, the recruitment of male nurses and a 
manipulation of colonial legislation to the clear benefit of British nursing. Nurse 
shortages are explored against government unease in the immediate post-war period with 
the effects of increasing colonial immigration of black workers, which was uncontrolled 
due to their status as British subjects. The ultimate inadequacy of workforce policies in 
nursing to deal with the recruitment of black nurses remains a current and controversial 
workforce issue. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis examines the government workforce policy and planning of British nursing 
between 1939 and 1960. This introductory chapter will outline what the thesis will 
explore, and explain the subsequent structure. This aims to emphasise the importance of 
the focus of this thesis as part of the understanding of British workforce policy and 
planning in nursing. The following chapter will add to this by analysing the historical 
background and context relevant to the current study. 
The thesis explores three differing government ministries who were involved in the 
policy and planning of the nursing workforce during this time period. These are the 
Ministry of Labour and National Service (MLNS), the Ministry of Health and the 
Colonial Office. The time period has been chosen because, prior to 1939 and the need to 
organise national nursing services in readiness for first time air-raid casualties in Britain, 
the government had taken little interest in the occupation. The period therefore represents 
a new and intensive involvement of government in the national nursing workforce, and 
encompasses the nationalisation of the health services in Britain. 
The terminus is 1960. This time point involved several changes in the policy approach to 
nursing, although none of them overly radical. By the later 1950s, the MLNS had handed 
over their role of assisting the occupation with recruitment through their Appointments 
Offices, partly as a matter of expediency, to the Ministry of Health. In addition, this 
period represented the beginnings of the Hospital Plan for England and Wales. ' This 
subsequently led to a reorganisation of nursing management in the light of the Salmon 
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Committee's report in 1966.2 The latter is a significant document in its attempt to 
reorganise nursing to meet the changing health care services, notably the expansion of the 
district general hospitals. It remains poorly explored and partly because of this, together 
with the change in government policy approach to nursing, it provides a useful terminus 
to the study. 
The thesis currently remains the only detailed study to explore the policy and planning of 
the three British ministries involved with the nursing occupation during this time period. 
As the literature review will highlight, other studies have examined areas such as the 
inpact of the National Health Service (NHS) on the occupation, but none have explored 
the ministries' rationale for policy and planning, how the occupation was viewed in terms 
of its professional aspirations and, importantly, the workforce links between the three 
goverrunent departments. The work of the ministries is divided into three 'Rs'. The 
Ministry of Health dealt with the 'retention' of staff through negotiating machinery such 
as the Whitley Council which set salary scales, the MLNS addressed 'recruitment', and 
the Colonial Office through facilitating diversification of recruits, represented 
&replenishment'. The ability of nursing to negotiate its role in society, notably through its 
professional organisations, and in areas such as its scope of practice and remuneration, 
relies on its relationship with government. This is notably when the greatest number of 
British nurses are employed by the NHS. This relationship remains important today, and 
this thesis allows the reader to understand the role of the ministries in nursing workforce 
policy and planning at an earlier time point, and as the root of this cur-rent relationship. 
8 
Structure of the thesis 
As a valuable starting point, the thesis will outline the key issues in the time period prior 
to the study, but relevant to its focus. This aims not only to set the scene for the 
workforce issues explored, but will assist in explaining the rationale for government 
policy, based upon their previous relationship with the nursing organisations. The 
literature review will then reinforce the unique contribution of the study amongst other 
similar research. The main structure of the thesis examines the same time period three 
times, but through the role of each of the different ministries. This allows each to be 
explored in depth. Although it is argued that there was little conscious inter-departmcntat 
planning regarding the individual roles of each ministry in nursing policy and planning, 
such a structured approach can inevitably separate out ministerial roles. To reduce this 
effect, the other ministries are introduced into the main chapters to highlight where 
collaboration occurred. 
As the thesis progresses, the time periods within the chapters vary slightly to reflect the 
predominant involvement of each'ministry. During World War II the MLNS was the 
primary ministry involved in organising the national nursing workforce, under the 
direction of the Minister of Labour, Ernest Bevin. By 1957, after 9 years of the NHS and 
with improvements in recruitment, their role was handed over to the Ministry of Health. 
Therefore the MLNS is explored from 1939 until 1957. The Ministry of Health is 
examined over the entire period of the thesis, with particular emphasis on the policy and 
planning role in the new NHS. Here, from 1948, the majority of British nurses became its 
employees through the system of fourteen regional hospital boards (RHBs). The role of 
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the Colonial Office in nursing was slightly different. Prior to the end of World War II, its 
role was minimal. It is introduced at this time point because with the cessation of 
hostilities in 1945, it was quickly used, in a matter of weeks, to expand the main 
underpinning of a reactive workforce policy. This was through the expansion of 
recruitment, via the supply of nursing recruits from the colonies. Each would be utilised 
for at least 3 years while training was undertaken, and prior to returning home or settling 
in Britain. 
The section examining the role of the Colonial Office has a wider remit than the other 
chapters. It commences with a broad exploration of the various workers who were both 
leaving Britain and who were coming to the country to settle in the post-war period. This 
has relevance to nursing workforce policy and planning for two reasons. Firstly, it 
provides the context of the various workers who could be sourced to staff British nursing, 
as well as the reasons why such workers may wish to settle in Britain. Two contrasting 
groups are explored: black colonial workers and white European volunteer workers 
(EVWs). The former were British subjects with passports allowing free access to the 
country, while EVWs were limited by landing restrictions and could be placed in areas of 
work chosen by the MLNS- 
The second reason is the underlying racial tension which influenced British workforce 
policy and planning both in nursing and in general. The desire to use EVWs in large 
numbers as hospital domestics enhanced recruitment into unpopular jobs, assisting 
Minister of Health Aneurin Bevan's policy to free nursing staff to care for patients. 3 
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Concern over the rising numbers of black workers arriving in Britain, although 
appreciably lower than EVWs, was palliated by nurse recruitment. Here, primarily 
women could be employed and enter a respectable profession whose rules and regulations 
pervaded work and private life. Black men, who appeared to be regarded with some 
suspicion, were generally excluded. All nurses were encouraged not to marry, certainly 
not during training, and once qualified black nurses could return home. The chapter 
explores the use of overseas recruits and emphasises these underlying issues through the 
policy and planning of the Colonial Office and the MLNS. 
The contribution of the thesis 
Early histories of the occupation have generally ignored external factors such as 
government policy and planning and their influence upon occupational development in 
favour of a eulogistic portrayal. This tended to construct nurse leaders in a heroic light 
and in control of nursing's destiny. 4 Abel-Smith's 1960 history of the English nursing 
profession, beginning in 1800, was one of the first accounts to assess the development of 
nursing in relation to the ministries, notably the Ministry of Health. 5 His work is 
important in recognising the issue of occupational dilution and the attempts of the Royal 
College of Nursing (RCN) and nursing's regulatory body the General Nursing Council 
(GNC) to emulate the professional gains of medical colleagues. 
White examined the effects of post-World War II government policy on the nursing 
occupation through the first thirteen years of the NHS. 6 Her work primarily addresses the 
manipulation of conditions of nursing service led by the Ministry of Health, rather than 
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the wider perspectives of nursing management through a variety of different ministries. A 
part of this is the response of groups such as the hospital matrons to their lack of 
representation on the new RHBs. 7 In addition, White explores the continued tension 
between representative groups of nursing whose members were seen by government as 
part of the general nursing workforce. Placing unqualified nursing auxiliaries together 
with qualified staff on the Whitley pay scales in 1955, resulted in the RCN diversifying 
its membership in order to maintain a strong influence within the negotiating machinery 
and in policy decisions. 8 Hence, despite emerging histories placing emphasis on the 
ministries and their effect upon the development of nursing, there remains no 
examination of their distinctive and inter-related roles in the management of the 
occupation. 
The thesis stems from a personal interest in government workforce policy and planning, 
which emerged through my nurse training in the 1980s. This appeared to take little 
account of such influences; they certainly were not a formal part of the curriculum, yet 
provoked much of the ward discussion with the advent of the Griffith Report in 1983, 
which examined and made recommendations for the management of the NHS. 9 
Subsequently, as my career progressed and managerial restructuring gave way to issues 
of quality and clinical targets, it became clear that government policy has had a 
significant impact on the occupation, an influence I experienced initially and which has 
continued throughout my working life. 
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This thesis argues that the workforce policy and planning in nursing in World War Il and 
the immediate post-war period was highly reactive, but cannot be seen in isolation from 
the wider plans of the ministries for health-care services in Britain. Initially, the 
predominant desire was to adequately staff the nursing service for anticipated air-raid 
casualties. Following hostilities, the desire was to staff the flagship of the Attlee 
Government administration, the NUS, during a period of acute nurse shortages. 
Subsequently, while historians such as Raffertylo argue that the passing of the 1919 
Nurses' Registration Act should be understood in the context of the Ministry of Health's 
plans to reconstruct the health services, so should the Report of the Committee on Senior 
Nursing Staff Structure (the Salmon Report), which provides the terminus for this 
thesis. " This represented a change to the workforce policy and planning approach to 
nursing, with the occupation viewed for the first time as a part of wider health service 
reorganisation and planning. 
In addition, by the end of the 1950s, applications to the higher-grade nursing posts had 
markedly reduced, the reasons for which having been suggested in other research. ' 2 The 
Guillebaud Report (1956), 13 examining the cost of the NHS, had noted under-funding of 
the service, and the 1960s marked a changing health service, with an emphasis on the 
growth of the district general hospital. 
14 The Salmon Report was therefore a catalyst for 
change within the roles and structure of nursing, but did not necessarily herald a 
particularly new attitude of the Ministry of Health towards the development of nursing. It 
aimed to meet the needs of a changing health-care system, and indeed, its terms of 
reference prompted an examination of the senior nursing staff structure in the light of 
13 
modem hospital methods and their development against the Hospital Plan published in 
the previous year. 15 
The main aim and objectives of the thesis will be examined in the methodology chapter. 
Primarily, the thesis will explore the governmental approach to managing the nursing 
workforce during World War II and in the immediate post-war period. The objectives are 
as follows: 
9 To identify the division of labour and the different roles of the ministries' 
involvement in nurse recruitment, managing conditions of service and facilitating 
colonial recruitment during this time period. 
9 To compare the division of labour between the ministries, with an examination of 
how their areas of functional overlap were negotiated. 
9 To examine these areas against the background of factors which drove and 
influenced government policy in managing nurse recruitment and conditions of 
service, and how the ministries viewed and responded to the occupation. 
The thesis argues that each of the ministries' work, although relatively distinctive, 
culminated in a reactive policy that focused almost entirely on recruitment. The formal 
development of policy aimed at organising the nursing workforce into a profession, 
which appeared to be the aim of organisations such as the RCN, was for the government, 
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secondary to the main objective of meeting recruitment needs. The Ministry of Health 
maintained a flat, rigid structure of historical nursing roles through the Whitley Council's 
system of nationalised remuneration. This did little to encourage any growth and 
development within the profession to meet changing health care needs. It was not until 
the Salmon Report in the early 1960s, that differing managerial and subsequently clinical 
roles could emerge. 
Workforce policy and planning are presented within the wider context of increasing 
government concern regarding the societal effects of black colonial immigration, together 
with the attitude to post-war women. The role of women as home makers emerged from 
the shadow of the Beveridge Report 16 and led to adaptations to nurse recruitment to 
facilitate part-time working, which was virtually unheard of in the years prior to World 
War Il. In addition, the thesis argues that the Colonial Office was happy to utilise labour 
from the colonies to augment British nurse recruitment through controlled programmes, 
but was acutely aware of limiting the free arrival of black workers. This was despite the 
numbers being appreciably lower than for white European workers arriving during the 
same time period. Changes in the 1949 Nurses' Act allowed the recruitment of nurses 
who did not meet GNC standards, but who could undergo adaptation programmes on 
arrival in Britain in order to join the nursing workforce quickly. This situation still 
prevails today. The gradual decline of Empire and a post-war move towards colonial 
independence heralded the emergence of the 'New Commonwealth'. This represented a 
need to maintain good relations, primarily for issues such as trade, with those countries 
pressing for and achieving independence. 
15 
Nurse recruitment was therefore complicated by a post-World War II social attitude 
towards race and a post-colonial agenda on the part of the Colonial Office, which needed 
to avoid overtly racist behaviour. White European volunteer workers (EVWs), whose 
history is explored in chapter 8, were seen as desirable recruits to British society, even 
though language was a major barrier, an issue not encountered with many colonial 
workers. The former could be assimilated into British society with relative ease, this was 
not only due to their colour but because, unlike with colonial workers, Europeans were 
not British subjects. The MLNS therefore had the ability to select the youngest, fittest and 
usually those without dependents to staff the hospital system from the post-war displaced 
persons camps of Europe. Generally, EVWs were filtered into ancillary roles, although 
the issue of language may in fact have been an important barrier to entering the upper 
echelons of the occupation, rather than overtly racist undertones. EVWs did, however, 
allow the local female population to remain at home, as the new foreign workforce took 
the more unpopular traditional female jobs in domestic hospital work, as well as in textile 
and manufacturing industries. 
The thesis concludes that government workforce policy in nursing did little to develop 
the occupation professionally and focused upon immediate short-term goals. Workforce 
policy emerged during a period of national crisis, which although abating with the end of 
World War II, was replaced with the Conservative government's continued concern at the 
cost of the NHS- This concern was based primarily on the high cost in the initial few 
years, rather than continued monetary escalation. 17 This did little to palliate a largely 
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reactive policy that prevented the expansion of, or change to, the traditional hierarchy of 
nursing, enshrined in the structure of the Whitley Council pay scales. Struggles to 
maintain differentials between the various segments of the occupation formed the centre 
of the workforce policy of the Ministry of Health. This had become increasingly complex 
with the increasing dilution of occupational labour, ushered in through both a gradual 
increase in unqualified nursing auxiliaries and the emergence of the state enrolled 
assistant nurse in 1943. 
In conclusion, this thesis argues that within government workforce policy and planning of 
nursing, in both World War 11 and in the immediate years following, expediency won the 
day. This ensured that long-term objectives to develop a credible career structure for 
nursing were sacrificed to short-term goals. These focused upon areas such as 
recruitment, formed within a reactive and opportunistic policy and subordinated to any 
long-term notion of workforce planning. 
in the early years of World War II, the Ministry of Health and the MLNS had struggled to 
gain control of the management of the nursing workforce, where previously they had 
shown little interest. Much early effort appears to have been wasted appealing to the 
patriotic fervour of women to answer the call to either train or return to nursing. It was 
not until three years after hostilities began that compulsory registration was initiated, 
through the formation of a representative NAC at the MLNS. 
Severe shortages of nurses and a reluctance to direct wartime nursing labour in favour of 
limiting employment opportunities through a Control of Engagement Order, resulted in a 
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workforce crisis that was arguably worse at the end of World War Il than at the 
beginning. The post-war years and the desperate need to staff the new NHS resulted in a 
continuation of a reactive workforce policy, which altered only in its diversification of 
nurse recruitment and the involvement of the Colonial Office. The emphasis on part-time 
schemes and employing male nurses did little to enhance the status of nurses in the NHS, 
or to create a clear career structure. Increasing 'coloured' immigration in the immediate 
post-war years raised government concerns regarding the societal effects. Colonial 
workers were British subjects driven to the motherland by economic hardship. Their use 
in nursing attempted to solve the workforce crisis and allowed a legitimate use of women 
over black men, who were misguidedly perceived as potential troublemakers. The 
approach also supported an essentially unfounded belief on the part of the ministries, that 
trained 'coloured' nurses would want to return home to dissipate their skills. 
EVWs offered a more desirable workforce option, despite the fact that the language 
barrier appears to have led to a severe hindrance to offering public service. The ability to 
limit the flow and direct workers through workforce restrictions: 'landing conditions', 
offered a more controllable solution to the nursing crisis. In reality, EVWs did little to 
augment the nursing workforce, but their ability to be assimilated into the British race, 
due to their white ethnic origins, offered a highly desirable alternative to 'coloured' 
workers. 
Finally, the literature review within this thesis introduces the work of civil servant and 
psychologist Dr John Cohen. 
18 His Minority Report written with the assistance of 
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Geoffrey Pike, and published at the launch of the NHS in 1948 in response to the 
government initiated report into the recruitment and training of nurses (the Wood Report, 
1947), 19 remains one of the most radical critiques of the failings of workforce policy and 
planning in healthcare of the period. The report's analysis of the lamentable lack of 
statistical data on which to base long-term workforce planning in health services and 
notably nursing, is both a reflection on the flaws of government management of nursing 
within the NHS at the time and a salutary reminder of today's continuing workforce 
problems within the occupation. The conclusion reflects on the Minority Report in the 
light of the data analysed in nursing workforce policy and planning of the period, and 
reviews the key themes developed within this thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Historical Context 
This chapter explores the historical background to the current thesis. It examines the 
'laissez-faire' attitude, of government to the worsening nurse recruitment crisis in the 
1930s and the dissatisfaction, expressed by a variety of organisations claiming to 
represent nurse's interests, to conditions of service and pay. This aims to provide the 
reader with an understanding of the issues facing the government when it initially became 
involved in nursing workforce policy and planning, primarily in preparation for air-raid 
casualties on the home-front in 1939. 
The nursing occupation during the period of the 1930s has been explored by a variety of 
historians. ' It represented a time of increasing unrest amongst those who emerged or 
existed to represent the workforce. The supply of nurses gradually increased during the 
decade, as indicated by the number registering with the General Nursing Council (GNC), 
the occupation's regulatory body. The number had in fact more than doubled in the 
eleven years since 1926.2 The demand however was exceeding supply. This can be seen 
through the increasing number of advertisements placed by hospital matrons desperate to 
recruit nursing staff. This increased in the occupation's main journal which held vacancy 
advertisements, 7he Nursing Times, by 10,690 in the three years to 1937.3 The primary 
reasons for this are explored in chapter 5, but included the effects of the 1929 Local 
Government Act which extended the range of services offered to the public by 
transferring hospitals and infirmaries to local government control. 4 
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Hospitals themselves had been excluded from most of the statutes which had been passed 
during the 19d' and early 200' century to regulate the hours and conditions of industrial 
workers. 5 Dingwall et al describe nurses' pay, working environment and terms of 
employment as being largely deter-mined by the play of market forces, together with 
whatever degree of industrial organisation nurses had been able to establish in the face of 
hostile employers. 6 Hospital employers had generally been against the pro-registration 
movement, led primarily by Mrs Bedford Fenwick. This had achieved a Nurses' 
Registration Act in 1919, but only after a series of bills had been unsuccessfully 
introduced to parliament. 7 
The employer's opposition was based upon its reliance on its own trained staff to produce 
the service. In the absence of a national system of credentials for nurses, the voluntary 
hospitals had created what were essentially a series of captive labour markets. The job- 
specific nature of training produced a class of skilled assistants who depended upon that 
particular hospital for employment. If the hospitals allowed the occupation to organise 
itself and create a more homogenous market, they recognised that their influence would 
be matched by a monopolistic supplier of hospitals-8 The hospitals would have to employ 
nurses on terms set by the occupation. In the 1930s, the voluntary hospitals in particular 
were severely short of funds, 
9 and any improvements in the working hours or nurses' pay 
could be ill afforded. The alternative would be financial assistance from the government 
to support salaries and the cost of regulated hours, which could inevitably lead to a long- 
term commitment. 
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By the mid 1930s the national press had become the champions of the nursing cause, 
vividly describing the plight of the nurse and adding to the unrest within the occupation. 10 
Registration itself had not resulted in a homogenous group of workers. The Act produced 
a central register, but a variety of supplementary parts. " In addition were a growing 
number of assistant nurses, who were experienced, but not qualified. It was the 
government initiated Inter-departmental Committee on Nursing Services (the Athlone 
Report), which was published in an interim form in 1939 due to the outbreak of war, that 
tried to eradicate their uncontrolled employment. The report viewed them as a 'definite 
danger to the patients under their care', calling for a second level of nurse through a roll 
of assistant nurses. 12 This was finally placed on the statute books through the 1943 
Nurses Act. 13 The occupation therefore represented a core of registered nurses, who had 
trained for three years, nurses with various skills and qualifications on the supplementary 
part of the register, such as fever nurses and sick children's nurses and those earning their 
living by experience alone. 
This 'hybrid' nature of nursing would create a variety of workforce policy and planning 
issues for the ministries in subsequent years. This was notably through the need to create 
large advisory committees which held members from a variety of organisations all 
representing differing aspects of nursing. Although there was no government inquiry into 
nursing until the Athlone Report in 1939, there were various points where Members of 
Parliament (MPs) attempted to improve working conditions for nurses. Of note, was 
back-bench Labour MP, Fenner Brockway's attempt to pass a private members Bill in 
1930, to establish a maximum 44-hour week and improve the wages, notably of 
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probationers. This was not welcomed by nursing organisations such as the College of 
Nursing. 14 Brockway had failed to involve them in discussions for the Bill, a mistake 
which the MLNS and the Ministry of Health were to make again in the autumn of 1942, 
when planning the more even distribution of the nursing workforce. 15 The College of 
Nursing also rejected Brockway's Bill through their view that the external regulation of 
hours was unprofessional. 16 This view was in contrast to those of the unions. 
In respect of the latter point, the 1930s represented an increasing unionisation and 
militancy within a proportion of the nursing workforce. The Trade Union Congress 
(TUC) emerged into the nursing arena by the mid 1930s, with the creation of an eleven- 
point charter in 1937 to improve pay and conditions for nurses. 17 Thora Silverthome, a 
registered nurse, created the Association of Nurses, which unlike the College of Nursing 
was formed along unions lines, but was created specifically for nurses. 18 The TUC would 
only subsume nurses into its pre-existing membership. In addition, the National 
Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO) and the Guild of Nurses, formed as 
part of the National Union of County Officers, all made provision to represent the various 
elements of nursing-19 This inevitably emphasised the 'hybrid' nature of the occupation. 
Dingwall ct al highlighted the issue, which will be repeated within this thesis, that no one 
group had the power to promote positive change, but many had sufficient to veto them. 
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This fragmentation inevitably played to government inertia, which was able to maintain a 
'laissez-faire' approach, compounded by the varying views on what change should occur, 
and the lack of power in promoting change of any one group. 
23 
The inquiries into nursing during the 1930s were dominated by two reports at the 
beginning and end of the decade. They notably emphasise the point raised later by Dr 
John Cohen, as part of the post-World War II Wood Report which examined the 
recruitment and training of nurses, that planning of nursing services was based more on 
committee opinion than statistical analysis. 21 The Lancet Commission began its work at 
the end of 1930, producing two interim reports which offered details on their findings and 
a final report in 1932, with recommendations. 22 This was the first large scale study of the 
nursing workforce, although the impetus for its work does not remain entirely clear. It is 
interesting to note that it was a private investigation by the medical journal and not by 
government or the College of Nursing. However, the latter provided evidence, and 
Rafferty has argued that with the paucity of good statistical data on the characteristics of 
the nursing workforce and nurses' educational background, the Commission relied 
heavily on the opinion of the College in its recommendations. 23 The commission's terms 
of reference were to inquire into the reasons for the shortage of candidates trained and 
untrained for nursing the sick in general and in special hospitals throughout the country, 
and to offer recommendations for making the service more attractive to women who were 
deemed suitable for the Work. 
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As well as oral and written evidence, a questionnaire was sent to various hospitals. These 
were highly select, and instead of being a truly random sample, they were sent to 
voluntary and municipal hospitals in those counties beginning with the first letter of the 
names of those on the Commission. Only the letters C, K, S or M were chosen. However, 
a random selection of sanatoria were selected, with tuberculosis being an area of notable 
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shortages of nursing staff. This resulted in 1,251 hospitals being sampled. 25 Shortages of 
all grades were reported, with 61% of London voluntary hospitals, and only 6% of 
London and provincial municipal hospitals (approved as training schools), stating that 
they required secondary education, matriculation or the school leaving certificate as the 
educational standard for probationer entry. 26 It simply was not practical for all hospitals 
to enforce this. Attrition was reported as high, with only one quarter of the full 
establishment of probationers in the voluntary hospitals (London and Provincial) passing 
the registration exams in 1930. In the municipal and children's hospitals it was about one 
sixth. In all the hospitals combined, nearly one fifth of Probationers left annually, 
heightening the recruitment drive to replace them. 27 
In the final report it was noted that questionnaires had been sent to sixty nurses in 
training. The questions asked recipients for the reasons for advising girls from their own 
school to undertake nurse training, or not to do so. The report stated that the objections 
raised were much inore numerous than the points in favour of nursing, although many of 
them were deemed of 'a minor character'. Of concern is that the report states the 
recipients were 'for the most part personally known to the members of the Commission 
or to their friends', once again basing recommendations on a wholly biased sample. 28 
The College of Nursing attributed the recruitment problem to an increasing demand for 
nurses and not their SUPPlY. 
29 As highlighted here, this was bom out as the decade 
continued. In addition, the College made the assumption, as Rafferty noted, that nursing 
was losing ground to other middle-class Professions, such as teaching and social work, 
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which were seen as more attractive. 30 No statistical evidence was provided to support 
this, and research by Maggs in the early 1980s examining recruitment in two large 
voluntary hospitals and two poor law infirmaries, suggests that it is unlikely recruits were 
ever drawn in any great numbers from the middle classes. 31 Rafferty in examining the 
publicity material of the College of Nursing in the early 1930s, argues that this was the 
professional ideals proposed, but did not match reality. 32 
The three reports ultimately produced can be criticised, not only for the point which Dr 
Cohen was to later make, but because of its unrepresentative methodology as a basis for 
making plans to solve the unfolding nursing crisis. The report did little to change the 
worsening crisis in nursing beyond raising awareness, less perhaps because of an 
unrepresentative sample which organisations such as the College of Nursing did not seem 
to identify, but because it aimed to adapt rather than radically reconstruct existing 
facilities. 33 Importantly, the financial problems of the voluntary hospitals which were 
heavily represented in the report, resulted in findings which were predominantly confined 
to non-monetary measures. The press response emphasised the varying views and ideals 
of differing groups involved with the nursing occupation. Rafferty argues that the conflict 
of ideals was seen with senior nurses who regarded long hours as an important part of 
training, and those who recognised that the training failed to cater for the intelligent 
girl. 34 The one issue where there seemed to be agreement was raising probationers 
salaries to attract recruits, 
35 but this was not a realistic possibility with the financial state 
of hospitals. 
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Dingwall et al bring together the key elements which, by the end of the 1930s, led to the 
government inquiry into the nursing situation. 36 By the mid 1930s the weight of public 
concern had been heightened by the popular press painting the nurse as the abused 
ministering angel. Industrial militancy had grown, and included staff who as part of the 
Guild of Nurses, had marched down the strand in London. Parliamentary pressure was 
growing for a policy response to the Limitations of Hours Bill. The proposal for this new 
Bill to reduce the nurse's working week to 48 hours had been initiated by the National 
Union of County Officers (NUCO), who persuaded the TUC to organise parliamentary 
sponsorship. " An inquiry by the government would also have the advantage of 
prolonging the period of inactivity, while the Commission reported. 
The subsequent Committee under the chairmanship of the Earl of Athlone, had a wide 
remit to examine the arrangements in regard to nurse recruitment, training, registration, 
and terms and conditions of service for those who nursed the sick . 
38 The report supported 
the issue of increasing demand outweighing supply. 39 The interim document was not in 
fact dissimilar to the TUC charter, with proposals for national machinery to negotiate 
salaries, a 96-hour fortnight and transferable superannuation. It also recommended 
protecting the public through the aforementioned creation of a roll of assistant nurses. 
40 
The financial implication of implementing the report was once again of grave concern. 
World War 11 brought the opportunity for a lack of action, while nursing services began 
to be examined in preparation for first-time air-raid casualties within the United 
Kingdom. 
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In conclusion, the 1930s represented a worsening crisis in British nursing in terms of 
increased unrest through active and diverse unionisation and pressure from the College of 
Nursing for government action. The period represented a 'laissez-faire' attitude to the 
crisis from government, notably because of the financial implications resulting from 
intervention. The report from the Inter-departmental Committee on Nursing Services was 
the result, but it was never published in its full version due to the outbreak of war. Its 
recommendations were not acted upon for three years, until the standardisation of salaries 
across the country through the Rushcliffe Committee. 
41 This was primarily in preparation 
for possible direction of nursing labour, and to enable a greater fluidity of nurses to move 
to areas of greatest shortage. Rafferty has suggested that the instigation of a committee of 
enquiry did not imply zeal on the part of the govcrnment to assume greater financial 
responsibility for nursing services or indeed education. The intervention can be 
understood as a pre-emptive strategy during a period of great unrest in the occupation, 
designed to quell industrial unrest and palliate the deepening crisis in the nursing 
service. 42 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
This section examines historical studies that have explored nursing issues within the 
time period under study, as well as the relationship of the occupation to government 
workforce policy and planning. The aim is to demonstrate how historians of nursing 
have framed the workforce problems encountered by the occupation, the seemingly 
unending riddle of achieving adequate nurse recruitment and nursing's own drive for 
professional status. Once explored, this will provide the framework for arguing that 
the unique contribution of this thesis to the history of nursing workforce policy and 
planning is the detailed exploration of the government approach to managing the 
occupation in World War 11 and in the immediate post-war period. Overall, there still 
remains a paucity of available studies examining workforce policy and planning in 
nursing. Of those that exist, the predominant approach remains an examination of the 
relationship of the nursing organisations with the NIinistry of Health. No previous 
study has explored the different roles played by the three ministries, the interplay 
between them and especially the contribution of the Colonial Office to the recruitment 
crisis of the newly formed National Health Service (NHS) in 1948. 
The thesis argues that there was a discernible division of labour across the ministries' 
functions, defined in the introduction as encompassing three 'Rs'. The Ministry of 
Health addressed issues of 'retention', the Ministry of Labour and National Service 
(MLNS) addressed 'recruitment' and the Colonial Office allowed for increased 
diversification in recruitment, therefore aiding 'replenishment'. An analysis of the 
balance between the three ministries involved in nursing workforce policy and 
planning remains lacking. It is these integrated approaches to wider workforce 
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strategies and sociological attitudes of the time that are considered in the present 
thesis. 
Early histories of nursing have tended to examine nursing against the accepted view 
that the ideal occupational status is that of a profession. Abel-Smith's history of the 
nursing profession published in 1960, focuses primarily on the occupation's attempts 
to achieve the traits that appeared to be the hallmark of professions such as medicine 
and law. ' Early sociological commentators such as Carr-Saunders and Wilson had 
promoted such traits since the 1930s. 2 Although variations in traits have been 
identified by authors, 3,4,5 the list of features is generally consistent. These involved: a 
philosophy of public service and altruism, skills based on theoretical knowledge, 
extensive training or education, a code of conduct for practice; and the issue of self- 
regulation. Prior to the 1970s and the emergence of sociological writers such as 
Freidson 6, Johnson 7, Rothg and Illich et al9, there was no notable criticism of 
professional power over those it served. By the late 1960s, authors such as Etzioni 
(1969) were still claiming that nursing was a 'Semi-profession', with the implicit 
message that all health-care disciplines tended to revolve around the static concept of 
the paradigmatic profession, medicine. 
10 On occasions when nursing analysts 
reviewed their own history, they invariably reported that they were moving nearer to 
achieving their professional ideal. 
' 1,12,13 
Abel-Smith's work was one of the first to address a progressive dilution of labour, 
especially in the post-World War II period. Nursing emerges in his work as 
increasingly dependent on untrained auxiliary nurses, thereby moving the whole 
occupation away from a fully trained and closed Profession. 14 The Royal College of 
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Nursing's (RCN) decision not to oppose a second level of nurse emerging from this 
group, through their support for a regulated assistant nurse, 15 aimed in part to reduce 
workforce competition. Importantly, it attempted to place the new nurse firmly at a 
lower point in the professional hierarchy, by allowing the registered nurse to pursue 
an educationally more privileged and orientated form of nursing. Abel-Smith's thesis 
relies upon the notion of cooptation, and draws attention to the capacity of a domain 
and group within a profession to incorporate potential rivals who threaten their 
interests. He does not attempt to criticise the role of professions, but that is not his 
aim; he elucidates the historical progress of nursing in its goal to achieve professional 
status. 
Therefore in terms of historical studies, Abel-Smith's work is unique in that it still 
remains one of the few to address the issue of the dilution of labour, 16 examining 
more widely the key groups involved in delivering a nursing service. His account 
marked a watershed in the history of nursing since it departed from previous studies, 
which had tended to focus much more narrowly upon professional leadership as the 
agent of change and the controller of nursing's own destiny. Such histories were often 
written and explored in a somewhat eulogistic manner. 17 
Subsequent historical studies of nursing from the 1970s have built upon the 
sociological analysis of the role of professions and their interaction with society. This 
was accompanied by placing the history of nursing within a much wider sociological 
landscape. More recent examples include Davies's examination of the issue of 
professions and professional status. 18 Here Davies looks back at nursing's history 
from the often ignored position of gender. She then considers how nursing has 
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developed within this framework and maps out a future direction. Her argument 
centres around the idea - 'the twist', as Davies calls it - that nursing is not a 
profession but an adjunct to a gendered concept of profession. Nursing is therefore the 
activity that enables medicine to present itself as masculine/rational, and to gain the 
power and privilege of doing so. Nursing's role may not be to become a profession in 
the traditional or conventional sense of the term, but to challenge the gendered basis 
of the concept-19 Davies's work builds on that of medical sociologist Margaret Stacey, 
who espoused 'new professionalism' with its recognition of the differing, but equally 
valuable, role of other healthcare professionals, and the necessary adjustments within 
medicine to the judgement of, and control over, these other groups. 20 This shift also 
includes an altered role for the professional in power relations with the patient. 
The inter-war years 
The time period immediately preceding this study has been relatively well explored. 
This covers the nursing occupation during the 1930s. There is a general consensus in 
work such as Dingwall et al '21 Rafferty, 
22 Hart '23 and Scott, 
24 that while the 
occupation struggled with low pay, long hours and a hierarchical regime in the 
workplace, the government adopted a 'laissez-faire' attitude to workforce planning in 
nursing. Abel-Smith, in his history of the nursing profession, focuses primarily on the 
growth of unionisation in this period and the tension between the aspirations of these 
emerging groups and the College of Nursing (it gained royal patronage in 1939). 25 
However, again he argues that any recommendations for change could be not 
implemented without more money being found for the ailing voluntary hospitals and 
concomitant long-term commitment from the Treasury. 
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Eventually, a government-initiated inquiry was launched and reported, but was 
ultimately aborted as an interim measure due to the outbreak of war in 1939.26 The 
use of an inquiry can also be seen as a method of forestalling action and avoiding the 
financial implications, until all interested parties had been consulted. The reasons for 
the lack of involvement of organised nursing are explored within this thesis and its 
influence on the subsequent workforce strategy explored. Failure to remedy the 
situation resulted in an approach that needed to unite an occupation in readiness for 
air-raid casualties on the home front. However, the numbers of nurses and their 
distribution were not known. Staff numbers were low and matrons had been left to 
deal locally with their own recruitment needs, with no standardised salaries to aid 
mobilisation of the workforce. 
World War 11 
Stams has examined British nursing during World War 11.27 Her work particularly 
focuses upon the Civil Nursing Reserve (CNR), which was utilised to augment the 
nursing numbers. Again, the issue of professional status is introduced, with Starns 
framing the issue around her very personal view that the nursing occupation turned to 
what she defines as 'militarisation' to achieve professional advancement. The work 
highlights the chaos which ensued from ministerial attempts to deploy and distribute 
the nursing workforce in the early war years. This emerged from the unrest that 
differentials in pay created between CNR nurses and those working in the struggling 
hospital system, desperate for nursing staff. A critique of Starns's militarisation 
theory is offered in this thesis in the context of the reluctance of both the Ministries of 
Health and Labour and National Service to resort to direction of labour, and as a 
measure of conscription that one might associate with militarisation. 
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White's Ph. D. thesis and subsequent book examined the effects of the introduction of 
the NHS upon the nursing workforce in the first twenty-three years of the health 
service. 28 Her work explores the effects of bringing together varying groups of nurses 
from previously differing service sectors, such as the voluntary and municipal 
hospitals. To White, the voluntary hospitals regarded their nurses as part of a 
prestigious organisation with 'traditional charisma' and occupational status as 
'ladies'. In the municipal hospitals, where nurses were employed by the local 
authorities, they were regarded as employees and often merely as 'hands'. 29 
White's work focuses less on a progressive dilution of nursing labour, than the effect 
of the NHS in creating a pluralist view of nursing. She argues that the occupation 
emerged into the 1950s as consisting of three broad groups: the generalist nurse, who 
regarded nursing as practical and skills-based; the specialist who saw post-registration 
qualifications as the method of achieving enhanced nursing prestige and status; and 
the nurse administrator. The latter sought greater authority in policy-making, turning 
to bureaucratic values, in competition with the administrators and civil servants. 30 
White suggests that there is no evidence that organisations such as the RCN, and 
indeed the nurses themselves, understood this division of goals 'or the ambiguity in 
their collective search for status. 01 This, White appears to suggest, is seen through the 
suppression of differing dissenting groups within the RCN membership, rather than 
the embrace of a pluralist approach and an attempt to meet the varying needs in the 
post-war years. 
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Against these differing factions she contrasts the government attitude towards 
nursing, and this is again analysed primarily through the Ministry Of Health. For 
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White, the Nfinistry had little regard for nurses and never appeared to see them as 
anything other than a single group; that is, generalists or semi-skilled workers. She 
believes that they were perceived and presented in ministerial documents as only one 
step away from domestic staff: 
'The race, after 1948, to recruit and train as many nurses as quickly as 
possible in order to staff the half-million empty beds meant that the 
emphasis on numbers had to predominate over quality. ' 33 
This idea that nursing was one large group of generalist workers is supported by her 
view that the Ministry of Health followed what is described as a unitary workforce 
policy. The Whitley Council, which set salary scales with both employer and staff 
representatives, provides an example of a system whose aim was primarily to 
maintain differentials between ancillary staff and the lowest grade on the nursing 
structure, the auxiliaries. It adhered to a generalist view of nursing, with nurses seen 
as practical skills based workers, not as specialists in a particular area, therefore 
fitting posts to grades, rather than opening up the grades and fitting these to the posts. 
There was thus no means of encouraging clinical expertise, or rewarding excellence. 
Salary enhancements or leads were only given to nurses working in shortage areas, 
rather than to those with additional training and qualifications. 34 Her argument 
therefore centres on the relationship and subsequent tension between three broad, but 
differing status-seeking groups within nursing, and a reactive, unitary workforce 
approach from the Ministry of Health. Nursing as an occupation, unlike medicine or 
the hospital administrators, had not achieved a clear status or a strong negotiating 
position in the new NHS. 
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What White does not suggest, and partly because it was prior to her study, was that 
nursing as an occupation was highly fragmented before the NHS was formed. White 
contends that following 1948 nursing separated into the three new groups referred to 
above. While the Ministry of Health dominated nursing policy as its primary 
employer, all other nursing institutions, such as the RCN, had to subordinate what 
professional goals they had to the overriding needs of the 'common good. '35 These 
were short-term goals and appear to have been led by a desperate need to staff the 
shortage of beds. There was as a result little regard for the long tenn, and, as far as 
White is concerned, no one questioned the robustness and rationale of these goals, or 
the ways in which they should be achieved. 36 
This reactive policy is identified and discussed within this thesis, with the MLNS 
utilised as a recruitment machine to fuel the NHS nursing workforce needs. Following 
World War II and within the wider confines of the perceived role of women in 
society, the Colonial Office performed the same role with overseas staff. However, in 
contrast to White's assumption that the Ministry of Health saw nurses as semi-skilled 
staff close to the domestic role, the issue in fact may have been more complex. 
This thesis argues that nursing was perceived as a 'hybrid' occupation. This is not 
because the ministries did not see nurses as semi-skilled, generalist workers; indeed 
the MLNS Appointments Department questioned whether nurses were of the 
appropriate professional standing to use its service to gain employment. It was a 
matter of how nurses viewed themselves and could therefore be manipulated. Nurses 
had no unemployment problem and had traditionally found employment through the 
matron of the hospital. The N1LNS had to hide any views of how it saw nurses, to play 
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to the occupation's own view of themselves, encouraging them to utilise MLNS 
employment resources and therefore enable statistical monitoring to be undertaken. 
The NHS may have brought together status-conscious voluntary hospital nurses and 
those employed by the local authorities, but this amalgamation may not have affected 
how the ministries viewed the occupation. Where this thesis differs from that of White 
is its teasing out of consideration of the in-fighting and variety of opinion within the 
ministries, excavated in this thesis for the first time from the primary documents. 37 
These data are analysed within an argument which explores how the ministries 
interacted with each other in the process of policy formulation and implementation, 
and how they viewed and responded to the nursing occupation. 
Scott's Ph. D. study again analyses the relationship between the Ministry of Health 
and the nursing occupation. 38 This is manifest through three organisations, the RCN, 
the Association of Hospital Matrons and the General Nursing Council (GNC). The 
latter set nurse-training requirements and maintained the professional nursing register 
and roll of assistant nurses. Scott's work extends from the formation of the Ministry 
of Health in 1919 until 1968, when it was amalgamated with the Ministry of Social 
Security. Again, the primary focus is upon one ministry, with passing reference to 
other ministerial involvement, notably the RCN's negotiations with the MINS. 
Whereas White addresses the effects of the NHS on the nursing occupation, Scott's 
work is somewhat critical of a politically immature occupation, and a series of missed 
opportunities to work with the Ministry of Health in shaping the emerging post-war 
health services. She concludes that nursing had not been limited in what it wanted to 
achieve by the Ministry of Health or the Civil Service, which is essentially the 
antithesis of White's arguments. 
39 For Scott, the limiting factors, which appear to 
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have prevented the achievement of a strong negotiating position in the NHS, were 
largely of nursing's own making. 
'While the Ministry were developing proposals for fundamental changes in 
public policy and services, the nursing organisations were pursuing 
narrower professional interests isolated from these service demands. The 
civil servants in the Ministry of Health, in frustration at their failure to 
establish satisfactory working relationships with the nursing organisations, 
concluded that the problem lay with the people who held positions of 
leadership. 240 
Scott's argument about the failure of nurse leadership still leaves the issues and 
reasons why under-explored. Although evidence is suggested, and is indeed supported 
in this current thesis, that the RCN worked favourably with the MLNS nurse advisory 
committee, it is not clear from Scott's work why the RCN was so reluctant to work 
closely with the Ministry of Health. This argument goes beyond the implied and 
alleged political naivety and lack of awareness of wider social issues, to an awareness 
of the effect of the NHS upon nursing in the RCN's attempt to regroup and focus on 
the recommendations of the pre-war Athlone Committee. The RCN addressed the 
professional status of the qualified nurse through the later Horder Committee it set up 
itself in 1941, endorsing the curriculum for the new assistant grade of nurse. This was 
an attempt to widen the differentials between trained nurses and unqualified staff, and 
to control the threat posed by the latter. 
This thesis challenges those aspects of Scott's work that suggest the nursing 
leadership failed to engage effectively with policy-makers. Indeed, quite the contrary 
would appear to be the case. The RCN were perhaps less proactive than they could 
have been in taking the opportunity of discussing the NHS White Paper with the 
Minister of Health, Ernest Brown. Symptomatic of their thinking is the statement 
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from the RCN's General Secretary, Frances Goodall, who declared that her committee 
was not concerned with any ministerial or departmental aspect of nursing, but urgent 
professional adjustments. 41 Scott's work attributes the lack of policy focus primarily 
to the poor preparation of nurse leaders who found themselves negotiating with the 
Ministry of Health. Most, she argues, came from the ranks of matrons to the RCN or 
GNC. For Scott, they had undertaken nurse training on leaving school and no further 
general education: 
'They brought with them a knowledge of nursing but little awareness of the 
wider world in which the profession of nursing existed. Also the practice of 
nursing was, at the time those women trained, concerned with carrying out 
practical tasks in response to the directions given by others. It was therefore 
not surprising that those women, who stayed in the profession and attained 
positions of leadership, could not easily consider nursing services within the 
overall context of health PoliCy., 42 
This speculation, unlike White's work, does not take account of what nursing itself 
was trying achieve, beyond what nurses chose to focus upon. In addition, White 
suggests a continued fragmentation occurred within nursing, unlike medicine, which 
inevitably makes negotiations difficult when a variety of needs, particularly those 
required to placate an organisation's membership, have to be met. 
Scott is also critical of nursing within the Ministry of Health. Chief Nursing Officer 
Katherine Watt's division is seen 'as more or less a paper exercise'. 43 The saving 
grace for the occupation appeared to have been Elizabeth Cockayne, Watt's 
successor. She is represented as the founder of the modem division of nursing at the 
Ministry, described as moving day-to-day work from the management of a service to 
an involvement in policy planning for multi-disciplinary and multi-faceted services. 
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Scott's work provides another useful argument and reference point in speculating how 
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negotiations may have progressed, but again takes a narrower perspective of the wider 
workforce management of nursing, by addressing one aspect of a tripartite approach 
to post-war nursing issues. 
Of interest and in contrast to Scott's work is Baly's analysis of Goodall's professional 
life as RCN General Secretary. 45 Scott portrays Goodall as narrow in her vision of 
nursing, looking inwards to professional status, rather than to the wider contribution 
of nursing to an emerging NHS. While Scott argues that the RCN in fact had little 
interest in nursing officers in the Ministry of Health, 46 Baly describes Goodall as: 
The General Secretary, who had done so much to get the College into the 
corridors of power during the war and who had battled for a chief nursing 
officer at the Ministry. Far sighted, and often ahead of her Council, she had 
welcomed the National Health Service and worked hard to get the best deal 
for nurses in what was a chauvinistic, medically orientated world. 47 
Careful reading of Baly's articles calls into question whether this is in fact an 
alternative viewpoint or whether she has achieved what White had wanted to do with 
her analysis of the Ministry of Health. 48 She teased apart the differing voices within 
an organisation, the RCN, seeing light as well as shade. Support for this viewpoint 
comes from Baly's argument that: 
'At the time of the inauguration of the NHS in 1948 most of the profession, 
and particularly the leaders, saw nursing as a vocation and regarded labour 
relations as dirty words. They were not interested in a proper professional 
salary, but clung to the idea of emoluments - preferably tax-free - to 
provide their basic needs. #49 
Of importance to this thesis is Rafferty's final chapter in her exploration of the factors 
which have shaped and limited the development of nurse education from 1860 until 
the formation of the NHS in 1948 . 
50 Emphasis is placed upon Dr John Cohen's 
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Minority Report published in the year that the NHS was formed. 51 This followed 
Cohen's involvement in the government initiated enquiry into the recruitment and 
training of nursing staff (the Wood Report) of the previous year. Cohen felt unable to 
sign this because he felt at least part of the conclusions were not based on sound 
methodological approaches, with statistical resources utilised within the Ministry of 
Health condemned as 'lamentably defective. 52 
The report written with Geoffrey Pike, argued that the traditional Committee approach 
of policy making did not address the intractable problems of nursing. Nursing 
workforce problems could only ever be amenable to solution if examined within the 
context of wider health service developments, with an integrated and comprehensive 
approach to health services, social and economic planning. 53 This was seen as 
fundamental to the optimum use of man and woman power. Poor quality data on 
which to solve the nursing workforce issues in the new NHS were seen as a major 
impediment. The report called for a social research organisation to service 
government departments and to provide a stronger foundation on which to create 
workforce policy in the health service. 54 
Rafferty's highlighting of the Minority Report is significant to this current work for 
several reasons. It emphasises an early and radical critique of government workforce 
policy and planning at the beginning of the NHS, that was essentially ignored. This 
was in favour of a reactive and primitive workforce policy approach based on the 
short-term gains of a blanket approach of mass recruitment. Cohen's work is 
supported within this thesis with a detailed exploration of how the ministries managed 
the nursing workforce within a poorly developed policy, the roles that each undertook 
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in this area and how they viewed the occupation. Despite the passing years, the 
Minority Report still remains a salutary reminder of the inadequacies in current 
workforce planning within the nursing occupation. 
In conclusion, previous historical studies have examined many of the key elements 
involved in the overall workforce policy of nursing, such as solving the recruitment 
problem and achieving professional status. Early studies, especially internalist 
accounts, were narrow in representing nurse leaders as the key to the occupation's 
destiny. This thesis argues that the history of the professions is inextricably linked to 
examinations of the history of nursing and to workforce policy and planning. Abel- 
Smith widened the focus of previous nursing histories by addressing the dilution of 
labour as the framework for the occupation's attempts to achieve professional status, 
while attempting to solve the recruitment problem. Later studies began examining 
nursing within a wider social context of changing needs for the service and the 
general influence of government policy. This, however, aside from Rafferty beginning 
to highlight the inadequacies in post-war government workforce policy and planning 
in nursing, is the first study to examine the wider and more detailed role of the 
different ministries and their interactions with professional bodies and trade unions 
within the area of managing the nursing occupation. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter will explore the methodological approach adopted in the study, within 
the context of the quantitative/qualitative debate in the study of history. The role of 
historical research in nursing will be considered against the backdrop of its link to 
current nursing policy. The research aim and objectives will be outlined, with an 
exploration of the differing data sources and the methods of collection. In particular, 
the value of a modified form of triangulation, cross-referencing through the use of a 
variety of primary and secondary sources exploring the same event is considered, to 
strengthen the arguments being presented. 
The quantitative/qualitative debate in nursing research 
Historical research is generally regarded as part of the qualitative paradigm. This is 
not only because of its generation of a rich narrative as opposed to numerical data, but 
because of the subjective interpretation which the historical researcher employs, 
resulting from the often fragmented data which have survived to the present day. 
However, historical research is not exclusively a qualitative endeavour. The formation 
of the cliometric society in 1983 is an example of an academic organisation utilising 
quantitative methodology through economic theory and statistical techniques to study 
economic history. 
I 
Within historical research, debate has occurred, notably since the early 1960s, 
regarding the ability of historians objectively to capture past events. Carr and Elton 
are generally presented as representing the polar positions in this debate. Carr 
proposed that the study of history could not be the collection and organisation of 
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objective facts. Historians inevitably brought their own interpretation to events, 
together with the influence of their contextual surroundings. Munslow of 
Staffordshire University reinforces this point, arguing that: 
'Every historical interpretation is just one more in a long chain of 
interpretations, each one usually claims to be closer to the reality of the past, 
but each one merely another transcription of the same events, with each 
successive description being the product of the historian's imposition at the 
level of the trope, enplotment, argument and ideology. 3 
Elton sounded the opposing argument with his staunch belief that the study of history 
should be the search for an objective truth regarding the past. 4 Carr set his students 
along the sociological path to find out about historians as the key to understanding 
accounts of history. Alternatively, Elton set store by the potential of the written record 
to reveal its essence through the evidence, and to exclude the historian's interests and 
influences from the past. 5 The emergence of post-modernism. has added to the debate, 
with a number of authors rejecting the idea that there is such a thing as historical 
'truth' at all. 6 
The role of historical research in nursing 
Historical research within nursing remained limited to a somewhat self-centred and 
self-congratulatory approach for a significant number of years following the 
emergence of the Nightingale cult and its influence upon the occupation. Early 
histories, usually written by nurse reformers and their supporters, tended to synthesise 
existing knowledge rather than produce new knowledge through investigation. 7 
Rafferty, in reviewing the evolution of historical perspectives within nursing, ' argues 
that the eulogistic quality of early histories, present in works such as Nutting and 
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Dock's (1907-12) history of nursing, 9 generally extolled the pioneering efforts of 
nurse leaders struggling heroically to further the cause of their occupation in the face 
of adversity. McPherson, in examining the development of Canadian nursing, 
reinforces this by arguing that this traditional interpretation has influenced much of 
the scholarship generated within nursing itself This has generally been a focus on the 
process of professionalisation, with the struggle for professional legitimation and 
status. 10 McPherson's point emphasises how history can infon-n scholarly activity, 
while a particular perspective may not address all of the wider, external issues, which 
influence nursing's development and thus future pathway. 
Rafferty argues that these early approaches were somewhat self-defeating for an 
evolving occupation because they looked inwards, representing professional 
leadership as the agent of change and controller of its own destiny. This suggests that 
such an approach does little to advance nursing practice and notably leadership, 
because it may paradoxically obscure rather than clarify the factors which inhibit 
nurses from taking command of this, their own destiny. ' 1 The hallmark of these early 
studies appears to be an idealistic history written as a progressive linear narrative. It 
may not, however, take account of advances in nursing leadership, which may 
subsequently be lost with changing political approaches. The advent of general 
management in the 1980s and its effect on nursing offers an example. 12 A lack of 
critical analysis of the impact of wider social forces upon the occupation may produce 
a history which lacks not only validity, playing down tensions and conflict between 
competing bodies, but also offers no useful starting point for analysing the current 
potential affects of change. 
45 
The 1960s represented a watershed in the application of differing approaches to the 
study of nursing history, notably emanating from those outside the profession. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Abel-Smith, an economist, examined nursing's 
history from the beginning of the I 9th century and adopted materialist approaches to 
his study. He based his research on the pragmatic approach of nursing as paid work. 13 
Baly, although a nurse of some standing, placed the occupation within a wider sphere 
of a social and economic context, leading the way for more innovative approaches to 
nursing history. 14 Dingwall et al's located nursing within the context of government 
policy and applied sociological insights to the historical data. Davies, a sociologist, 
has examined the occupation from the perspective of the politics, class and gender 
affecting its development. 16 The latter issue is explored in her text Gender and the 
Professional Predicament of Nursing. Davies's argument framed nursing's historical 
relationship with medicine within the concept of gender and the criticism of 
professions. 
Rafferty argues that in early histories it was taken for granted that the interests of the 
leadership writing the account were synonymous with those of the rank and file of the 
occupation. 17 The possibility of inconsistencies, which in reality symbolised the 
growing fragmentation of nursing as an occupation in the 1930s, through emerging 
multi-union representation, is rarely, if ever, considered. Similarly, the emergence of 
feminist writers in nursing history, such as Summers, 18 now lends itself to the 
possibility of examining previously unpalatable issues such as the oppression of 
women by women and its possible affect on areas such as recruitment. The latter 
possibility had some resonance with findings from official documents considered in 
this thesis. 19 By allowing the history of nursing to be open to interpretation from a 
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variety of perspectives, and importantly from those outside nursing, the occupation 
can explore those factors which have shaped, and continue to shape, professional 
development in a more critical and comprehensive way. Fashions in historical 
research affected by changing social attitudes have resulted in the re-emergence of 
figures such as black nurse pioneer Mary Seacole from the historical wilderness. Such 
issues may have led to the desire to explore black history in nursing and the wider 
society, as indicative of a more culturally tolerant Britain, but also to the submergence 
of the contribution of poor, white European workers to nursing, notably the European 
volunteer workers (EVWs) explored in this thesis. 
Scope of the thesis: the research aims and objectives 
The introduction to this thesis has highlighted that this research explores the 
governmental policy-making approaches towards the British nursing workforce from 
the beginning of World War II, until the end of the participation of the Ministry of 
Labour and National Service (MLNS) in 1957. The study examines the functions of 
the ministries involved in nursing, and the factors influencing the approach to policy- 
making activities, formulation and implementation. It explores how their distinct roles 
evolved, were negotiated and operated in respect of the occupation and in relation to 
each other. 
A form of modified triangulation, the use of multiple sources examining the same 
event, is used within this thesis. This is used to both verify the arguments made and to 
track the often covert decision-making which can be the cornerstone of policy 
analysis. This is primarily through a variety of differing primary sources, such as the 
minutes of meetings, internal memoranda and letters. This is particularly important 
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because this thesis examines the workforce policy of three British ministries involved 
in managing the national nursing workforce during World War II, and in the 
immediate post-war years. These are the MLNS, the Colonial Office and the Ministry 
of Health. It will be argued that each ministry had a distinctive role, but that this was 
not mutually exclusive. A combination of what Rafferty refers to as 'multiple realities' 
is useful in teasing apart and tracking the pathways of decision-making involved in 
policy formulation and implementation. 20 
The thesis argues that following a period of 'laissez-faire' towards workforce policy 
in the nursing occupation in the 1930s, two principal ministries became involved with 
the nursing occupation during World War Il. These were the Ministry of Health and 
latterly, from 1942, the MLNS. The former was primarily involved in managing 
conditions of service and retention, while the latter launched and maintained an 
extensive recruitment campaign, utilising policy approaches such as a Control of 
Engagement Order and Direction of Labour. This demonstrated highly pro-active 
workforce planning in an attempt to enhance the service during wartime hostilities. 
As war ended, the reactive recruitment policy was augmented by the involvement of a 
third ministry, the Colonial Office. While the MLNS recruited overseas hospital 
ancillary staff to relieve nurses of their duties, in addition to some nurse candidates, 
from those left destitute in Europe following war, the Colonial Office took advantage 
of a worsening economic crisis in parts of the colonies to recruit staff for British 
hospitals. The complexity and often contradictory factors relating to race, the need for 
women to return to the home and rear the Post-war generation (the Beveridge ideal), 
within a context of a severe shortage of workers are explored. These issues all form 
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three overarching objectives, which are operationalised in the relevant chapters 
dedicated to the ministries involved in managing the British nursing workforce. The 
aim of the thesis is to explore the governmental approach to managing the nursing 
workforce during World War II and in the immediate post-war period. The objectives 
are: 
To consider the roles of the different ministries involved in both nurse 
recruitment and in managing conditions of service during this time period; 
To compare the division of labour between each ministry and how their areas 
of functional overlap were negotiated; and 
op To identify the factors which drove and influenced government policy in 
managing nurse recruitment and conditions of service, including how the 
ministries viewed and responded to the nursing occupation. 
Sources 
The data for this study and its examination of government workforce policy in nursing 
are derived from both primary and secondary sources. A small number of oral 
histories were also taken in the early part of the thesis, related to the impact of the 
Salmon Committee's recommendations for senior nursing management on the hospital 
system in 1966. These interviews were undertaken with staff who were at sister and 
charge-nurse level, with a male member of staff having been a nursing officer newly 
appointed at a pilot site for the report. These oral histories were enlightening, but were 
subsequently not used as they ultimately extended beyond the final time period of the 
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study. However, they were useful reference points in understanding what was 
accomplished in developing a career structure for nursing and the potential to address 
long-standing problems related to leadership in the nursing occupation. Consideration 
was given to interviewing key figures who would have been involved in the policy 
making process within the three ministries of this study. After initial examination, 
through various contacts such as unions and professional organisations, it became 
apparent that many would have been towards their middle years at the time of the 
study, and were no longer alive. 
So far this chapter has emphasised the growing and varied historical perspectives to 
nursing history. In the initial stages of the thesis these were accessed to provide both a 
useful overview of the immediate pre- and post-World War 11 time period for nursing, 
and to examine what arguments and subject material had already been explored. In 
addition to the use of secondary sources, a rich variety of primary sources were used. 
This was particularly important in examining the post-war government policy of 
utilising European and colonial people for both nursing and other public services, 
such as transport, but also in agriculture and the textile industry. The 'moving here' 
website, a project offering a database of photographic, document, audio and oral 
histories of migration to Britain over a 200-year period was extremely valuable. 21 This 
resource brings together items from 30 local and national archives, museums and 
libraries, but was lacking in the experiences of EVWs who were used within nursing 
in the post-war period. The Mary Seacole Centre for Nursing Practice, an academic 
centre within the Faculty of Health and Human Science at Thames Valley University, 
was also useful, primarily in accessing staff for further data searches. Newsreel 
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footage was also utilised, notably through the British Pathe archive, 22 together with 
photographic sources such as the Hulton Getty library in London. 23 
A valuable and unusual source was the original calypso recordings made in London in 
the immediate post-war years, by artists such as 'Lord Kitchener' and 'Lord 
Beginner'. 24 The decision to examine this source of data stemmed from newsreel 
footage of 'Lord Kitchener' (Aldwyn Roberts) singing to the waiting camera teams as 
the Empire Windrush docked in Tilbury. 25 These men had arrived in 1948 looking for 
work and the lyrics to their songs explore life for colonial workers in London. These 
range from a celebration of the 'mother country' through to treatment by dubious 
landladies, rationing and stereotyped assumptions of 'coloured' labour: If you're not 
white, you're considered black. 26 It is known that two of the men aboard the Empire 
Windnish were given work in nursing. 27 
The predominant sources for this study involved the investigation of primary data 
from a variety of public archives. Ministerial files from the Ministry of Health, the 
MLNS and the Colonial Office were examined in detail from 1937 until 1959. The 
year 1937 demarcated both a period of heightened unrest and unionisation in nursing, 
as well as government preparation for war and possible air-raid casualties on the 
home front. This marked a turning point in the involvement of, initially, the Ministry 
of Health in organising the national nursing workforce, which had previously been 
left to its own devices and the vagaries of the market. Public records for the MLNS, 
the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Health are housed at the Public Record Office 
(the National Archives) in Kew, west London. This was by far the largest data source 
utilised, with the archive also housing a useful reference library, containing secondary 
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sources of published histories, and details of the staffing of ministerial departments 
through the annual "itaker's Almanack . 
28 The 30-year rule, which prevents access 
for this time period from the date of the last document in the file, did not prove a 
major problem because this study terminates at the end of the 1950s. However, it did 
produce some problems in accessing files examining changing trends in the 
employment of black nurses as state-enrolled nurses, as one of the related files 
contained documents until 1974 extending (when that section was studied) into the 
last 30 years. 
Additional documentary material came from the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) 
archive in Edinburgh. This contains a variety of minutes, published documents and 
photographs from the organisation's history, as well as collections from their affiliated 
groups, such as the Association of Hospital Matrons. These were invaluable in 
tracking the effects of government policy at the grassroots level of nursing practice. 
The Modem Records Centre at the University of Warwick was visited early in the 
writing of this thesis, for background reading regarding the unions representing 
nursing, such as the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the Confederation of Health 
Service Employees (COHSE). Public attitudes to wider social change were seen 
through the anthropological surveys of the Mass Observation archives at the 
University of Sussex, Brighton. Local effects of changing workforce policies in 
nursing were noted through hospital records. These included minutes of meetings, but 
more frequently matrons' letters and ledgers of staff training with matrons' comments. 
A great deal of this material for the London area is housed in the London 
Metropolitan Archive. 
52 
Use of sources 
This section offers an insight into the use of primary and secondary sources as data, 
their limitations and how this may be reduced by a method such as triangulation. 
Secondary sources are valuable in providing both an overview of past events, 
particularly their chronology, and in offering differing interpretations on the same 
subject. As highlighted, with the differing perspectives now emerging in historical 
studies in nursing, this can broaden the researcher's armory of interpretative 
possibilities surrounding past events. The limitation of secondary sources is the 
inevitable editing of events and the imposition of a particular interpretation. However, 
it is fair to argue that this also occurs with the creation of some primary data such as 
the minutes of a meeting, where every comment will never be captured verbatim and 
is subject to editing and the writer's interpretation. 
Despite this issue, primary sources proved invaluable in indicating how policy 
agendas were set and equally how certain positions and evidence were excluded. This 
was a point made by Cutler in his study of the problem definition and policy response 
to the early costing of the National Health Service (NHS). 29 The limitations of 
primary data not only relate to what has survived, but what was recorded in the first 
place and why there may have been prudent editing or omissions. Cutler also argues 
that in modem state departments the volume of work necessarily means that a 
substantial devolution of decision making to officials at the lower levels of the policy 
machine occurs. 
30 In arguing this point he refers to Michael Roper, the former 
Principal Assistant Keeper at the Public Record Office. Roper offers a useful guide 
regarding how policy-making can occur through differing pathways. 3 1 This requires 
the historian to consider a variety of sources to more readily capture who was 
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involved, the arguments made and how these ultimately influenced the final policy 
approach. Roper suggests looking at policy 'initiation, development and execution'. 32 
It may seem evident that ministerial initiative in policy making can be ascertained 
from records of the Cabinet and its committees, but a notable feature of World War Il 
was the role of non-departmental ministers. This reflects the positions of such 
ministers as the chairmen of Cabinet committees and as co-ordinators of major 
policies which might cut across departmental boundaries, as well as their personal 
status and interests. 33 
Roper highlights that the initiation of a Cabinet paper by a minister does not 
necessarily mean that he was the real instigator of the policy which he is putting 
forward. He argues that it is therefore important to seek beyond the Cabinet records to 
ascertain whether the minister himself, or his department, or some outside source was 
the real initiator. 34 This of course presumes that there is an underpinning policy of 
workforce development and planning, with this thesis arguing that prior to World War 
Il it was difficult to discern this emerging from the government. Roper's discussion of 
casting the net broadly is useful in capturing workforce policy and planning for 
nursing, notably when ministries appear to be vying for the control of differing areas 
such as the recruitment of staff. Policy-making may therefore be influenced by 
varying viewpoints, with the ultimate policy shaped by yet further factors such as 
financial implications, all of which will emerge through differing files of primary 
sources. The latter was a key feature of the relationship between the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of Labour and National Service in the immediate post-war 
years (see chapter 4). This said, primary sources can offer an insight into the 
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individual filtering role of civil servants which, in turn, can relate to the political 
stance of such individuals or to a departmental view. 35 
Throughout this thesis it can be noted that correspondence, minutes and documents of 
the time period held a formality perhaps viewed as alien today. First names were 
rarely used, even with colleagues who obviously had quite close working 
relationships. 'My dear Jones' may have started a letter, but first names rarely entered 
usage. Even Hitaker's Almanack 36 offered only the initials of civil servants, with 
No's Tno 37 offering the most likely answer to full names, if the person was within 
its pages. Therefore, occasionally first names are used for the more significant figures 
within workforce policy and planning of nursing, but generally the conventions of the 
time are adhered to. 
Finally and in addition, the importance of memoranda and interdepartmental notes, 
comments and marginalia often jotted on more formal correspondence and providing 
further valuable material, lies in the inability of both official documents and minutes 
to capture either the full discussion-making process, or inevitably to present a 
consensus decision. Through the use of a variety of primary documents, particularly 
surrounding the same event, a fuller, more valid interpretation is possible. In 
methodological terrns this can be tenned as a modified form of triangulation, because 
essentially it is using variations of the same data source, rather than completely 
different types. It can however, greatly assist historical research in understanding 
points of tension within or relating to a range of different perspectives. This is 
reassuring to the researcher endeavouring to develop an argument, and in offering 
some guidance in a process which at times can seem like a journey without maps. 38 
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Chapter 5: The Recruitment and Retention of the Nursing Workforce in World 
War 11 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the workforce strategies utilised by the Ministries of Health and 
Labour and National Service within the occupation of nursing during World War 11. The 
overall aim of the strategies was to rectify the severe shortage of nurses through 
recruitment drives and to address the perceived problems in distribution. This was prior 
to the anticipated German air-raids on Britain. Ministry officials appeared to view 
nursing as an entirely unique occupation and for the purposes of this chapter the 
workforce will be termed a 'hybrid, due to its mix of qualified and unqualified nurses. 
This presented difficulties for officials in categorising nursing as either a group of 
workers to be dealt with through the Labour Exchanges, or as a profession more 
amenable to the newly created Appointments Department. 
This chapter explores how the Ministry of Labour and National Service (MLNS) was 
able to utilise a carefully constructed consensual approach to deal with the nursing crisis, 
which acknowledged the uniqueness of the occupation, in order rapidly to introduce 
intense recruitment campaigns and workforce controls. The chapter argues that the 
Nursing Advisory Council (NAC), set up by the MLNS and composed of ministry staff 
and representatives of nurses and employers, was used to achieve this approach, but can 
be considered as a smoke-screen for centralisation of health services and control of 
nursing workforcc and policy. 
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Wartime management of nursing can be divided into two distinct periods. Initially, in the 
early war years, the Ministry of Health attempted to increase recruitment through the 
creation of a reserve of nurses, the Civil Nursing Reserve (CNR). This was handled 
poorly, resulting in discrepancies between their salaries and those of civilian nurses and a 
period of approximately a year, during which nurses waited for casualties that did not 
materialise. This contributed both to the deterioration in nursing morale and to the 
difficulties in maldistribution, as civilian nurses struggled with increasingly low numbers 
of staff. The second period covers the involvement of the MLNS, which reluctantly had 
to consider a series of increasingly restrictive workforce controls, such as a direction of 
labour, as the nursing crisis worsened. The reluctance to impose workforce controls 
reflected a reticence on the part of the Minister of Labour, Ernest Bevin, to direct any 
group of workers, but notably nurses, whom he and other officials considered to be 
engaged in a vocational occupation. 
In adding to the difficulties in managing the workforce, throughout the pre-war years 
nursing had experienced an increasing shortage of staff, low morale and poor pay, yet 
government involvement had been virtually non-existent. Nursing had been left to the 
vagaries of market forces, and now the ministries were attempting to deal with the crisis 
and hoping to court cooperation from an occupation they had previously largely ignored. 
The occupation had always dealt with its own recruitment problems at a local level, with 
the result that there were no national statistics regarding workforce numbers or 
distribution. Nursing was also a newcomer to the MLNS in a time of increasing national 
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crisis. It had no unemployment problems and no real need to utilise the placement 
services of the Ministry. 
The NAC ostensibly invited what appeared to be a consensual approach, but in reality 
used senior nurses and employers to filter through increasingly severe controls to a wary 
workforce. Evaluation of these methods reveals that they were ultimately ineffective and 
the nursing crisis was as bad at the end of the war, in the run-up to the nationalisation of 
the health service, as it had been at the outbreak of hostilities. The reasons for this 
apparent 'failure' are explored. 
The nursing workforce at the outbreak of war 
By the outbreak of World War II it was clear that there was an acute shortage of nurses, 
yet from a national perspective there were no workforce statistics for the country as a 
whole. Yhe Nursing Times estimated in 1938, supported by figures from the occupation's 
regulatory body, the General Nursing Council (GNC), that an additional 10,000 nurses 
were needed to enter the occupation each year to staff the hospitals. ' The journal, which 
advertised the majority of nursing vacancies, carried 6,429 advertisements in 1934, but 
this had risen sharply to 17,119 by 1937 .2 It was not until the post-war era that the 
Working Party on the Recruitment and Training of Nurses, (the Wood Report: 1947), 
estimated retrospectively that the male and female civilian nursing workforce had been 
approximately 158,000 in 1938.3 Only 79,000 of these were trained nurses or midwives, 
while the rest were experienced staff who were unqualified and were used in a variety of 
roles at the discretion of the matron or ward sister. 4 Their lack of job clarity was 
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demonstrated through various titles ranging from assistant or auxiliary nurse, to nursing 
orderly. 
The primary issue was not a drop in nurses qualifying, but a sharp increase in the demand 
for their services. In 1926,4,269 nurses sat the final state registration examinations, yet 
this number, in 1937, had more than doubled, to 9,5165 The government-initiated interim 
report chaired by the Earl Athlone in 1939 had examined the nursing services and 
concluded that a variety of factors had resulted in the rise in demand. The greatest effect 
was noted as the Local Government Act of 1929, which transferred hospitals and 
infirmaries to local government control, extending the range of services offered. The 
public were also using nursing services to a greater degree, with a larger number of 
patients described somewhat nebulously as the 'acute sick'. Other factors included the 
development of medical techniques, with those undergoing 'x-ray and heat therapy' seen 
as requiring constant nursing care. Marriage was noted as a drain on nursing numbers, 
with a high number of nurses ceasing practice once married. 6 
Throughout the 1930s the shortage of nurses, together with unsatisfactory working 
conditions, came to the fore both in the popular press and through an increase in the 
number of organisations claiming to represent nurses' interests. The Royal College of 
Nursing (RCN), which gained royal patronage in 1939, was formed in 1916 and 
represented approximately 29,000 registered nurses by 1938.7 Its philosophy was that of 
an organisation created by and for nurses, which saw nursing as a profession in a similar 
vein to medicine. As such there was no place for the political and radical ideology of a 
59 
Trade Union, with nursing seen as a scientific and philanthropic profession. This 
professional ideology reinforced middle-class values and displayed itself in the belief that 
students should not be paid high salaries, because they were ultimately training for a 
8 profession. Such an approach would inevitably reinforce a recruitment policy which 
would only attract those who had additional monetary support for the three-year training. 
The vocational and altruistic element in nursing was reflected in a rejection of attempts 
by the RCN to legislate working hours, on the basis that a nurse could not merely leave 
the patient when a certain hour was reached. 9 
Press campaigns highlighting the plight of nurses through their long hours, low salaries 
and what were seen as the petty restriction in work and private lives emerged from the 
mid 1930s. 10 Students predominantly lived in hospital accommodation, as did many 
qualified nurses, and the nurses' home was presided over by a home sister enforcing strict 
rules. Against this background of concern, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) convened a 
Joint Advisory Council for the nursing profession by the end of 1937, having previously 
shown little interest in nursing. " Their eleven-point charter to improve nurses' work 
conditions formed the focal point of a campaign that proved a stimulus to increased 
unionisation. 12 Nurses were represented not only by the TUC: Thora Silverthorne, a 
registered nurse, created the Association of Nurses in 1937 within a Trade Union 
philosophy, which subsequently sought affiliation with the TUC. 13 
The overwhelming problem with unionisation was its fragmentation. A range of 
organisations claimed to represent nurses, swelling its numbers with those who nursed, 
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but may not have been qualified. These included the National Association of Local 
Government Officers (NALGO) and the Guild of Nurses, the latter being a branch of the 
National Union of County Officers. Rafferty notes that such fragmentation ultimately and 
perhaps inevitably weakened the overall union effectiveness during this period. 14 In 
addition, the disparity of those representing nursing resulted in no one group having the 
power to promote positive changes, but many having sufficient clout to veto them. 15 
There were a variety of issues emerging during this time that impacted on the wartime 
organisation of nurses. The outbreak of war would mean for the first time the occurrence 
of air-raid casualties on the home front, yet there remained no statistics regarding overall 
nursing numbers, the distribution of nurses, and no national method to plan recruitment 
or to distribute the workforce. The RCN maintained a register of vacancies and applicants 
for nursing jobs, but membership did not cover all those who were nursing for a living. 16 
At the outbreak of war the Local Emergency Organisations, which covered a county or 
county borough and which usually met under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Health, 
held a register of vacancies and of what were termed 'immobile nurses'. The latter were 
those who could only work within a small radius of their home, usually owing to 
domestic reasons. 17 Recruitment was generally left to the individual hospital or institution 
and commonly to the matron, who advertised in the local press or, more usually, The 
Nursing Times. 
Despite this increasing unrest, the 1930s was characterised by a 'laissez-faire' attitude 
towards nursing from the government. Only the threat of casualties on the home front 
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seemed to stimulate action to organise, and improve the nursing situation. Why the 
government took such a hands-off approach throughout this period is unclear. Rafferty 18 
contends that the nursing workforce issues were complex, with the government seeing 
many 'political and sociological variables' as a disincentive to intervention. Doubtless 
economic implications were very much to the fore, but stalling action could offer two 
main advantages. It could distance the government from the immediate political pressure 
and provide the opportunity for any subsequent action to be represented as independent 
rather than reactive. Any thorough investigation of the nursing workforce could also have 
significant economic implications, while unfavourable comparisons with other forms of 
employment may have generated pressure for state expenditure. 
The eventual Inter-departmental Committee's report (the Athlone Report), remained in 
an interim form owing to the outbreak of war. It was in fact never published in its 
entirety. None of its recommendations, which included a move towards a 96-hour 
fortnight, the creation of a roll of assistant nurses to regulate the vast numbers of 
unregistered nurses, and a committee to set national pay scales, was implemented for 
three years. 19 The last-mentioned feature was the first to take effect and this may be seen 
less as an altruistic gesture, than a need, if required, to effectively direct nurses to areas of 
shortage. This would have been severely hindered without standardised scales of pay. A 
Control of Engagement Order, followed by an extension of workforce direction to 
nursing, was able to occur within a year of national salary scales being set by the 
Rushcliffe Committee. This committee, as will be discussed, was set up in October 1941 
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by the Ministry of Health with representatives of nurses and employers to examine 
national salary scales for nursing for the first time. 
Nursing emerges as a 'hybrid' occupation at this time. It consisted of a core of qualified 
nurses represented by the RCN and an outer shell of various experienced but unqualified 
staff, producing fragmentation in terms of representation and an inability to unite in a 
strong, unidirectional way. This may have added to the government's lack of urgency in 
dealing with the increasing unrest in the nursing workforce. However, as war appeared 
more likely, with the prospect of civilian casualties at home, the primary issue became 
the government's need to consider workforce strategies in an occupation acutely short of 
staff and increasingly demotivated. A stark U-turn needed to be effected from the pre-war 
years where nursing had been left to its own devices and to the vagaries of market forces. 
Disarray and disorganisation 
The initial government move from the 'laissez-faire' approach of the 1930s to mobilising 
the nursing workforce to contend with the possibility of air-raid casualties was 
immensely problematic. Initially the Ministry of Health was utilised rather than the 
MLNS. This was probably a more pragmatic move, as the issue of mobilising the nursing 
workforce began in 1938, prior to the Minister of Labour being granted legislative 
powers in May of 1940 to direct workers to areas of required work or service. 20 The issue 
of nurses being directed by a ministry more associated with industrial and factory 
workers, rather than aspiring professions, will be discussed shortly. However, as one of 
the initial problems with mobilising nurses was the need for heavy dilution with 
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unqualified staff to augment numbers, and a rapidly emerging maldistribution of the 
workforce through the creation of the CNR, it is unlikely at this stage whether resistance 
to potential direction was considered. 
Starns, in reviewing the immediate pre- and wartime experiences of nurses, has described 
nursing services at the outbreak of war as being 'on the verge of total breakdown', with 
'chaos on the home front'. 21 The acute shortage of nurses hampered the situation, with 
the government attempting to increase numbers by forming a CNR and utilising the 
voluntary aid detachment nurses (VADs). The latter were unqualified nurses who had 
nursing experience and as a workforce had been utilised in World War 1. VADs were 
trained by the Red Cross, most having received a minimum of 12 lectures on first aid and 
22 50 hours of practical nursing experience in a hospital. The government formed a Central 
Emergency Committee for nursing in late 1938. This would advise the Ministry of Health 
on nursing matters and assist with organising the reserve nurses. The Committee's remit 
also included the creation and maintenance of a register'of all nurses and nursing 
assistants who were prepared to offer their services in an emergency. The Committee was 
also required to maintain a ftirther register of nursing auxiliaries. Starns maintains the 
Committee only contained five trained nurses. Three of the five were the matrons-in- 
chief of the armed forces, who were generally preoccupied with organising their own 
services. 23 
The Committee was disbanded at the end of 1939 amongst a general feeling of 
disorganisation, with the national press heightening concerns with stories of discontent 
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towards the CNR amongst nurses. Terms and conditions for the latter had not been 
agreed and were not published until August 1939, with nurses reluctant to commit their 
services until this had occurred. The acute shortage of qualified nurses resulted in 
inexperienced VADs manning first-aid posts and casualty clearing stations. Added to this 
was the lack of hostilities for the first year of the war, what became known as the 'phoney 
war', resulting in a bizarre maldistribution problem, with nurses waiting to serve while 
there was an acute shortage in the civilian nursing service. 24 The issue of maldistribution 
was seen as a major concern in both meeting nursing service needs and avoiding low 
morale amongst nurses. A. W. Neville, Principal Assistant Secretary of the Ministry of 
Health, expressed this concern in January 1940, with the 'great majority' of CNR nurses 
standing by in reserve. He feared 'there may be a tendency for them to melt away'. 25 He 
suggested one person from the regional local Emergency Committee to act as an 
6organiser', using local groups, regular meetings and practices to maintain intereSt. 26 Yet 
it was over a year later, at an 'exploratory' meeting with representatives of the RCN, 
commissioned medical officers, and the Secretary and Parliamentary Secretary of the 
Ministry of Health, that it was thought wise for the CNR Advisory Council to launch a 
campaign for more mobile members. The rationale for this morale-boosting move was 
seen as the lack of a need to wait for a post, because nurses could be sent where they 
27 
were needed . This move was soon agreed as an appointment PoliCy. 
28 
Tbc Minister of Health, Walter Elliot, subsequently convened a CNR Advisory Council 
with 14 nurse representatives. This included a wider spread of advisory staff, from the 
RCN, Association of Hospital Matrons and the GNC. They met monthly from 1940, and 
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regional nursing officers were allocated to a series of civil-defence regions to coordinate 
the allocation of reserve nurses. 29 Despite this, discontent with the CNR continued. The 
salary discrepancies between registered nurses in the CNR and the hospital system 
remained a source of tension. Trained nurses in the CNR were paid E90 per annum for 
whole-time service. This was in addition to board, lodging and laundry, or an amount to 
cover this cost. The latter would be one guinea a week for board and lodging, and 3s 6d a 
week for laundry. 30 On average only E70 per annum was paid to the same class of nurse 
within civilian hospitals. Many nurses consequently left the hospitals to join the CNR, 
exacerbating distribution problems. 31 The issue was further hampered by prolonged 
negotiations between the Ministry of Health and various parties, including the British 
Hospitals Association and the King Edward's Hospital Fund for London, to try to remedy 
the situation. 32 In July 1941 a set of interim salary scales (prior to the anticipated national 
scales of the Rushcliffe Committee) were agreed by the Ministry of Health for the CNR- 
A grant was offered to those hospitals who wished to bring their civilian staff to the same 
salary level, yet suffered a monetary gap 33 . Starns has also suggested that the move of 
registered nurses to the CNR had been a useful way for the cash-strapped hospital system 
to save money by replacing nurses with lower-grade staff, such as experienced but 
unqualified assistant nurses. 34 
Within the armed forces themselves, the poor accommodation many VADs found 
themselves in led to a stream of unanticipated complaints to their own Council. In order 
to pacify the VAD Council, the army Council limited the scope of VAD duties, but 
awarded them officer privileges. This only served to antagonise existing qualified nurses 
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and no doubt lines of authority, with the creation of anomalies in terms of VAD task 
allocation. Qualified nurses resented officer status being granted to VAD nursing 
assistants, while Stams argues that qualified non-nursing VADs such as opticians and 
radiographers were denied such privileges. 35 It appears that the VADs were unable to take 
36 
on the roles and responsibilities of officers, what Starns refers to as 'officer workloads' , 
despite being awarded privileges. To aid nurse mobilisation and recruitment, chief 
nursing officers were appointed to the Ministry of Health, the MLNS and the Colonial 
Office. A matron-in-chief was appointed at the War Office. The CNR was no longer 
restricted to the emergency services, but extended to all fields of nursing to try to further 
correct the issue of maldistribution. The War Office attempted to return senior nurses to 
their respective hospitals on request, to ease the civilian nursing manpower crisis. In 
reality, if the hospital were experiencing difficulties, a request for, and the actual return 
of, the nurse could take up to six months, because nurses in the armed forces were often 
overseas. 37 The army's former Matron-in-Chief stated in 1944 that of the 10,000 qualified 
nurses in the Queen Alexandra's imperial military nursing service, 9,000 were overseas. 38 
The remuneration and redistribution issues of the Ministry of Labour and National 
Service 
Prior to the detailed involvement of the MLNS in the wartime recruitment and 
distribution of nurses, it is worth considering in more detail the two main nursing issues 
that had emerged in the early war years. These were remuneration and the distribution of 
nursing staff. This chapter has argued that throughout the 1930s the nursing occupation 
was left by government to the vagaries of market forces, with no implementation of any 
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of the Athlone Report's recommendations for three years. The Ministry of Health argued 
in a draft circular in 1941 that it was not possible in wartime to give effect to all of the 
recommendations of the Athlone Report. 39 However, it knew that if distribution problems 
were to be corrected, standardised salaries would be needed to aid the movement of 
nurses from one area to another. The issue of remuneration had also been clearly 
heightened due to the discrepancies in pay between CNR and civilian nurses. Webster, in 
his history of the National Health Service (NHS), emphasised the acute shortage of funds 
and near collapse of the voluntary hospitals prior to nationalisation. 40 Pushing local 
authority hospitals to pay CNR rates to their nursing staff was a difficulty the Ministry 
41 felt 'could be surmounted', but one in which the voluntary hospitals could be 'crippled' . 
The issue was compounded by the fact that nursing was competing with other better paid 
war work for women. The Ministry of Health knew that the mobilisation of women into 
industry would be to the detriment of nursing. As one ministry official noted, this would 
be on account of the potential for industry to produce 'a sufficient number of more 
lucrative openings. ý42 The same official noted: 
11 should doubt if a permanent occupation which cannot rely on itself or its appeal 
to the money-making instinct like nursing, can hope to compete in the financial 
return with the more immediate rewards of a (one hopes) comparatively short- 
term stimulated effort in war production. 03 
it was therefore generally felt that if action were taken on nurses' salaries, the Exchequer 
would be required to pay the total cost of any monetary additions. Officials 
acknowledged that it was 'hopeless' to consider either voluntary or local authority 
hospitals' ability to carry out improvements in pay for only one set of employees, 
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especially in wartime conditions. 44 In addition, the introduction of standardised and 
raised salary scales would be a long-term and costly commitment. However, the continual 
appeal of nursing purely because of its importance in wartime had a limited competitive 
value in monetary terms or utility against other more attractive occupations. An internal 
Ministry of Health memorandum of December 1940 concluded: 
'By taking such action the government in effect commit themselves to ensuring 
the permanent maintenance of such standards after the war, or to a grave and 
unmerited disappointment to nurses at a time when the need for their services will 
no doubt continue to be just as important. The alternative, less openly attractive 
but in harmony with the best traditions of nursing, may be found in the action 
which is being taken to emphasise the vital importance of nursing (and not merely 
of nursing casualties) to the war. 945 
The remuneration issue would, however, not disappear, and by March 1941, Sir Sidney 
Johnson, secretary of the County Councils Association, was apologising for troubling the 
Ministry of Health, with a reiteration of their concerns in obtaining and retaining 
nurses. 46 A resolution had been passed, with their committee viewing with grave concern 
the difficulties compounded by the 'counter attraction of the high salaries now paid 
elsewhere. 47 They could see no easy solution, but viewed a conference of representatives 
more appropriate than the expedient approach in war time of the Athlone's Report's 
recommendation of a Burnham-type committee. 48 The latter was used in the teaching 
occupation to set national salary scales, but, as Johnson states, both his association and 
the Ministry of Health had regarded this as too costly during the war . 
49 By July 1941 the 
aforementioned CNR salary scales, with grants for civilian hospitals to meet the 
monetary differences, had been introduced. A representative committee to examine salary 
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scales nationally was ultimately set up and met under the chairmanship of Lord 
Rushcliffe, but did not report until 1943.50 As will be discussed, as the war progressed 
and coercion alone failed to solve the nursing-service crisis, the implementation of salary 
scales allowed for the rapid adoption of a Control of Engagement Order within nursing 
and subsequently the direction of nursing labour if required. 
The need to distribute nurses more equitably was complicated by the lack of statistical 
data regarding both the available workforce and the local need for it. In January 1941 the 
Ministry of Health declared: 
'There is at the moment no firm evidence on which we can build any reliable 
estimate of the extent of the need for civilian sick at the present time, or the 
extent to which it could be met either quantitatively or as a matter of 
administration by the temporary transfer from a hospital which is over staffed to 
one which is under staffed. 's' 
The discrepancy in pay between the CNR and civilian nursing had encouraged an 
inappropriate movement of staff, and then resulted in nurses waiting for casualties at 
first-aid posts who took a year to materialise. The availability of nursing staff was now 
noted to be particularly low for fever, tuberculosis and public-assistance institutions. 52 
Yet again it was argued that no estimates existed regarding the extent of their need. By 
November 1940, it was known that there were some 2,000 trained nurses and 2,500 
assistant nurses with fever, mental or tuberculosis qualifications on the CNR register. It 
was not known how many were employed on CNR work. Only 400 of the trained and 
500 of the assistant nurses offered mobile services, " restricting the number who could be 
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sent to areas of shortage. To try to meet the need, the CNR began what can only be 
described as a move towards a voluntary direction of labour. Ministry of Health Circulars 
pushed for the avoidance of part-time volunteers and generally those who would be 
classed, as 'immobile', thereby allowing deployment of staff where needed. 54 Discretion 
was urged, for example with immobile and married trained nurses ready to offer whole 
time service, but unable to travel far because of their husbands and homes. 55 Those 
enrolled as immobile staff and not in full-time employment were asked by the local 
emergency organisations if they would now become mobile and undertake service in any 
part of England and Wales. 56 
The move to manage the recruitment and distribution of nurses by the MLNS appears to 
have occurred through a series of meetings and internal memoranda. These were between 
the MLNS Labour Supply Departments, their Nurses' Services Branch and the Ministry 
of Health. 57 The primary aim at this point was identified as the need to improve nurse 
distribution. 58 A variety of solutions were considered. These included the setting up of 
machinery which could advise and place nurses, the instigation of a Control of 
Engagement Order for all nurses changing their jobs, and a review of existing distribution 
and employment. 59 MLNS staff were clearly attending a variety of Ministry of Health 
meetings at this time, which examined the nursing issues throughout the regions. A. M. 
Reisner, of the MLNS Nursing Services Branch, wrote to E. M. Stopford, temporary 
administrative officer in the Labour Supply Departments of the same Ministry, in 
October 1942. She stated that she and a principal from their Labour Services Department 
had attended a meeting of regional representatives of the Ministry of Health. Such was 
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the crisis, that a 'considerable amount of discussion' occurred regarding the direction of 
nursing labour, but 'nothing new emerged on that point 60 
John Wrigley and Kathleen Watt, the Deputy Secretary and Chief Nursing Officer in the 
Ministry of Health, held discussions with M. G. Smieton, the Assistant Secretary of the 
MLNS Labour Supply Departments, in October of 1942. They concluded that the way 
forward in the following few months had to be a review of distribution and nurse 
employment, but that the MLNS and not the Ministry of Health had the national 
framework and staff to conduct this and instigate any placement system. 61 In considering 
the latter or ultimately direction, the MLNS believed that all nurses were now caught up 
in the problems encountered, whether working in hospitals, industry, schools or other 
institutions. 62 
The workforce management of nursing offered unique challenges to the MLNS, which 
would dictate the approaches used. Nursing can be viewed as somewhat of a 'hybrid' 
occupation. It contained a core group of registered nurses that predominately aspired to 
the professional status acquired by medicine. Such aspirations were contradicted by the 
necessity of dilution to meet service demands resulting in an outer shell of unqualified, 
but experienced, nursing staff. Unionisation was now more significant since the turbulent 
years of the 1930s, and following the 1943 Nurses Act, there would be a new group of 
assistant nurses placed on a roll in an attempt to further regulate the service. 63 
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This 'hybrid' nature of the occupation would dictate which sections of the Ministry 
would both manage the issue of recruitment and distribution and, significantly, what 
would be most amenable to nurses themselves. Nursing had been left to deal with and 
struggle with its own recruitment issues throughout the 1930s. If, as will be argued, 
direction of labour was disliked by the MLNS, then how nursing could be best managed 
to meet wartime demands would have to be considered carefully. This was particularly 
relevant if the occupation was to work in partnership with the Ministry to solve the 
problem more effectively. The MLNS knew nursing had no unemployment issue and no 
need to utilise the Ministry's services. 64 Yet the fragmented local system of recruitment 
and placement meant that the exact statistical nature of the nursing problem remained 
buried. 
It is of value also at this point to examine the roots of the MLNS and how nurses may 
have viewed it, particularly qualified nurses represented by the RCN. Primarily, this is 
because the MLNS was associated with industry and the trade unions, whereas nursing 
was not. Wrigley and Watt both noted in discussions with the MLNS, which in 1942 was 
becoming more involved in the nursing issue, that nurses 'as a profession would not react 
well to a proposal that they ought to get their jobs through the Labour Exchange. 65 A 
system of placement and method of working with representatives of nurses, which 
courted the professional ideals of organisations such as the RCN, had to be found. 
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The involvement of the Ministry of Labour and National Service in the nursing 
workforce 
The MLNS became involved with the recruitment and distribution of the wartime nursing 
workforce in February of 1943. It was at this point that the first meeting was held of its 
NAC, which would be used to advise on the wartime national recruitment campaigns and 
16 
to facilitate the implementation of increasingly restrictive controls on nurses. The 
progression from national registration, through to a Control of Engagement Order and 
ultimately powers to direct nurses to specific posts, all occurred in just over a year. The 
involvement of the MLNS in nursing and the problems it encountered along this pathway, 
which dictated its workforce strategy, will be discussed shortly. Initially, it is of value to 
highlight certain aspects of the Ministry that influenced its use with the nursing 
workforce. 
The Ministry of Labour was formed in 1916 by the New Ministries and Secretaries Act. 67 
The addition of the suffix 'and National Service' occurred in 1939, when it gained 
responsibilities for the administration of the Military Training Act. 68 This resulted in men 
over 20 years of age being required to undergo six months' military training. Its longest 
serving permanent secretary, Sir Godfrey Ince, saw its creation as altruistic. 
'It deals, for the main part, directly with human beings, and their individual 
problems arising from their employment, and this gives it what might be called a 
humanitarian character. 69 
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He argued that it occurred over a period when: 
gnew problems arose from the exploitation of child labour, the relations 
between masters and men, the conditions of employment, the safety, health and 
welfare of workers in factories and mines, of under-payment and 'sweating' 
and of unemployment relief. s70 
Lowe takes a more pragmatic approach and highlights the administrative need for the 
Ministry. A variety of legislative changes including the Unemployed Workmen Act 1905, 
the Labour Exchanges Act 1909, the Trades Board Act 1909 and the National Insurance 
Act 1911, were all Liberal reforms which markedly increased the administration needed 
to support them. 71 The 1894 Minority Report of the Royal Commission of Labour had 
recommended the establishment of the Ministry in view of the increasing prominence of 
industrial problems. However, before its creation, objections were launched on the 
grounds of public expenditure, and fears that the Cabinet would become too unwield Y. 
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Lowe argues that the issue of impartiality in industrial relations dogged its creation. Such 
arguments centred on the degree of compulsion the Ministry could exercise in industrial 
relations, together with trade union hostility to welfare services, notably the Labour 
Exchanges. The need to avoid a servile state as seen by the unions was required, and yet 
it remained unclear what the Labour movement saw as the role of the MLNS. 73 
World War I clearly hastened its formation with the appointment of a Director General 
(later Minister) of National Service, to deal with labour supply and priorities. The Labour 
Exchanges had to adapt their work to mobilise men and women for war work, and work 
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with unemployment insurance nearly doubled in 1916. The MLNS clearly came into its 
own during World War II, with its preceding years viewed by Bullock, Ernest Bevin's 
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75 biographer, as representing the least important home department . It remained the 
subject of a variety of inquiries between 1919 and 1921, with the Geddes Committee on 
National Expenditure recommending its abolition in the early 1920s. 76 Even Ernest Bevin 
had previously described it during peacetime as little more than a 'glorified conciliation 
board' holding a variety of registers. 77 
Following the General Strike of 1926 the trade union movement was more willing to 
accept the state as a guarantor of minimum industrial and social standards. In the 1930s 
the Ministry was recognised as the government's laboratory for economic and social 
experiment. Yet according to Lowe it remained, until World War 11, a ministry that 
would not challenge financial orthodoxy, merely question it. 78 He argues that inter-war 
ministers held 'home rule for industry' as a course of political convenience, and this 
weakness evaded questions of whether both sides of industry could work together and 
indeed whether the national interest would be best served by this. 79 
The Ministry's role altered over time, but it held four broad functions. Its primary role 
was in manpower, through its involvement in the supply of labour to industry and other 
activities in civil life and the armed forces. This included the distribution, training and 
efficient use of manpower, notably through the national system of Labour Exchanges 
coordinated by the Ministry. The Ministry's involvement in industrial relations 
concentrated on issues of wage negotiations and conditions of employment, and generally 
centred upon an encouragement to settle disputes locally with the assistance of the MLNS 
regional offices and their conciliation officer. The safety, health and welfare of workers 
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came under the Ministry's remit, which had also to ensure that the Factories Acts were 
implemented correctly. International labour was a final broad role, through involvement 
in all of the above issues that touched upon an international context. 80 
The Ministry became synonymous with the working classes, but its remit was wider. 
From 1939 it began the Technical and Scientific Register, as part of the build-up to 
wartime hostilities. Under the voluntary national service scheme, there was an active 
encouragement to register for those who held technical, educational or professional 
qualifications and could be utilised during the war. By December 1939, a supplementary 
register was created for those with similar experiences, but not possessing the technical 
qualifications .81 
By March 1942 it was necessary to create a new Appointments 
Department at the Ministry headquarters to administer both registers. The Supplementary 
Register with some changes became known as the Appointments Register. The Technical 
Register remained centralised with links to the MLNS regions, until it was abolished in 
1962.82 
Despite this extension into professional work areas, Peter Jenkins, correspondent of Yhe 
Times, described it as the Whitehall department most steeped in the tradition of the 
Labour movement, being an executive department of government operating 
'... in the manner of an embassy to a foreign power - the working classes. It 
was never entirely clear where its first loyalty lay, with the power it represented 
or the power to which it was accredited. 983 
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The appointment of Ernest Bevin as Minister of Labour in 1940 by Prime Minister, 
Churchill, was inspired. Bevin held an enormous amount of respect and experience in 
dealing with industrial and labour issues. He was a highly respected trade unionist, who 
had been instrumental in leading the amalgamation of fourteen unions in 1922 to form the 
Transport and General Workers Union. He then became its first General Secretary. 84 The 
appointment did, however, reinforce the labour roots of the Ministry, and raise issues 
regarding how nursing abandoned by government in the 1930s, could be mobilised. A 
study of Bevin's workforce strategies reveals that he relied heavily on the issue of 
voluntary compliance to improve productivity and services during the war. Labour 
historian Peter Weiler describes this as Bevin's 'corporatist ideal', with his general desire 
to see a voluntary partnership of business, the trade unions and the state in running the 
war. 85 Part of this approach was based on recent events. 
Prior to Bevin becoming Minister of Labour, there had been a hurriedly prepared Control 
of Employment Bill introduced into the House Commons on 5h September 1939.86 The 
TUC had already presented its own scheme for the control of industry during wartime, 
and this followed Bevin's own approach of making industry, through its joint negotiating 
machinery, responsible for meeting the government's needs, including increased 
production and the transfer of labour as needed. The approach would also oblige the 
government to impose collective bargaining on those industries whose own trade unions 
were too weak to secure it. However, negotiations lapsed, and the MLNS's own scheme 
was introduced without consulting the trade union leaders, much to their anger. MLNS 
officials had to placate Walter Citrine, TUC General Secretary and Bevin, then Chainnan 
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of its General Council, with amendments which robbed the scheme of most of its value. 87 
Only one Order was issued under the Control of Employment Act and when Bevin 
entered office as Minister of Labour in 1940, Bullock highlights the fact that little had 
88 been done to transfer manpower to the industries where it was urgently needed. 
Bevin disliked the idea of the direction of labour immensely. Its late introduction and 
ultimate lack of use in nursing may have as much to do with the view that caring for the 
sick should be voluntary, as with the Minister's dislike of forced choice and coercion. His 
primary argument was that the focus of labour should be a practical one: how you got 
more production. 89 Drawing on his years as a union leader, he believed that workers with 
a sense of grievance, which would occur through compulsion, could interrupt not increase 
production. The whole issue was based on his belief that the war was not going to end 
quickly. 90 His critics argued that there might not be time to increase vital production by 
encouragement alone-91 Yet the subsequent attempts to increase production by the 
dilution of labour with unskilled workers and women in solidly unionised industries, such 
as the sheet-metal workers, produced such resistance throughout the war as to support 
Bevin's caution. In fact the latter industry never accepted dilution with women during the 
entire war. 92 Bevin argued that: 
'... whatever may be my other weaknesses, I think I can claim that I understand 
the working classes of this country. I had to determine whether I would be a 
leader or a dictator. I preferred and still prefer to be a leader, and if my Hon, 
friend the Member for Seaham. Harbour (Mr Shinwell) had taken office, having 
regard to the speech he made this morning, I assume that he would have taken 
the other road, that of being a dictator., 93 
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Bevin further argued against direction because in the early years of the war there was no 
general shortage of labour, not until the second half of 1941. His proposals as Minister 
were that more suppliers be brought under direct government control and, where this 
proved too complicated, that prices be fixed to limit profits. This aimed to prevent 
workers feeling that their extra energies were going into profits. 94 
His approach enlisted the cooperation of both the employers and trade unions to carry out 
the state's policies, a method he would come to use with nursing. To that end he proposed 
a new position, a director of labour supply. This position, with representative employers 
and trade unionists, would create a Labour Supply Board to survey the needs for labour in 
industry, and to decide how it was to be provided to meet the needs of wartime. 95 Bevin 
remained successful in gaining the agreement of the Cabinet for the majority of his 
wartime measures, but they were less keen on his overriding concern for voluntary effort 
and avoiding interfering with the labour market. 96 The Emergency Powers Act of May 
1940, passed through all its parliamentary stages in a single day amid the fear of 
invasion, gave him the power to direct any person over 16 years to perform work or 
services under terms set down by the Minister. Bullock argues that Bevin stuck to his 
original view; he did not ask for the powers and used them sparingly. By July 1941 he 
had issued no more than 2,800 Orders to individuals under the powers of direction. 97 it 
was factors such as the Report of the Manpower Requirements Commission that 
persuaded him of more radical measures. This revealed that the three armed services 
needed an additional 1,700,000 men and 84,000 women by the end of 1941. For them to 
be equipped, the munitions industries would need to expand their labour force by an 
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additional million and a half, and this he knew could not be achieved by persuasion 
alone. 
98 
Nursing as a 'hybrid' occupation 
It is difficult to ascertain the resistance that nursing organisations and employers may 
have exhibited to increasing ministerial involvement in nursing. This is primarily because 
by 1943, when the MLNS became actively involved in nursing, air-raid casualties were a 
stark reality, with a need for all services to pull together for the good of the war. 
However, there were several factors that may have increased resistance. Prior to the war 
and with no tangible involvement from government in nursing, the Council of the College 
of Nursing (subsequently becoming the RCN in 1939) had been calling for an enquiry 
into the worsening nursing crisis since 1935.99 This did not begin to emerge for another 
two years. 100 
In addition, prior to a NAC being set up at the MLNS at the beginning of 1943, a 
desperate and unfortimate approach by the Ministry of Health and the MLNS to improve 
the nursing situation threatened any consensual approach that may have been created. 
Collaboratively they produced a detailed draft memorandum outlining their proposals for 
a more even distribution of nursing staff throughout the country. '()' This they sent to 
interested bodies such as the TUC and RCN on October 10,1942.102 Neither had been 
involved in its preparation, but both were asked to comment. The draft suggested that the 
Minister of Health ask regional officers to communicate with nurse- training schools to 
draw the attention of students completing their training to the special needs of what were 
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termed 'priority' hospitals - hospitals known to have acute staff shortages. The newly 
qualified nurses might be asked to fill a vacancy for a minimum of six months. If 
persuasion failed and the regional office were of the opinion that there was no valid 
reason for refusing the work, a national service officer of the MLNS might be involved 
who would utilise powers of direction. 103 
The response of the unions and nursing organisations was swift and hostile. The RCN 
described themselves as 'gravely concerned' that the plan had been formulated without 
any preliminary consultation with nursing organisations. 104 They emphasised the prior 
announcement in the House of Commons by the Minister of Health, which had led them 
to believe a full discussion would take place before any schemes were put in place. 105 
They raised the point reiterated by the TUC that it was highly unusual to control the 
movement of any body of workers without the stabilisation of conditions of services and 
rates of remuneration. 106 The Ministry of Health recognised their haste. John Wrigley, the 
Ministry's Deputy Secretary, questioned whether the RCN and TUC would now offer 
any 'practical cooperation' in solving the distribution problem. 107 The only logical 
method therefore of ensuring any practical advice and partnership from the nursing 
organisations and employers would appear to be a consensual approach of utilising them 
fully in a ministerial advisory committee. 
What appears clear at this time, despite Bevin's dislike of direction which he raised at the 
first NAC meeting, is that it was a topic being actively discussed and seriously 
considcrcd by both ministries. 
108 Wrigley wrote to Godfrey Ince, then Director General of 
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Manpower at the MLNS in November 1942, emphasising that nursing's immediate 
problem was the need for the proper distribution of the trained workforce, particularly to 
the sanatoria caring for patients with tuberculosis. The crisis was not being solved, 
despite what Wrigley described as his ministry's long campaign of 'appeals, publicity 
and propaganda'. 109 
After the aforementioned discussions between the Ministries of Health and Labour in 
1942, the NAC for the Recruitment and Distribution of Nurses and Midwives first met on 
23'd February the following year. ' 10 This was at the MLNS in central London, under the 
chairmanship of Conservative Member of Parliament and Parliamentary Secretary, 
Malcolm McCorquodale. The allocated seats were based on the number of nurses 
represented by the various organisations, as well as interested employers. Frances 
Goodall, the General Secretary of the RCN, attended with three of her Council. There 
were two representatives from the Association of Hospital Matrons, two from the Royal 
College of Midwives, two from the TUC, and one from NALGO. Three more represented 
the British Hospitals Association, with three from the MLNS itself. The Council totalled 
33, excluding the chairman. "' 
The Council appeared to serve several functions for the MLNS. Its extensive 
representation appears in some way a recompense for the lack of ministerial consultation 
in the previous months. Discussing workforce strategies would take time, but the Council 
was needed for both its advisory role, and importantly to filter through a series of radical 
control measures to the nursing occupation. To offset the time that might be taken to 
83 
reach decisions, a preparatory meeting was held a month before the official meeting, with 
many of the planned Council representatives. 112 The MLNS emphasised the recruitment 
and distribution problems and members agreed in principle to the general scheme for the 
control and distribution of nurses and midwives. 113 There appear to be no detailed 
minutes of this meeting. 
Council procedure in fact demonstrated a remarkable speed in discussing issues and 
implementing change. The general approach was for the Council to discuss the merits of 
implementing a series of what were termed 'NAC' documents. Forty-five were produced 
by the end of the Council's first year and were notably didactic. This tends to emphasise 
the Council's advisory, rather than policy-planning, approach. An example was NAC 7, 
providing a detailed outline of the nursing publicity campaigns, which ran, after Treasury 
approval, for an initial six months, commencing the week after Easter 1943.1 13 This 
Circular offers 'the campaign in detail', with specific numbers of BBC news 
announcements, together with dates for the commencement of newspaper advertisements 
in the Daily Mirror, Daily Sketch, the Telegraph, the Times and national Sunday 
newspapers-' 15 At the first meeting the Council was told that the machinery of the MLNS 
Appointments Department, not the Labour Exchanges, would be used to manage nurse 
recruitment. 116 This is an interesting move, because in reality there were some 1,200 
Labour Exchanges throughout the country in 1942, yet only 31 Appointments Offices. 117 
The Appointments Department themselves were unfavourable to using their offices for 
nursing, considering them as 'not really of Appointments Department standard', in the 
summer of 1942.1 
'a This appears to have been overcome in favour of appealing to the 
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professional ideal represented by the RCN. It is not totally clear whether all staff 
involved in nursing, that is those on the register and those who only had experience, were 
ultimately able to utilise the Appointments Service. It appears likely, because 
correspondence in the immediate post-war years highlights the fact that differences in the 
roles of nursing orderlies resulted in those undertaking domestic duties gaining 
employment through the Labour Exchange and those involved in nursing through the 
Appointments Service! 19 The issue was that the roles often blurred in reality, depending 
on the requirements of the matron or ward sister. 
Ernest Bevin made a speech at the first meeting, although he did not attend for the whole 
time. He again emphasised the need to push for voluntary cooperation and not direction: 
'So far, nursing and midwifery have been left out of the various schemes of 
control: both services must essentially be based on the will to sacrifice much to 
help others and recruitment to both must therefore be voluntary. "" 
Such schemes generally referred to other groups of workers, notably those undergoing 
industrial conscription, and by December 1941 the National Service (No 2) Act. Through 
this Act all men and women between the ages of 18 and 60 were placed under statutory 
obligation to undertake some form. of national service. The conscription of women was 
controversial, but was embodied in the Act. It did exclude married women, and no 
woman was posted to a combatant service except as a volunteer. 121 Ince had also 
emphasised, in a nursing manpower meeting in December 1942, that he felt nurses should 
be volunteers, because there was a difference between tending a human being and a 
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machine. 122 However, as the nursing crisis continued, even Bevin had to concede that the 
Rushcliffe scales offered a basis on which it would 
'... be possible to consider - as it had not been possible in the past - whether 
directions should be issued in certain cases to nurses who had demonstrated their 
fitness for nursing work, but who were not now employed in nursing, to return 
to the profession. ' 123 
Despite the general reluctance to move to issue workforce controls to nurses, the first 
meeting discussed the scope of compulsion for nurses to register at local Labour 
Exchanges, to enable an accurate picture of the workforce to be ascertained. The Council 
agreed that the scope should be as wide as possible, and should include student nurses, 
only excluding auxiliaries not working in nursing, who had less than six months 
experience of the job. 124 The progress of the Council was rapid in instigating a series of 
controls. Within six weeks of the first meeting, McCorquodale was speaking on BBC 
evening radio explaining the registration procedure. 125 On April 10'h, 1943 all nurses and 
midwives had to register at their local Labour Exchange. In addition, if not employed, 
they were urged to take up a post in an area of shortage. He again pushed the necessity 
for voluntary movement, reassuring the audience that 'there will be no question whatever 
of disturbing or transferring nurses or midwives unnecessarily'. 126 
What was 'necessary' could of course be open to interpretation. He believed he could 
count on the willingness of those workers to move to a new job, where they might be 
more urgently needed. Table 5.1 offers an example of the nursing workforce from the 
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first compulsory national registration in 1943.400,741 nurses registered, 25,697 of them 
being men. The table below is a sample of the total number who registered. 
Table 5.1 Sample of nursing groups derived from the Nurses and Midwives 
Registration for Employment Order: Saturday April loth 1943. The complete 
registration produced twenty-three categories: 
Women Men 
Student nurses/probationers 49,326 700 
Nursing auxiliaries 37,164 1,010 
Nursing assistants 10,802 2,501 
Nurses employed at first-aid 
posts 
15,642 3,020 
Industrial nurses 8,300 179 
Domiciliary nurses 5,980 29 
Matrons, Assistant Matrons 6,817 100 
I Sisters 18,721 1 583 
ives 3,337 J - Nil 
Source: Figures and table created from statistics for an appendix to the twenty-second meeting of the 
r*ILNS National Advisory Council for the Recruitment and Distribution of Nurses and Midwives, 
21/6/45. Source: PRO LAB 8/1083 National Advisory Council for the Recruitment and Distribution 
of Nurses and Midwives: Minutes of the eighteenth to twenty-second meetings, 194445. 
By September of 1943 a Control of Engagement Order already applied to women 
between the ages of 18 and 40. It was now extended through the NAC to nurses and 
midwives. Employment would have to be taken through the MLNS Appointments 
Offices. By April 1944 tighter controls emerged with the final passing of a Direction of 
Labour Order affecting the nursing occupation. Nurses could be directed to areas of need 
at the discretion of the Appointments Service and the MLNS. Directions remained in 
place until June 1946.127 
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In reality, managing the distribution of nurses and midwives occurred through the 
Control of Engagement Order. The reluctance in directing nurses remained, and there is 
little evidence that any nurse or midwife was actually directed to work in any specific 
post. Practising midwives had been required since the Control of Engagement Order of 
September 1943 not to take employment other than in midwifery. 128 This was to be 
reviewed in February 1944 and the control was subsequently extended at that point until 
May 3 I't of that year. 129 Newly qualified midwives were required to practise for at least 
one year after qualifying. 130 The restrictions in fact were not lifted until June of 1946.131 
The Control of Engagement Order also required newly qualified state registered nurses to 
spend a year within a specified area of noted shortage. These were tuberculosis, fever, 
mental and district nursing, or caring for the chronic sick. 132 With the move to directions 
in the spring of 1944, it was also decided that these could be issued to women with 
substantial nursing experience, but no formal qualification, provided that they had at least 
one year's nursing experience within the past two years. 133 
Direction of labour 
The following section will offer a further evaluation of the workforce strategies used 
within nursing during World War II, as part of the issues that would be considered by the 
ministries in managing health services in the post-war era. The primary question here is 
whether the wartime measures had any effect upon the nursing crisis. The direction of 
nursing labour introduced in the spring of 1944 is difficult to evaluate. The measures 
lasted only two years, with the direction for any British workforce introduced as a last 
resort by the MLNS. As highlighted, the Emergency Powers Act (May 1940) resulted, up 
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to July 1941, in no more than 2,800 orders. 134 The Essential Work Order (No: 1302) 
again avoided direction of named individuals, through its ability to allow the Minister of 
Labour to schedule a factory or undertaking as engaged on essential national work. Once 
achieved, no man employed could leave without permission of the MLNS local national 
service officer. By the end of 1941, approximately 6 million workers were under its 
provision. 135 
Direction of labour appeared to be equated, certainly in the mind of Bevin, with forced 
labour, an undemocratic approach used in Nazi Germany. He believed strongly in 
communication with the trade unions on all his policy approaches. He did not believe that 
in order to match the degree of workforce organisation. of Nazi Germany, it meant 
abandoning democracy and copying the totalitarian methods Britain was fighting 
against. 136 Bullock argues that he focused on the principles of democracy, government by 
consent and the willingness of people in an emergency to make greater sacrifices than 
they could be 'dragooned' into making by compulsion. 137 The lack of the application of 
direction showed that the British people could pull together to increase production as a 
result of voluntarism, rather than as a response to what Bevin saw as a dictatorial 
approach. Nursing in particular was singled out as a profession based on vocation and 
compassion, and not one where people could be forced to care. 138 Whether direction 
improved the distribution of nurses and the services offered is questionable, with little 
evidence that any nurse was directed to a specific area of work. A more dilute policy was 
to control the choice of employment of nurses and midwives to those areas noted to be 
particularly short of staff, through the Control of Engagement Order. This was much 
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more widely used, but its effects appear to have been relatively minimal. There appear to 
be two reasons for this. Firstly, nursing and midwifery were so short of staff that they 
operated according to a 'hand-to-mouth' existence. As new nurses and midwives 
qualified, they were quickly absorbed to staff the still large number of empty beds and to 
rectify the high attrition rate, notably in the early years of training. Preventing newly 
qualified nurses in particular from taking any post they chose for a year after qualifying 
may have helped some of the acutely short areas, but it starved other less severe areas of 
utilising the newly qualified staff. 
To this end, the second reason for the ineffectiveness of the Control of Engagement 
Order came into play. The NAC received correspondence from various nurse specialities 
such as cancer, sick children, orthopaedic, and ear, nose and throat nursing, all concerned 
over the employment restrictions. The Council then began progressively to grant 
exceptions to these areas, to allow them to recruit from newly qualified nurses. 139 The 
Council could not ignore the cry for help and the pragmatic move may have helped 
particular areas, but it continually weakened the effectiveness of the Order. Inevitably, 
midwifery appears to have benefited to the greatest degree from the measures instigated. 
This was affected by preventing the leakage back into general nursing from newly 
qualified midwives, but also through a loophole in the Order, which allowed the newly 
qualified nurses to avoid being forced to take particular employment, if further training 
was undertaken. 
140 It is important to note that this was regarded as a first course. It did 
not cover those taking subsequent training, and the Council was clear at its tenth meeting 
in October 1943 that 
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I... in time of war nurses should not be free to go from one course of training to 
another, never settling down and using the qualifications they had obtained, and 
that in certain cases it may be necessary to postpone training for a few 
months. ' 141 
However, midwifery appears to have been a popular choice to avoid the restrictions. The 
number of midwives increased steadily, albeit slowly, from 1943.142 In addition, the NAC 
believed that the mandatory registration and subsequent publicity would also increase the 
number of older midwives practising. 143 
Nevertheless, the issue of supply and demand continued to work against the recruitment 
of midwives, with the Report of the Central Midwives Boardfor England and Wales still 
reporting a widespread unsatisfied demand by March 1947.144 A great deal of the 
problem was the inevitable rising birth rate at the end of the war as families came back 
together. The birth rate was 791,656 in 1945, but rose to 1,021,460 by 1947.145 By that 
point there were 17,095 practising midwives, the highest number since 1940.146 The 
avoidance of newly qualified nurses being pushed into restricted choices of employment 
can perhaps be seen indirectly by the rising number of midwives under 25 years of age. 
This increased from 2.4% in 1943 to 6.7% by 1946.147 
At the end of 1945, the Council examined the results of wartime controls through NAC 
document 94. The figures presented were slightly unusual in demonstrating the 
effectiveness of measures, in that they took account of occupied beds, but ignored closed 
wards and waiting lists. The Council did in fact note this omission. 148 The review aimed 
primarily to see whether controls should now be lifted or continued owing to their 
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benefit. The Council was divided regarding the effects, with some members concerned 
that areas such as midwifery would suffer if controls were lifted. Others argued 'how 
relatively little the worst staffed special fields had benefited from the control. 049 The 
indecision was reflected in the view that controls should continue for another six months, 
before finally being lifted in June of 1946.150 By the end of 1947 NAC document 180 had 
to conclude that 'broadly speaking the national nursing situation remains as difficult as it 
was in 1945, indeed if anything, more difficult. "51 
Such a conclusion stemmed in part from the changing workforce as the war ended. In 
mental health, staff numbers in fact rose. This was due to the large number of men in that 
speciality who had returned from the war. The numbers rose by approximately 4,000 by 
the end of 1947.152 Other hospitals appear to have benefited by approximately 3,000 
men. 153 However, to offset this, within the hospitals generally, nursing and midwifery 
numbers declined, with an average drop of approximately 1,800 a quarter between March 
1945 and December 1946.154 The total decline in this period was about 12,500.155 A large 
part of this workforce change came from women who had given wartime service and 
chose to leave once hostilities had ended. 
The nursing organisations and employers appeared to work highly collaboratively 
through the Council structure. The MLNS and Ministry of Health valued the consensual 
approach to the point that the Council had its remit extended to be advisory to the 
Minister of Health and the Health Departments in 1945.156 A further expansion in 1948, 
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which will be discussed in subsequent chapters, continued the Council's advisory remit to 
the two ministries in the new NHS. 157 
Why collaboration worked quite so well is unclear, but it may speculatively have been 
linked to nursing's traditional hierarchical regime. The Council may have viewed 
themselves as the top of the hierarchical regime, positioned to direct nursing through the 
ranks, much as occurred within the hospital system. Additionally, the MLNS, in courting 
the professional aspirations of nurses by utilising the Appointments Department, rather 
than the Labour Exchanges, may have encouraged a greater partnership with the MLNS- 
Nurses were now represented round the table with the ministries, and remained, until 
1957, the only single occupation to have its own placement service, through its series of 
technical nursing officers. This was a point that did not escape the Treasury when 
reviewing MLNS expenditure in the mid 1950s. 158 
Resistance from Council members outside the MLNS was relatively rare, but generally 
focused on two areas. Firstly, there was resistance to any suggestions of interfering with 
the local hospital recruitment structures, which ensured a steady supply of recruits. The 
Council's willingness to grant exceptions to a variety of specialities when the Control of 
Engagement Order restricted their ability to utilise newly qualified nurses is an 
example. 151 In addition, a common practice was for hospitals to contract students for four 
years, even though they could become state registered nurses in three. Nursing 
organiSations on the Council resisted any tampering with this practice, as did the British 
Hospitals Association, which argued that insisting on three-year contracts would not 
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increase supply. 160 However, an additional fourth year could affect distribution, and offer 
a staff priority to training hospitals that others may have used if given the opportunity. 161 
McCorquodale's comment was that the training in other spheres had been reduced during 
the war. This was generally rebuffed, with Miss Goodell and Miss Udell for the RCN 
merely pointing out that many of the nurses on the Council were products of the three- 
year training. 162 It does appear that hospitals who contracted nurses to include an extra 
year did not actually allow them to take the state registered nurses examination until that 
fourth year. D. M. Elliot, representing the TUC at the Council, argued that: 
4even if the nurses serving a four years' contract sat the General Nursing 
Council examination at the end of three years, they were still on the staff of the 
hospital and could not be used in any other part of the health services, however 
much greater the other needs may be. ' 163 
Secondly, attempts by Council to extend its remit into areas controlled by nursing's 
legislative body, and hence deprive the occupation of a degree of independence, were 
strongly rejected. When the Council was reconstituted in 1945, much discussion ensued 
with the extended proposal that it would advise the Ministers on 'all questions relating to 
the recruitment, training (my emphasis), welfare and distribution of nurses and midwives 
on civilian work. "64 The issue of training was seen as the remit of the GNC, and created 
what was described as 'considerable discussion' at the Council's twenty-fifth meeting. 165 
It could be suggested that the MLNS was attempting to widen the scope of the Council 
and more pragmatically adjust issues which could be a hindrance to training and 
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distribution. This may in part have emerged from the tension that appears to exist 
throughout Council minutes between the GNC and the MLNS. These focused, for 
example, on ministerial attempts to increase recognition of qualifications not covered by 
the GNC register. An example was the MLNS request to discuss a suggestion that the 
GNC should be asked to recognise the certificate of the Tuberculosis Association, and 
raise the standards of the desperately short-staffed sanatoria. 166 Council members 
generally again rejected this, with the Association of Hospital Matrons reminding the 
Council of the functions of the GNC. If certificates not offering the prescribed training 
for the various registers of the GNC were recognised, the country would be flooded by 
partly trained nurses, proficient only in one branch of nursing. 167 It is difficult to see how 
this differed from the position of fever nurses, for example, except that they were 
regulated by the GNC. There seemed to be no discussion on assisting the Tuberculosis 
Association to work with the GNC to meet agreed criteria, but a suggestion was made to 
gain the attitude of the latter to the proposal. The remit of the Council was subsequently 
curtailed to advising on 'training in so far as it affects the work of the Council. ' 168 
The militarisation theory 
The arguments presented in this chapter, particularly the rejection of the direction of 
nursing labour by the MLNS, oppose the idea of an adoption of a 'militarisation' policy 
in civilian nursing, which Starns has argued occurred at this time. 169 Certainly it appears 
to have had no influence on nursing policy-making within the ministries, beyond the 
recruitment issue of providing enough nurses to meet armed forces, civilian hospital and 
air-raid casualty needs. Starns within her thesis and published work argues that within 
army nursing, its Matron-in-Chief, Dame Katherine Jones, suggested that militarisation in 
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nursing would provide an opportunity to resolve nurse status problems once and for all. 170 
Once achieved in army nursing and other services, it could provide a framework which 
would secure nurse status for the occupation as a whole. 171 
The militarisation of nursing appears to be defined by Stams as the adoption of behaviour 
equating to and ultimately achieving military 'officer' status. ' 72 The actual attainment of 
this appeared to be the ultimate goal of separating nurses from other women's services in 
the forces. For Dame Katherine this also meant a widening status for registered nurses in 
relation to auxiliary personnel. 173 The officer rank therefore equated to 'responsibility and 
hard earned privilege reflecting professional and military achievement. '174 Starns 
suggests that with this approach in mind Dame Katherine 'initiated a full-blown 
i 
militarisation programme for army nurses. ' 175 This involved identification with 
masculinity and a corresponding suppression of the more feminine aspects of nursing. 
Nurses were expected to stress the concept of efficiency because this was considered to 
be a military virtue. 176 Fitness programmes were introduced, uniforms turned to khaki and 
nurses were increasingly expected to administer care in front-line positions. 177 
Starris suggests that militarisation was successful in articulating Dame Katherine's goals. 
Registered nurses were awarded commissioned officer status in 1941 and this extended 
from the army to include the Royal Airforce, Royal Navy and Commonwealth nurses. 
Once hostilities had ceased, army nurses were established as a distinct corps and emerged 
to negotiate a 'professional' salary lead over members of the women's services. 178 She 
suggests that in stark contrast to the civilian nursing services, those in the military were 
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flooded with applications from women eager to join their ranks. 179 This appears to imply 
the 61itist attraction of military nursing, a phenomenon which historian Anne Summers 
utilised to suggest that this form of nursing gave respectable expression to less admissible 
female notions. 180 Home ties could be legitimately abandoned as the nurse travelled 
abroad 'ready to surmount hardship and encounter danger. " 81 
The impression is given that civilian nurses turned towards military values because their 
service colleagues had gained so much from the adoption of such approaches. Civilian 
nursing openly advocated military identification in the vain hope that once registered 
nurse status was linked to military officer status, the overall position of the professional 
nurse would improve. 182 However, Starns suggests that such an approach ultimately was 
not in line with the instigation of medical and technological advances, with nursing in the 
armed forces recognising the weaknesses of 'aristocratic militarism' and subsequently 
shifling in the direction of education and professionalism. 183 A clear exploration of 
professionalism remains unclear in the argument. Unlike the military, civilian nursing did 
not change in the immediate post-war years, but preserved an 'iron triangle of military 
influence, royal patronage and religious beliefs. ' 184 
It is suggested that this approach, of adhering to an existing status, prevented civilian 
nursing from moving forward to meet the changing health-care needs brought about by 
technological and medical advances. These were met with a reactive rather than a pre- 
emptive approach. Nurse leaders who were progressive were unable to alter the rigid 
status that the occupation (as represented, apparently, by the RCN and the matrons) was 
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desperate to maintain in a changing health field. 185 For Starns, civilian nurses interpreted 
military officer status in terms of social class, and failed to appreciate that the primary 
function of an officer was to provide leadership. 186 
It is desirable but ultimately difficult to evaluate Starns's theory against the arguments of 
this chapter for several reasons. Primarily, when she states that nurses 'adopted their own 
distinct militarisation policy' and one with 'specific aims and objectives', 187 it remains 
hard to grasp whether this policy, which in itself suggests a degree of direction and 
structure, remained the ambition only of Dame Katherine, and where influence was 
confined to military nursing. The degree to which it permeated, albeit in a somewhat 
distorted fashion, to civilian nursing remains speculative and poorly supported by the 
available evidence. 
Whatever the process of militarisation, the caution with which both MLNS officials and 
the NAC utiliscd the control and direction of nursing labour does not suggest a conscious 
application of a militarisation policy. This was in the sense of viewing nursing as a 
&national service' and using compulsion to post nurses to where they were necded in 
civilian nursing. Posting and directing nurses in the armed forces are natural features of 
the obedience and hierarchical structure of military life. Civilian nurses were not directed 
and indeed appear to have gone out of their way to avoid NAC controls on their choice of 
practice area. By May 1946, Helen Dey, a member of the NAC and the Association of 
Hospital Matrons, requested that the issue of recruitment be returned to the individual 
matrons and not be kept with the MLNS. 
"' It could be argued that she was fighting for 
the power of the matron to direct and control her own nurses. Military service by its very 
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nature is a hierarchical regime, directed by a higher body representing King and country. 
Resistance to any form of direction appears strongly to contradict any theory that military 
values were actively seized upon by civilian nurses. 
The argument for militarisation becomes conftising when a policy that aimed to achieve 
cofficer' status and privileges is applied to civilian nursing. In civilian nursing there was 
no such rank as officer. By its very nature civilian nursing is not a part of the military. It 
is difficult to see how Dame Katherine's 'policy' could permeate a sector of nursing that 
was not within the armed services. What appears to be more apparent is that civilian 
nurses may merely have maintained the status quo built into a long-standing hierarchical 
regime. This may be what Starns is describing under the concept of militarisation, but it 
also suggests a need to use the concept with caution or to define it clearly and further 
clarify what is understood by 'policy'. Yet the inability of nursing personel, such as 
matrons, to exert strong influence in local decision making in the new NHS, as described 
by Rosemary White, may have strengthened their internal hierarchical regime., 89 This 
may justify Starns's view of a reactive rather than pre-emptive approach to change, but 
this does not amount to a conscious policy of militarisation. 
In contrast to the aims of Dame Katherine Jones, the crucial question of the war itself has 
not been considered in this chapter as revolving around the issue of direction of labour. 
The latter emerged as a consensual and collaborative process from the ministries. The 
move to khaki by nurses, and the attraction of the military, may have been the patriotic 
response of a united population against a tyrannical foe that swept nursing along with it. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the workforce strategies utilised within nursing by the 
Ministries of Health and Labour during World War II. The need to increase recruitment 
and address issues in the maldistribution of the workforce, in preparation for air-raid 
casualties, commenced at a period of crisis in the nursing occupation. This was manifest 
not only in a severe shortage of staff, an inhospitable working environment and low pay, 
but a need for the ministries to perform a strategic U-turn, and become heavily involved 
in issues which they had previously left to the vagaries of market forces. Prior to the war 
the occupation had dealt with its own recruitment issues on a local level, and with no 
need and little desire to utilise the services of the MLNS. A series of Ministry of Health 
blunders in the early years of the war, notably involving the CNR and salary 
discrepancies, worsened the state of maldistribution. Desperate attempts by the Ministry 
of Health together with the MLNS to suggest workforce restrictions, without involving 
nursing organisations and unions, only exacerbated a feeling of unrest within the 
occupation. 
By 1943 when the MLNS became involved in the nursing crisis, it was clear that it 
needed to look at the occupation as a unique workforce. This thesis argues that nursing 
was a 'hybrid', made up of various qualified and unqualified workers, and yet contained a 
core that aspired to the professional status akin to that achieved by the medical 
profession. By this point the MLNS knew that the only way to address maldistribution 
problems was to utilise workforce controls. Minister of Labour Ernest Bevin disliked 
such measures intensely, primarily because he believed that they could result in 
resistance from a dissatisfied workforce. The need to utilise controls, yet ensure 
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compliance from the occupation, resulted in a consensual approach, through an unusually 
large advisory Council for nursing and midwifery alone, and a series of technical nursing 
officers around the country to resource the Nursing Appointments Service. No other 
occupation had such a service. The latter was used purely because it was feared nurses 
would regard Labour Exchanges as beneath their professional status. This was despite the 
fact that the Appointments Service itself did not believe that nurses were of the 
appropriate professional standing for this department. The approaches were therefore 
somewhat contradictory and elaborate, in order to placate a dernotivated occupation and 
ensure compliance with the restrictive measures. This was necessitated because of the 
ineffective way the ministries had dealt with the increasing nursing workforce crisis in 
the previous decade. 
The lack of statistical data regarding maldistribution resulted in compulsory registration. 
However, by this stage, nursing was suffering such low numbers, that controls to filter 
newly qualified nurses to the worse areas of shortage merely demonstrated the 'hand-to- 
mouth' existence and desperate measures used to staff areas which had been starved of 
resources. Concessions to allow additional areas to recruit from newly qualified staff 
merely weakened the effectiveness of a Control of Engagement Order. Ultimately, the 
Council could not decide whether the wartime controls had been effective. This in part 
reflects the continued lack of statistical data, but also the changing workforce as war 
ended and families reconvened in peacetime. What is clear is that the nursing recruitment 
crisis was no better at the end of the war than at the beginning, and was a poor starting 
point for the newly envisaged NHS shortly to emerge. 
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Februany 194-1 11 ic \ýmona I Ad%isoiý Counci I (NAC) for the Recruitment and Distribution of Nurses and Midwives. This 
official photograph taken at the Ministry of Labour and National Service in London, shows Conservative Member of 
Parliament, PirfianientarN Secretary and NAC Chairman, Malcolm McCorquodale standing at the head of the table 
(photograph reproduccd m ith kind permission of the National Archives, Kew). 
June 1942: Women outside a Ministry of Labour and National Service van recruiting for war work (photograph 
reproduced under licence from and N%ith kind perrnission of the Hulton Getty library). 
November 1946: Munster of Labour George Isaacs (far right) inspects the mobile nursing exhibition van Outside his 
ministry in London. as part of the massive nurse recruitment campaign. Note on the back of the van, nurses enjoying 
leisure tifne appear for the most part to be if' unif0m, (Photograph reproduced under licence from and with kind 
permiss, on oftlic Ifulton (; ettv 
librarv). 
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June 1948: A new beginning and neN% hope. From the top, Jamaican boxers Charles Smith, Ten Ansel, Essi Rei(j, 
John 11jilcl. l3ov Solas and manager Mortimer Martin arrive on the f-',? jpjj-e Windrush at Tilbury (locks hoping to 
find N%ork in Britain. Jounialist Robert Winder said the men 'came as if on their way to a dance', Winder R (2004) 
Bloodý Foreigners: 1-he Storý of Immigration to Britain, London: Little Brown (photograph reproduced undcr 
licence from and with kind pennission of the II ulton Getty library). 
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JLIly 1948: ýN'cst Indian men arriý. ing on the Empire Mndmsh were housed in the ex air-raid shelter on Clapharn 
Common. 1.011don. adapted to function as a temporary hostel until accommodation could be found. Home Off-ice files 
indicate that two ofthe men were found 'nursing' work in Godalming and Orpington. 'Statement of West Indian workers 
placed in eniploynient from the Clapham shelter tip to 30/6/48'. PRO 110 2 13/244 West Indian immigrant workers, 1948 
(photograph reproduced under licence from and with kind perrnission of the II ulton (jetty library). 
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I 
oý 1 
June 1952: -1-%,. o Jamaic an men ta IkI ng, in a Brixton, south London street. The graffiti behin d means 'Keep Britain 
White'. a sign of the increasing racia) tension in the country to 'coloured' immigrant workers (photograph 
reproduced under liccnce from and %% ith 
kind permission of the I lullon (jetty library). 
Nt IIk. N II ol III 11c L" let "Im' '\C\\ Conlinotmea I Ih' at I lackney General II ospital, London 
(photograph rcproduced under licence from and with kind permission of the Hulton Getty library). 
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November 1958: Nurse Christine Oyemaja from Nigeria cleaning surgical instrunients at the Brook General 
I lospital, South London (photograph reproduced under licence from and with kind perrnission of the I lulton Getty 
library). 
January 1960: A %%ard of the Princess I'vlargaret I lospital, Swindon. 'rile first hospita Ito be bui It Linder the National 
I lealth Ser% ice (photograph reproduced Linder licence from and with kind perniission of the I Itilton (jetty library). 
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Persons who are or nave oeen 
(MALE or 
THE NURSES NURSES FEMALE) 
AND MIDWIVES 
I Reg , traýion for 
Erýpioyýenc) 
or MIDWIVES ORDER 
1943 
1 
must REGISTER 
All British subjects of either sex (whateNcr their period of residence in 
this countrv) BORN APTER 31st NUARCH, 1883, and BEFORF' 
Ist APRIL. 1926, %%ho fall N% ithin any of' the classes or deýcrirtion of 
rcrsons specified below, NIUST register at an Ernploýrricnt Lxchangc, 
on Sat. APRIL 
103 1943 
UNLESS (A) Xrrangements have been made for them to register at a 
Hospital. or , 
B' Fhey are exempted by the above Order from liability 
to register. 
PERSONS REOUIRED TO REGISTER 
, Xll nurýcs whose nanics appear on 
or Supplementary State 
et he General Nursing ( oun- 
cil for England and %%aleg and the Gen- 
eral Nursing Council for Scotland. 
Nurses not State Registered but who 
hold a Certificate of at least three 
-ars' training bc! *ore the 30th June, 1925 
in a Training School approved by the 
General Nursing Council for England 
nd Nk ales, or belore the 30th September. 
j_25. in a Training School arproved hy 
the (; encral NursingCouncil ror Scotland. 
3. sptrate Certified Nlidwiýes whether 
actisim, or not and women %%hose 
riarnes lia- b-i but are no longer on 
the Roll ol' %lid, i, es e, cept (it those 
ýho ýerc compolsoriiv retired by the 
rocal supervising authority under Section 
5 fZ) or (he Midwives Act, 1936 or hythe 
Local Aurhority under Secr: on4(2)ot the 
%laternitv Serý ices iScolland f Act, 1937 
(in ihe ground or age or infirmity : and 
tii) those whose names haýe been re. 
mo%ed Crorn the Roll bv direction (it' the 
Central %lidwi, es Board or the Central 
jvhdýives Board for Scotland acting 
under their Penal powers. 
4 SILLIdent nurses and popil mid- 
. wives. 
Persons who are or who have been 5- 
nursing auxiliaries in the Civil Nur- 
sing Reserve, or who are or who have 
been V. A. D. 's or nursing members of 
the British Red Cross Societv, Sit. John 
Ambulance Brigade or St. Ar; drews Am- 
balance Association who have had no[ 
less than six months' t'ull time experience 
in nursing duties, whether or not they 
a re now actually engaged in such duties 
6 NursCry nurses who hold a nursery 
nursing certificate after training al 
(i) a Nursery Training College: ot 
(ii) a Nursery approved by the 
National Society of' Children's 
Nurseries. 
Other persons who have had at least 7. 
one full year of' experience in the 
nursing of' sick persons in a hospital ol 
similar institution. 
8. All persons who, on 30th March. 
1943, were employed in, or engagcd 
for the purpose ot'nursing sick or injured 
persons. 
Women isho art, in Protess ofentering the Wornen's Auxiliari, Seri-ices, "r NOTE: 
the ý% or sing Services ofifle Crt, wn, but are nor let finally en-iled, anti 
men %, ho are in pfocevs of' being cailed upjor ihe Armed Forces, must neverthele's 
, ei! wer ij Met hate any oj tile quaiiIi-dons fisled above. 
Local Offices will be open for the Purpose of registration on 
Saturday, 10th April, 1943 from 9 a. m. to 11 a. m. and from 
12 noon to 6 p. m. To avoid waiting, persons should as for as 
possible attend at the following times : 
A. and B. between 12 noon and I P. M. 
Persons %hose 
C. to F. between I and 2 p. m. 
surnames commence 
G. to J. between 2 and 3 p. m. 
with the letters 
K. to 0. between 3 and 4 p. m. 
P. to S. between 4 and 5 p. m. 
T. to Z. between 5 and 6 p. m. 
Aurses and Midi, iýcs who cannot attend in the alternoon should attend betiteen 9 and 11 a. m. 
ALL PERSONS ATTENDING FOR REGISTRATION MUST BRING WITH 
THE , kI 
THEIR NATIONAL REGISTRATION IDENTITY CARDS, THEIR 
N-\IT0N-*, L SERýI( F RL(; ISTRA'TION' CERTIER AII-S AND IF A STAIE 
REGISI'LRI'D M RSE THEIR NUNIBI R. ON 1HF SlArE REC, ]..,, TER AND 
11, A STATE CERTIFIED MIDWIFE I HEIR NUMBER ON THL ROLL 01- 
N1 I DW I\ ES. 
Persons living more than six miles from an Employment Exchange, or 
\%ho cannot attend in person may register by obtaining the necessary 
form and returning it by Post duly completed not later than April 17. 
Nurses and Midwives genuinely unab! e to register on April 10 because of 
their hours of duty on that (late or becaiise they are sleepirig after night 
dýItN may register at a local office of the Ministry of Labour and National 
Ser%ice during the Aeek April 1.1 to 17. 
Press a&ertiselllent from April 1943 
following the announcement by Chairrnan of tile NAC for tile Recruitment and 
Distribution of Njurses and Nlidý%ives, Nlalcolm NIcCorquodale on 1313C radio of tile wartinic compulsory 
registration of nurses and nlid\ki%es oil 
April 10t" 1943. Source: PRO INF 2/107 Nursing Recruitment, 1945-61 
(reproduced b\, kind perTIliSSiOll of the National Arclli\es, Kew). 
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N. R. 11 55' Size 10 
'Io-worrow depends on -GOOD 
NURSING 
ThC %%Ork I)v our limses' wIII be I-cfIrcted III tile Ilea: , III of' I'M urr -1ý (-ars. The need kw help in Our Y10'spitals is very great and Nursing is a profession of' immense National 
value. Choose this noble calling and train NOW. Make it 
your Nvar work and your proud career in the days of'peace. 
Fill in the Coupon he'low 
for Cull details. 
0 
TRAINING WITH PAY 
FREE UNIFORMS 
NEW SALARY SCALE 
HOLIDAYS WITH PAY 
WIDE RANGE OF 
INTERESTING POSTS 
PENSION SCHEMES 
0 
I-. lM. ()F LAMM-'R AND N. I(. ) 
-',; Kl-N(; SNVAN, 1, (). NDUýN, \\ C, 
"ll'i illustrate(l literature "it Nursing as a war-time job an(l as a career. 
A:, o (letails of-FRAINING, PAY, etc. USE BLOCK LETTERS 
. "Ime all(l 
........... ... ...... .... .... . ... ...... 
... . ....................................... . ........... . ........................................ .... I .......... ........... . 
State age, if 
under 18 ........ 
Coulltv SG19 
Press ad,. cillNclncM', 11-l"ll 1'lc XILNS 
durim, World War 11, appealing to the patriot nature of women to traill as 
nurses. I. actors such as paý and conditions ot'service may not have been so attractive. Source! 
I'RO INIF 2 10; 
N, -fil (reproduced by kind Permission -cimes, Kew). L11,111, jý,: jLjjtTjjcjjt 
1045 of'thc National At 
t09 
POSTERS IN YOUR AREA 
W1 #rrP rA 
wwww. JVOMIN #A CO 
AT WORX AAAl 
Bus pincl ýicsign 
These are the campaign posters. In 
the double-crown and crown-folio sizes 
-numbered here-they are available 
for local use at your discretion. An 
order form is enclosed. 
.\Ij,, jjijcit% 
material called on women in the immediate post-World War 11 ci-a to return to work and aid 
British nduti-1,11 pioduction. Source: PRO INF 13/137/ t3 'We Need the Women Back at Work': 12 Leallets, 1947. 
(reproduccd bý kind pennission of the National Archi, ýes, Kew). 
Ito 
I postcr dcý, llll 
W lk, lu') 
Crown-folio poster 
NEW 
opatt'. 1 
gulý%751 
SCHEME 
The Part - Time scheme offers 
every ex-nurse a welcome back 
to hospital work without serious ol 
/ interference with her private life. 
Just those few hours you can spare 
0. 
every day, or several times a week 
are invaluable to your local 
hospital. Your qualifications, your 
experience in any field of hospital 
work are urgently needed. Already in some 
hospitals Part-Time Nurses, working together, have 
taken over a complete unit of the hospital. 
All categories of Nursitig Staff needez4 J-1 
NURSES 
This portion can be 
supplied as this if MIDWIVES desired. If not, the 
paper can substitute Assistant NURSES, etc. 
matter supplied by 
Local C. 0111111ittee, 
4pply to Your Local Hospital or 
Local Office of the Ministry of Labour 
11, tj ......... edlate po. st-ýýorld %ýar H period the NILNS began an extensiv -time nurses. 
This e campaign to attract part 
was aimed at . %ornen ýý 
lio had left nursing because of marriage or perhaps to care for sick relatives, but could offer a 
part-time ser-ce to tbe IlOsP'tal- lt "'as still 
felt not possible from both the NILNS NAC and the matrons flicniselves, 
that NNornen could be married and Nvork 
full-time in nursing. Wifely duties needed to be satisfactorily met first and 
time ýýas needed to achie"e this. Source: PRO INF 2/107 NUrsing Recruitment, 1945-61 (reproduced by 
kind 
permis,, ioii oftlic N. ItI011,11 Archi'ves, 
Kevý). 
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Chapter 6: The 1"ost-War Recruitment of Nurses in Britain: Policy and Planning 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the nurse rccruitment campaigns of' the Ministries of' Labour and 
Health in the immediate post-World War 11 period. A variety ot'argurnents are presented 
to ofTcr a comprehensive view of' the rationale for the campaigns. The National Health 
Scrx ice (NIIS) was established in 1948 with an acute shortage of' nursing stall'. Yet no 
matter how tcrilptill'u, the prospect may have been, and despite the majority ol'nurses now Z71 
bcm,., employed by tile state, the direction of nursing labour was rejected as a viable 
%vorkt'orcc stratcgy. The reasons t1or this, based upon the wartime experience, are 
explored. The changing roles of the post-war Ministry of' Labour and National Service 
and the Ministry of' Health in nurse recruitment are presented, with the 6ornic" 
takil-11-1 ZI IIILICII I'CdUCCd role in contrast to its wartime activities. Continue(] mision 
between tile two ministries resulted in tile Ministry of Health sceking to take the impetus :D 
t'()i- tile recruitniclit campaigns fi-orn the Ministry of' Labour and devolve this to its own 
Rcgjonal and Hospital Boards by 1957. 
Primm-11%. the chapter presents tile recruitment campaigns as highly reactive and 
charactensed by a policy of diversification. This term refers to the opportunistic 
widening, to a highly %aried population of recruits, of' access routes into IIII nursing. 
I lmý c% cr. the recruitment campaigns were strongly influenced by post-war social values. 
'I'llese ,, m the primary role of' women, many of' whorri had workcd during the war, as 
being motlicrs and horricbuilders. This contradictory approach to policy, in which women 
were simultaneously being encouraged by government to return to work to increase 
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exports and home production, while at the same time their duties to their own homes and 
families were presented as paramount, has produced controversy amongst historians with 
regard to women's post-war social gains. This debate is presented and is used to frame 
the discussion of nurse recruitment campaigns of the time. The specific groups the 
campaigns targeted, including part-time workers, men and nursing orderlies, are offered 
as indicative of these social values and the urgent need to staff the NHS, the flagship of 
the Attlee Government's policy of nationalisation. The argument is considered that nurse 
recruitment, as with the call to women back into industry, was not so much a choice 
between the country's economic needs and the prevailing attitude to women as home- 
makers or child-rearers, as a compromise between the two. 
The post-war ministerial management of the nursing workforce 
The post-war government policy on the nursing workforce differed in several key aspects 
compared to that which operated during World War II. It essentially moved from being 
the preserve of individual hospitals to a more centralised, managed approach. Prior to the 
nationalisation of the health service, recruitment was the individual responsibility of the 
hospital, with the matron advertising in the nursing and national press according to her 
staffing needs. The war ended this and brought with it more expansion into international 
advertising to utilise recruits from the colonies. In addition to this diverse recruitment, 
from 1943 the Ministry of Labour and National Service (MLNS), in its role of mobilising 
the workforce for the war effort, opened a series of Nursing Appointments Offices across 
the country within Labour Exchanges. The aim was to steer potential nursing recruits, 
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both qualified and those wishing to train, to hospitals with staff shortages and training 
vacancies. 
The MLNS had also planned and implemented through its National Advisory Council 
(NAC) for Nursing and Midwifery formed in 1943 extensive national recruitment 
campaigns to enhance the nursing workforce. These took place while the country was on 
the brink of utilising the direction of nurses to ensure the more even distribution of the 
workforce to areas of notable shortage. Such areas were subsequently identified in a 
Control of Engagement Order in September 1943 as tuberculosis, fever and mental 
nursing, together with district nursing and caring for the chronic sick. ' 
The implementation of direction in nursing encompassed progressive restrictions on 
working practice as the war continued. These began with compulsory registration in April 
1943, through a Control of Engagement Order the following September, to the ability if 
required to direct nurses to specific posts by April 1944. However, the term 'on the brink' 
emphasises that direction was never a popular choice within the MLNS to manage the 
British, and notably the nursing, workforce. Indeed, direction was seen as a last resort and 
one from which officials recoiled, since nursing was regarded as, and represented, 
vocational women's work - and is characterised consistently as such within the 
ministerial documents of this period. 
Sir Godfrey Ince, the MLNS's longest-serving Pennanent Secretary (1944-1956), had 
always felt that nurses should be volunteers. He contended that 'there was a difference 
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between tending a human being and a machine. 2 The Minister of Labour, Ernest Bevin, 
in particular can be seen in both primary documents and through his biographer Lord 
Bullock as a hard-liner, a passionate believer in coercion and persuasion, but with 
direction being used as a last resort. 3 Notably, during a debate on war production in the 
House of Commons in late 1940, he declared that although he might have other 
weaknesses, he understood the working classes of Britain. Here he prefer-red to be a 
leader and not a dictator, with regard to coercing increased production from the British 
workforce. Through his knowledge as a long-standing trade-union leader and General 
Secretary for the Transport and General Workers Union, Bevin believed this approach 
would prevent the resistance of an unhappy workforce directed against its Will. 4 In his 
inaugural speech to the NAC, he was quite plain that nursing was a vocational 
occupation: 
'So far, nursing and midwifery have been left out of the various schemes of 
control: both services must essentially be based on the will to sacrifice much to 
help others and recruitment to both must therefore be voluntary. 's 
In many ways the post-war recruitment methods used in nursing remained unaltered. The 
MLNS Nursing Appointments Offices continued, while specific groups were still 
targeted through mass advertising campaigns, and potential new recruits unavailable 
during the war years, such as the colonial populations, became a ready source to be 
recruited to staff British hospitals. This issue of international recruitment will be explored 
in the following chapters. Part-time schemes, the presence of male nurses and attempts to 
increase the use of nursing orderlies, accelerating their pathway to state registration, all 
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reflected the proactive approach to utilise as many different groups as possible in the 
nursing workforce. 
Differing approaches centred around which of the Ministries would now take 
responsibility for the recruitment and placement of nurses. This was particularly because 
from 1948 the health service was nationalised and the Ministry of Health became the 
employer of the majority of the country's nurses. This latter fact of a nursing workforce 
united by national pay scales and terms and conditions of service would appear to lend 
itself to the greater use of controls and direction in the post-war era, particularly given the 
continued acute shortage of staff. During the war, Bevin had noted that any consideration 
of direction of nurses would be severely hampered without national and standardised pay 
6 scales, allowing staff to be more easily transferred between jobs. These had now existed 
since 1943, with the salary scales set and periodically reviewed by the committee chaired 
by Lord Rushcliffe. 7 This chapter will explore what would seem the appeal of an ideal 
method to regulate the supply of nurses in a time of severe shortage, and in a health 
service which could be seen as the flagship of nationalisation. However, arguments are 
presented suggesting why direction was dismissed as a potential policy. 
Finally, the move of women away from the war-time workforce and back into the home 
to nurture the post-war generation influenced who could be recruited as nurses. This 
produced tension from two differing policy approaches. First, there was a desire to return 
to the pre-war traditional, almost nostalgic, values of the woman as mother and home- 
builder. Yet the need to move forward in nursing workforce planning driven by service 
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economy demands was urgent. Such movement resulted in recruitment diversification 
into areas such as part-time workers, as well as the increased use of men and overseas 
recruits. 
The post-war Ministry of Labour and National Service and the Ministry of Health 
The nationalisation of the health services in 1948 pushed to the fore the issue of which 
ministry should take responsibility for the post-war recruitment and placing of the 
nursing workforce. The Ministry of Health had overnight become the employer of a vast 
health-care workforce. On the appointed day of nationalisation employees and 
contractors amounted to approximately half a million people, while hospital staff 
accounted for 360,000, of whom 150,000 were nurses and midwives. 8 Despite these 
impressive figures, the NHS commenced with a staffing crisis and an estimated 53,000 
nurse vacancies and 65,000 unstaffed beds. 9 
Questions were inevitably raised in discussion between the MLNS and the Ministry of 
Health, regarding how each could best work together to ensure an increased supply of 
nursing staff for the new NHS. 10 Discussions were in part framed around the 1947 Wood 
Report. This government-initiated report examined the issue of the recruitment and 
training of nurses in the post-war era, prior to the nationalisation of the health service. " 
Drawing once again on the analogy of teachers and nurses, it argued that, just as the 
Minister of Education was responsible for ensuring an adequate supply of teachers for the 
education services, so the Minister of Health should be responsible for securing adequate 
numbers of nurses. 
12 Such a shift in responsibility had in part occurred in 1945, with the 
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recognition that the MLNS NAC was somewhat isolated from the Ministry of Health 
staff. The Council Chairman suggested to members that it might be more effective if they 
also advised the Minister of Health, who had direct control over health issues over which 
the MLNS did not, and yet which might impact on recruitment, such as conditions of 
service. 13 Such a move was subsequently approved by Council members, and was no 
doubt facilitated by the impending nationalisation. This apparently harmonious 
restructuring of the Council included the Parliamentary Secretary to the MLNS as 
Chairman, while the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health and the 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Scotland were joint Vice Chairmen. Joint 
Secretaries were offered by both the Ministries of Labour and Health. 14 Such an approach 
appeared to be warmly welcomed by both ministries and worked well until the NHS was 
launched. 
By 1948, the impetus was for the Ministry of Health to take responsibility for the 
recruitment campaigns of its own staff. The Wood Report had suggested the move, and 
under the terms of the NHS Act 1946, the Minister of Health and Secretary of State for 
Scotland were empowered to constitute a Standing Advisory Committee to advise on 
service provision. 
's Either this would produce replication of the MLNS's own NAC, 
which dealt with issues primarily related to recruitment, or the two Councils would have 
to work with differing remits. One Council, for example, could have focused upon 
recruitment, while the other examined terms and conditions of service and issues of 
training. 16 
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In discussion with Sir Godfrey Ince, Permanent Secretary at the MLNS, his counterpart at 
the Ministry of Health, Sir William Douglas, suggested a somewhat pragmatic view. 
Rather than presume what might be needed, he declared that all were becoming 
'immersed' in the recommendations of the Wood Report, but it might be wiser to decide 
what ought to be done once the pattern of the nursing profession emerged after it was 
nationalised, and the Hospital Management Committees were in place. " Both men 
agreed that their departments needed to be kept close to developments, particularly as 
regarded any emerging advisory bodies, which would have a bearing on the position of 
the MLNS in nursing. 18 Douglas and Ince's corTespondence appeared to suggest an 
inevitable tension between the ministries, unless the two advisory committees both had 
clear and decided remits. In Douglas's view only his ministry required a Council 
representing appropriate organisations such as the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) and 
the Trades Union Congress (TUC). He contended that: 
'We naturally agree, however, that it may well be necessary for you to have the 
assistance of some kind of advisory body in connection with nursing recruitment, 
but we think that the terms of reference of such a body should make it clear that 
they were being asked to advise on recruitment technique and not on matters of 
nursing policy which, of course, affect recruitment ... the difficulty seems to us to 
arise when we come to consider the type of body to advise you on recruitment 
technique. We had thought that the case might be met by a small body of 
individuals selected for their expert or technical knowledge and not representing 
any particular organisation. ' 19 
Ince was unsure what Douglas meant by recruitment 'technique, ' but it appears clear that 
the latter wanted a restricted role for the MLNS and the avoidance of any possibility of 
overlap. Although Ince agreed with the avoidance of two bodies advising the government 
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on the same questions, he could not agree that his minister should have anything less than 
a NAC. This he insisted should consist of representatives of relevant organisations to deal 
with the recruitment issue. 20 
By June IOh, 1948 a meeting between MLNS and Ministry of Health staff appeared 
reconciled to the likelihood that the MLNS NAC would continue, but focus upon the 
specific issue of recruitment to the desperately low nursing numbers within the NHS .21 
MLNS staff struggled with the exact wording of the NAC's remit to prevent overlap with 
the functions of the Ministry of Health's own NAC for nursing. The ultimate remit was 
declared as advising: '... the Minister of Labour and National Service on the recruitment 
and placing of nurses and midwives for all forms of nursing and midwifery, and on the 
development of his career-advice service for nursing and midwifery. 22 
The post-war approach to recruitment therefore remained essentially unaltered, but the 
MLNS remit within nursing was reduced as nationalisation occurred. During the war 
years the MLNS had been involved not only in recruitment, but also had the power to 
control the choice of engagement made by nurses (from September 1943), and finally the 
power to direct individuals to specific posts if required (from April 1944). 13 Miss Russell 
Smith, Under Secretary at the Ministry of Health, questioned whether 'placing' would 
equate with the issue of distribution, and presumably direction. 24 Mr Nash, her 
counterpart in the Appointments Department of the MLNS, indicated that issues of 
distribution would now be a matter for the Departments of Health and the Regional 
Boards acting for them. 25 It was made clear that the role of the MLNS had now devolved 
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to a support role, to feed the supply of nurses to the Ministry of Health, which as 
employer would decide how best to utilise the staff. As the new service dcvclopcd, it was 
hoped that the Hospital Management Committees would designate a spccific person 
responsible for appointing nurses, domestic and possibly clerical staff. The officers 
would then be the point of contact for the Nursing Appointments Officers involved in 
recruitment inquiries regarding nursing posts. 26 
Tension appeared somewhat inevitable between the two ministries. What Douglas had 
wanted was a much smaller role for the MLNS, advisory to his ministry and avoiding any 
idea of conflict or overlap in function. He did not want a NAC in the MLNS, with 
organisations who could begin commenting on issues relevant to his domain. lie did not 
get this and ended up with two Councils in two ministries, although their remits aimed to 
be different. By the mid 1950s, it was the Treasury which became the catalyst to change 
the uneasy situation. This department perceived that recruitment figurcs had improved, 
and questioned why the nursing profession required its own specific and somewhat costly 
Appointments Service through the MLNS. 27 In an apparent criticism of the attempted 
dlitist qualities aspired to by organisations such as the RCN, the Treasury could only 
contend that the 'dignity of the profession' demanded its own special recruitment system 
beyond all other NHS employees. 28 In discussion with the Treasury in 1954, the Ministry 
of Health appears to have moved towards adopting a somewhat sceptical attitude to the 
role of the MLNS- It stated that it had referred no questions for advice to the MLNS NAC 
and suggested that estimates of the number of nursing vacancies produccd by the MLNS 
should be treated with caution. However, it did admit that it could also place no rcliancc 
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on the vacancy figures produced by the hospitals for its own ministry. Hospital 
authorities were also cited as resenting the frequent visits of technical nursing officers of 
one sort or another, 29 who would clearly have included nursing officers from the MLNS 
Appointments Service. 
In fairness to the MLNS, this resentment may in fact have had less to do with which 
department sent the officers, rather than the matron viewing the visits as another step to 
taking responsibility and control from her once powerful position. 30 As discussed in the 
previous chapter, in the recent pre-war years the lack of government or ministerial 
involvement in an increasing nursing recruitment crisis was marked. Matrons may have 
felt slightly aggrieved that in the post-war years 'the men (and women) from the 
ministry' now felt it appropriate to call in and help advise and support on hospital 
recruitment. This area has been explored by White, 31 and demonstrates a continual battle 
by hospital matrons from the 1940s well into the 1960s, to gain representation on the 
Hospital and Regional Boards of their hospitals. 32 
The boards demonstrated a clear resistance to any directive from the Ministry of Health 
regarding whom they should choose to be on their committees, questioning why nursing 
should be seen as a special case above other representatives. 33 After a series of Ministry 
of Health Circulars, HM (61) 79 was subsequently published in 1961, reinforcing advice 
given previously in 1959 (HM (59) 2 1). 34 Through the former Circular, Minister of 
Health Enoch Powell reiterated that he considered that a matron should have the right to 
attend all meetings of the House Committees and the Hospital Management Committee 
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or the Board of Governors when matters directly or indirectly affecting her own 
department were discussed . 
35 As the recruitment crisis in the senior nursing ranks 
heightened, the latter Circulars demonstrate an increasing pressure from the Ministry of 
Health to gain nursing representation, yet reinforce how ineffective the Circulars were, 
now that the local boards had been empowered through nationalisation to run their local 
groups of hospitals. 
The Treasury decided that, in view of the need for cost constraints, and since other issues 
of recruitment were dealt with by the Ministry of Health, nursing-recruitment issues 
36 should be transferred to that department by May 1" 1957. This was a bitter blow to the 
RCN and their General Secretary Francis Goodall in particular, who had cherished the 
representation on the MLNS NAC. 37 She was clearly angry at the discontinuation of the 
Nursing Advisory Committee of the MLNS, claiming that only one of the NAC's 
represented groups favoured the move of recruitment responsibility to the Regional 
38 Hospital Boards, who would deal with their recruitment issues at a more local level. As 
the matrons fought for influence on their own Regional and Hospital Boards, this move 
away from a centraliscd NAC must have been seen by Goodall and the RCN as another 
step towards reduced nursing influence in the day-to-day running of the NHS. 
The rejection of the direction of nursing labour 
There appeared to be clear concern amongst the nursing workforce that once the health 
service was nationalised and nurses were employed by the state, they could easily be 
directed to areas of greatest need. It was Aneurin Bevan, the Minister of Health, and not 
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Minister of Labour George Isaacs, who was called upon in the summer of 1948 to make it 
6categorically clear' to members of the RCN that he had long rejected the idea of the 
direction of nurses. 39 Isaacs had replaced Ernest Bevin as Minister of Labour in July 
1945. This suggested that the concern in the post-war years was that it was now the 
Ministry of Health which held sway over the placement and control of the distribution of 
nurses, in contrast to the role of the MLNS during the war years. Nurses had clearly 
resisted direction when it had been progressively introduced, initially with a Control of 
Engagement Order, in the latter years of World War IL The NAC of the MLNS noted 
that not all matrons had been distributing the relevant letter and questionnaire to newly 
qualified nurses, who were to be restricted to a year's service in specific specialities. 40 
This was under the terms of the Control of Engagement Order from September 1943, 
with the documentation aiming to elicit who were eligible and where they would 
ultimately be working. To allay fears, the Chairman reiterated that the letter did not mean 
that the nurses would be withdrawn immediately from their hospitals, without the 
consideration of the matron. 41 Helen Dey, representing the Association of Hospital 
Matrons, confirmed the fears of an already short-staffed occupation, stating that the 
letters would have an unsettling effect on the nurses, encouraging them to start their 
year's service as soon as possible and depleting the ranks of the training hospitals. 42 
In addition to this history of known resistance, there are a variety of suggested reasons 
why direction of nurses was rejected by the Ministry of Health in favour of the continued 
mass targeting of specific groups of potential recruits. As previously highlighted, nursing 
was viewed as a voluntary occupation by the ministries. It was believed that people could 
not be forced under direction to show compassion and caring. The very idea of direction 
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had been at odds with the wartime propaganda, which encouraged the British people to 
offer their services voluntarily to the war effort. This propaganda focused on a 
democratic society all pulling together to defeat a tyrannical foe, and laid the basis for the 
Welfare State, where once everyone had been united they would be cared for from the 
cradle to the grave. Publicity material stressed this unity and the valuing of the 
workforce: Prime Minister Churchill's 'Let us go forward together', 'Dig for victory', 
'Our wonderful women, were all examples of this philosoph Y. 43 Hitler and Nazi 
Germany had utilised direction of its workforce during the war years, and Ernest Bevin 
quickly associated the term 'dictator' with the concept of direction in his House of 
Commons speeches. 44 
However, the main problem with the direction of nurses was practical; it simply had not 
worked. It had never been applied with any great conviction, so the effects and any 
consequent evaluation were minimal. Today it is difficult to find any records of a nurse 
who was actually directed to a specific post, beyond the limited areas offered to newly 
qualified staff through the Control of Engagement Order. Nursing was made up of many 
differing groups of staff on varying parts of the General Nursing Council (GNC) register, 
all working in areas which were generally short-staffed. Where employment restrictions 
had been applied, this merely created more acute shortages in the areas they could not 
choose upon registering. Hospitals in cancer nursing, orthopaedics, sick children, ear 
nose and throat, and oplithalmics all complained to the MLNS of the effect of 
restrictions. 45 This resulted in the NAC granting concessions in all of these areas, so that 
they would not lose the ability to recruit from newly qualified staff . 
46 A clear example of 
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the complexity of this workforce policy was in children's nursing. Here a nurse who had 
trained to care for children, who then chose to spend three years training as a gcneral 
nurse, could not under the Control of Engagement Order return to the children's wards 
for another year. 47 
The issue of maldistribution was improved, but the underlying problem was not solved. 
The Control of Engagement Order was not a recruitment measure; it merely redistributed 
an already short-staffed workforce. The use of direction to an already wary nursing 
workforce, who had just experienced the introduction of the NHS, may have been 
foolhardy. The number of nurses remained critically short at the beginning of the NHS, 
and the use of such controls had not been demonstrated to improve the health service 
markedly, while a large number of areas remained short of staff. 
Post-war social analysis 
The following section examines the social issues that underpinned and affected the 
recruitment of nurses in Britain during the late 1940s and 1950s. This will be followed by 
an analysis of the recruitment strategies of the MLNS and the Ministry of Health, framed 
against the background of the preceding discussion. Of note during this period is the 
contradiction behind the general encouragement by government for women to return to 
the home and rear children, and the need for an expanding workforce to rebuild post-war 
Britain. This has also produced controversy and divided historians regarding the 
subsequent social gains of the female workforce following World War IL Tom Harrison, 
the founder of the Mass Observation Organisation, the anthropological group that studied 
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social attitudes and behaviour in Britain, noted in May 1942 that women were being 
forced 
'... to notice more closely the wider implications of their environment outside the 
home and the comer shop and the town centre. In one sense the war is a painful 
process of education in citizenship and education in the interrelationship of 
distant events and the amount of available cheese, apathy and your house being 
ignited by something dropped from the sky. 948 
Marwick was one of the earliest historians to highlight what he saw as the social 
consequences of World War 11 and the resulting post-war gains of women as workers. 
The revoking of the marriage bar in teaching and the civil service (preventing women 
who married from maintaining their posts) in 1946, together with changing attitudes of 
employers to women workers, was seen by Marwick as evidence of greater equality and 
opportunity for women workers . 
49 This traditionalist view argues that following the war 
years certain avenues of employment may have closed for women (Marwick is 
presumably referring to women returning certain jobs back to men), but female 
emancipation had been advanced. This general statement does not take account of locally 
determined practices. Women were generally discouraged by the matron or sister from 
working as nurses once married, and the degree to which the heroic role of nurses in war- 
time altered such traditional Practices must be questioned. 
Kingsley Kent has written extensively on the issue of gender and power in Britain from 
the seventeenth century to the present day, and notably following the two world wars. 
so 
She argues very much from an alternative perspective, suggesting that government policy 
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was restrictive to women in the workforce, pushing them back into the home following 
World War II to be wives and child-rearers. This was ftielled by concerns regarding the 
falling birth rate. 51 Such policy measures were seen initially in the early 1940s in the 
planning of post-war life, and notably through the 1942 Beveridge Report. This produced 
the plans of the Welfare State for Britons and enshrined the male as the wage earner and 
the woman as the stay-at-home wife. This is noted both through Beveridge's comments 
on married women working in wartime being 'an anomaly', and unemployment benefits 
being based upon the income of, and ultimately paid to, the husband. The halving of 
subsidies to nurseries, forcing many local governments to shut them down after the war, 
reduced childcare options to those women who wished to work. 52 
Kingsley Kent further highlights the work of psychologists Winnicott and Bowlby, who 
emphasised the creation of delinquent juvenile characters through prolonged separation 
of mother and child. Such views are cited as informing the thinking of a range of policy- 
makers and influential members of society, from jurists, physicians and social workers 
through to welfare officials. 53 In Kingsley Kent's argument the official government view 
does not match that of the population at large, and therefore women are presented in the 
text as a resilient but oppressed group keen to work. Statistics are produced that 
demonstrate that 22% of married women were working in 1951 compared to 10% in 
193 1.54 This again emphasises the common theme in historical studies of this period, of 
the tension between two contradictory view points: the implied government 
discouragement of a female workforce, set against the keenness of women to enter the 
workplace, alongside men. 
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The flaw in Kingsley Kent's argument is that she takes no account of the huge 
propaganda campaigns of the Attlee Government in the immediate post-war years. These 
attempted to drive women back into work to aid production and ameliorate the post-war 
debt in which Britain found itself. During the war years, Britain had lost almost a quarter 
of its entire national wealth. The national debt had increased threefold, and, as the 
world's largest debtor nation in 1945, Britain had become heavily reliant upon the sale of 
overseas assets and the 'Lend-Lease' financial assistance from the United States. British 
exports had fallen by two thirds as industry worked for war production, and it was 
estimated that the volume of exports would have to be increased by 175% simply to 
recover wartime losses . 
55 The government's campaigns were therefore much needed and 
ran from June 1947 to November 1949, affecting industries, notably those of cotton and 
textiles, as well as continuing an intensive recruitment drive in nursing. 56 
The conflict between two apparently differing social messages is never explored by 
Kingsley Kent, beyond the brief recognition that the government acknowledged and 
facilitated the trend by eliminating the marriage bar in teaching and the civil service. L. C. 
White, General Secretary of the Civil Service Clerical Association, noted in 1952 that the 
removal of the marriage bar in the latter had not been based on a desire for equality, but 
because of an acute post-war labour shortage. 57 At their annual conference of that year, 
several members of the Association had called for its reinstatement based on the sanctity 
of the family unit, arguing that manied women would be tom between loyalties to their 
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family and employer. 58 Despite acknowledging the adverse effect of redundancy on 
59 
married men while married women were retained, the motion was strongly defeated. 
Other historians such as Wilson do touch upon the issue of the conflicting messages 
given to post-war women, albeit briefly. In reviewing the role of women in post-war 
Britain, Wilson argues that an attempt was made immediately following World War II to 
impart the ideal of homemaking as a career to all (her emphasis) classes of women. She 
argues that this was part of the general ideological enterprise which was to unite the 
classes and to identify the interests of the working class with the national interest. This 
'national interest' appears in Wilson's work to be part of a complex reconciliation 
between the classes, attempting to preserve the sense of one nation that the war had 
created. This was seen through the building of a new and democratic community, of 
which the Commonwealth was the expression overseas and the Welfare State at home. 
Full employment was to end the class war, and community would be epitomised by the 
full expression of family life. 
However, with the desperate need for workers to reconstruct Britain, Wilson again 
suggests the idea of tension, this time with Attlee's administration attempting a 'weird 
juggling feat' in promoting family values while continuing a call to labour. 60 Crofts, and 
particularly Carruthers, explore the resulting propaganda campaign in detail. 6 1 For Crofts 
the two messages are not complementary, with a decision being made to give 'priority 
over the population fears' in favour of female recruitment. 62 Carruthers suggests that the 
message of social values was more pervasive to the campaign and in regard to nursing 
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this is the complementary approach that is analysed within this chapter. This marrying of 
approaches, which is essentially the policy versus the reality, is seen within the context of 
a selective call to certain female groups. These were notably older women whose children 
were grown, or at least were not toddlers, and who may have had existing experience of 
the industry they were being asked to work in. This return to post-war traditional family 
values is seen to pervade the ministries. Both Isaacs as Minister of Labour and Bevan in 
the Ministry of Health were clear regarding who the target audience for the campaign 
should be and this was the selective-targeting approach that formed the model for nurse 
recruitment. Isaacs in his call for women to return to work reiterated that he was not 
6... speaking to the mothers of very young children. It is more important that they 
should be looking after their babes than volunteering to do a job outside the home. 
For those who want to do it, and who have children a little older, there are in 
many places Day Nurseries, and in other places employers have wisely set up 
cr&ches. 63 
Bevan was more specific and emphasised that the government was not making a drive to 
recruit women for industry who had children under two years of age. 64 Publicity stated 
that it was women's jobs that were available, with no return to the need to take these from 
men. They were presented as jobs traditionally performed in peacetime by women. When 
the comer had been turned in the vital production drive, it was felt that the need for 
women workers would not be so acute. 65 These were deeply contradictory messages and 
memoranda between the Ministries of Health and the MLNS even suggested that keeping 
nurseries open might have unnecessarily encouraged women with very young children to 
work. The latter were to be a last-resort option as workforce recruits: 
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'.. There can be no doubt that on health and social grounds, the proper place for 
the mother of young children is in the home. If, as appears from the Ministry of 
Health memorandum opposite ... the government would have to go to Parliament 
for approval of the continued provision of nurseries wholly at the cost of the 
exchequer, it would probably meet with a good deal of criticism if there was any 
suggestion that these nurseries were being provided to bring indirect pressure on 
mothers of young children to work. In reply to such criticism, it would need to be 
shown that all other classes of the community were fully pulling their weight on 
essential work. v66 
Industrial and Nursing Recruitment: Comparison and Contrast 
Carruthers's work only makes passing reference to nursing. This is in the context of 
being a part of a MLNS campaign to encourage women to remain in or return to industry 
and services such as nursing. The focus of Carruthers's chapter is upon industrial work 
for women and, although referring to nursing, it fails to differentiate between propaganda 
encouraging women to enter industry and that aimed at nurses. There were similarities, 
notably the mass poster, coupon and exhibition-van approach. Part-time schemes were 
also growing in nursing in contrast to the pre-war years. In industry whole-time to part- 
time shifts were encouraged at the factory, in accordance with the degree to which 
women could free themselves from 'household duties'. However, the differences were 
also marked. This was primarily in the social classes the two campaigns were aimed at, 
and in the implicit reasons why the two groups might have entered their chosen work 
area. In industry, propaganda focused on patriotism and the monetary gains which 
working women could gain: 'Women please lend your support a little longer, let's work 
together for prosperity. 67 The approach emphasised pulling together for the luxuries 
which could be available in the post-war era: 'Help to make the goods we want, join your 
friends at work, put more money in your bag, 69 (see illustration plates). 
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Harrison had previously argued, from Mass Observation's five years of surveying 
women, that there was no propaganda strategy which allowed for the differentiation 
between men and women's motivations and attitudes to the war. 69 He argued that male 
decision-making was so ingrained in British life, from policy to home decisions, that it 
had become implicit that women's propaganda would also be set by men within the 
ministries, notably those within the MLNS. He cited a variety of points which he felt 
those planning women's war-time workforce propaganda should consider. These 
included the observation that poorer women tended towards a very 'considerable apathy' 
about war appeals and what he termed 'urgencies'. The latter presumably referred to 
appeals for women to enter short-staffed essential industries and public services. He 
viewed working-class women as tending to be less imaginative and more day-to-day and 
practical than men . 
70 The conclusion was that they subsequently found difficulty in 
visualising hypothetical dangers or in accepting propositions stated in 'unempathic' 
terms. 71 One presumes this related to propaganda which did not focus on issues directly 
affecting the women's everyday lives. Carruthers bases a great deal of her argument 
around Mass Observation's data, and therefore propagates the view that workforce 
propaganda failed because of an insensitivity to women's issues and views, a conclusion 
consistent with Harrison's view. 
However, because men had led the propaganda campaigns, it did not necessarily equate 
them with failure. Carruthers suggests that only 3 1,000 women were recruited via the 
1947 campaign, with two thirds of vacant posts still remaining empty. " Crofts paints an 
altogether different picture, arguing that the effect of the textile-industry campaigns was 
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'fairly considerable', with a net gain of 20,000 workers, which included 3,400 part-time 
workers. During the 12 months ending May 1951 a net gain of 200,000 married women 
in industry was made, which Crofts suggests set the trend for a steady rise in this group of 
female workers into the 1960s. 73 
Yet it would appear incorrect to state that propaganda focused predominately on broader 
concepts. Carruthers argues that the government was aware of the powerful financial 
incentive to work during wartime, but did not use this inducement. The exact reason is 
unclear, but post-war propagandists are presented as more aware of the factors which 
encouraged women to take up employment, yet still reluctant to cast aside abstract 
themes altogether. They assumed women not working were not seduced by such practical 
appeals. 74 Perhaps abstract themes such as patriotism could be linked to a temporary 
crisis and therefore once this had passed women would return to the home. Too great an 
emphasis on pay may have subsumed them into a continuing income for the household, 
working against the desired social outcomes. This does not appear to reflect reality. 
Firstly, the initial post-war years appeared harsher for the housewife than the war itself. 
Food controls intensified. Bread was rationed for the first time from July 21 st, 1946 until 
July of 1948, and a potato-control initiative was launched from November 1947 to the 
following April. 73 The former was in part due to commitments to post-war Germany, with 
an agreement to provide 70% of the food needs for the British zone. This requirement to 
export vast quantities of wheat to Germany occurred at a time of bad harvests and 
diminishing world supplies. 76 
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The increasing emphasis on the need for exports to off-set the huge war debt resulted by 
1948 in the average citizen having to make do with 13 oz of meat a week, 1.5 oz of 
77 
cheese, 6 oz of butter or margarine, 8 oz of sugar, two pints of milk and one egg. The 
continuation of a culture of austerity had been compounded by one of the worse winters 
for 50 years in early 1947, resulting in the River Thames freezing over. Electricity had to 
be limited to certain hours of the day for domestic customers, owing to an inability to 
transport coal, and was cut off altogether to some regional industries. 78 
Against this was the call for women to return to industry to work as they had during the 
war. Aiming purely at patriotic feelings would have been short-sighted, and therefore the 
focus was more on the material gains to be acquired. In addition, Carruthers's argument 
plays down the statistical analysis performed for the MLNS in March 1948, which 
appears to shape female workforce propaganda more strongly. The survey randomly 
selected 2,807 women for interview within Great Britain across the range of income from 
earnings of up to 0 per week to ; ElO and over. 1,093 of those interviewed were 
79 employed, the rest were without jobs. In July 1947,73% of the women working said the 
money they earned was the chief reason for working. Sixty-two per cent of the 
unemployed women said that if they were to work, money would be the primary 
incentive. 80 The data supported Harrison's comments that it was the practical incentives 
that drove women to work. This supports the argument that attempts were made to mould 
propaganda to women's views. This is further reinforced by two factors. The report 
highlighted that it was marriage more than children that dissuaded women from working. 
In July 1947,22% of all married women aged 16 to 60 years were in employment, 
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compared to 53% of all widowed and 88% of all single women of the same ages. Of 
married women without children, 32% were in employment, compared to 88% of single 
women, who equally had no children, demonstrating the power of marriage to prevent 
women from working. 81 Secondly, only 2% of unemployed women mentioned their 
husband's disapproval as one of the difficulties they would face if they were thinking of 
taking work. 82 
The fact that only 9% of women aged 16 to 60 years were in part-time employment in 
July 1947 indicated a huge potential in both industry and nursing for this form of 
worker. 83 This was reinforced by the survey's view that husbands' attitudes would not be 
a major factor to women working. Whether this was actually recognised and became the 
catalyst to utilise part-time married women and those having left areas such as nursing for 
home commitments is questionable. However, in the post-war era, the increasing 
campaigns to draw back this group of women with facilities for part-time working were 
clear and formed a significant part of the recruitment drive. Finally, although it was 
estimated that approximately 100,000 women might be prepared to take up full-time 
employment, there was believed to be an additional 350,000 who would consider part- 
time work in industry. 84 
Framed against this survey were the practical gains and the logistics of how to fit factory 
work in with home life, which distinguished propaganda in the industries and factories 
from nursing, and can be seen more strongly when the two are contrasted. A negative 
correlation, although not great, could be seen between the lowest economic groups and 
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money as the incentive to work. In the lowest economic groups, those earning up to 0 
per week, which would include certain jobs in industry, 82% of women gave money as 
their chief work incentive. This was compared with 64% in the upper economic groups of 
the survey. These were the groups who earned f. 5: 10s to flO per week and ; ElO and 
85 above, and were more likely to encompass nurses. In industry, as well as the 'money in 
your bag' approach, 'personal stories' were presented of ordinary women who could fit in 
daytime work looking after the family, and still complete a flexible shift at the factory or 
Mill. 16 
In government propaganda of the war years, nursing appears as a symbol of its 
contribution to the caring elements of a free society and of nation-building. The idea of 
nurses being part of a people pulling together not only in the war years, but with a view 
to the peacetime reconstruction of the health service, was fully exploited: slogans such as 
'Nurses are building a New Britain', 'Tomorrow depends on Good Nursing' (both 
October 1943, see illustration plates), accompanied by pictures of cheery nurses and 
children, cemented through their phraseology the idea of a unified nursing workforce 
which the NHS would bring: 
'A new nation is now being planned and shaped, a Britain where health is to be 
paramount, and the health services more important than ever before. Will you 
help - will you train to take your place in the ranks of the nurses, upon whom so 
much dependsT 
87 
The above magazine recruitment advertisement from October 1943 continued in 
differing fonnats in the same month and in the same vein: 
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'The work done today by our nurses will be reflected in the health of future 
years. The need for help in our hospitals is very great and nursing is a profession 
of immense national value. Choose this noble calling and train now. Make it 
your war work and your proud career in the days of peace. ' 88 
The advertisements are somewhat reminiscent of Davin's study of the role of the mother 
in the concept of British national efficiency and infant mortality, during the latter 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 89 In Davin's argument, although increasing 
knowledge of areas such as the contribution of infection to infant mortality became 
available, together with maternal health and malnutrition, these were still underestimated 
in social arguments in favour of the central role of the mother. It was matemal not 
medical ignorance that always received the blame; the minimal available access of the 
poor to medical help was never mentioned as a cause for high infant mortality. The 
mother's ignorance and neglect predominated. 90 
Davin raises several interesting points which can be linked, perhaps speculatively, to the 
wartime and immediate post-war advertisements for nurse training. She argues that 
alongside the emphasis on the importance of motherhood, complementing although 
apparently contradicting this is the development of employment and careers in the 
expanding field of health. It appeared that 'racial motherhood, ' nurturing the next 
generation, was essential, but individual motherhood was not. 91 Certainly recruitment 
advertisements see the mothering nurse making a career out of nursing everyone else's 
children. However, this is a slightly difficult argument to grasp because it does appear 
contradictory to the philosophy of the Welfare State. The idea behind Beveridge's 
Welfare State had been to offer contributions, not full support, to child-rearing and not 
138 
even to the first born. This gave enough money to the woman to raise children, but kept 
her in the home through a dependence on the husband's wage. Beveridge had declared 
that housewives and mothers had vital work to do in ensuring the sustainability of the 
British race and of British ideals in the world. 92 The shortage of nurseries and ministerial 
statements on the role of the mother supported this view. Davin's closing comments 
perhaps offer some explanation of the complexity of this contradiction: whether married 
women's work is tolerated or denounced simply depends on whether it is needed. 93 In the 
post-war era it clearly was needed. The advertisements pushed women to work, but 
appealed to the ideology of what was appropriate women's work, that is motherhood, and 
emphasised the need to nurture the next generation enshrined in Beveridge's Welfare 
State. 
As the increasing crisis in nurse recruitment continued, the patriotic approach became 
much less evident in the late 1940s, and once the NHS was established to meet the 
nation's health. 'Meet Nurse Britain' was less of a patriotic call than an exhibition in 
photomontage of the work and recreation of a typical British nurse in 1948.94 As 
discussed, direction of nursing labour was not a policy option during peacetime and, 
subsequently for nursing, the predominant campaigns moved back to the traditional 
appeals of the non-monetary, self-fulfilling, individualist gains that the occupation could 
offer. This accompanied not only a sense of satisfaction and fulfillment, but the attributes 
of a proficient worker: 
, it's a job a thousand times worth while. That is why many nurses specialise in 
midwifery after taking their SRN. ' (October 1946) 95 
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'She is popular with patients, doctors and nurses alike. Matron says she could 
do with a dozen like her. She is calm, quick and efficient and a good team 
worker. ' (August 1946) 96 
Such an approach may correspond to the apparent decrease in remuneration as a driving 
force to work as economic class rose. Nursing was primarily seen by the Ministries of 
Labour and Health as commensurate with the professional class of teaching, particularly 
when considering remuneration. The Cabinet itself, when considering salary rises for 
nurses, usually compared the profession to teaching, because it believed the latter 'drew 
(recruits) from the same sources'. 97 
The campaign's initial promise of feeling part of a team and being valued remained in 
stark contrast to the reality. Students who had left nursing at the time of the campaigns 
reported a hierarchical and often unkind regime, which isolated them from their superiors 
and overshadowed any altruistic feelings towards the patients. Repeated reports had re- 
emphasised the problems of the hierarchical approach in nursing since the 1930s, but the 
ministries could do little to change the entrenched regimes stemming from what was 
perceived as the Nightingale approach to nursing. 98 
By the late 1940s and following the launch of the NHS, the ministries' approach to 
nursing propaganda took a much more pragmatic approach, focusing on the material 
gains to be had in the occupation. The country-wide Rushcliffe salary scales had been in 
place for five years prior to the NHS, yet were much less prominent in propaganda than 
one might expect following its launch. From the late 1940s nursing recruitment publicity 
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reflected the approach of propaganda in industry, with an emphasis on material gains as 
reward for the job. The short-story approach of the satisfied nurse was replaced with a 
declaration emphasising 'There's a future in nursing', with the remaining text truncated 
to an economic projection: 'Training allowances start at E200 a year, superannuation for 
all, 28 days paid holiday, opportunities for promotion at home and abroad', (June/July 
1949)99 This change can be argued as part of a general move to equate nurses with all 
other health-care staff within the NHS. Although the MLNS argued against the ending of 
their specific Appointments Service for nursing, by the mid 1950s both the Ministry of 
Health and the Treasury could not see why nursing in the health service had to be treated 
differently, now that recruitment was improving. 100 
Part-time and male nurses 
Utilising nurses on a part-time basis was a relatively new move in post-war Britain. For 
the Ministry of Health, as part of the approach to target specific groups, it clearly had 
advantages. At no stage did the Ministries of Health or Labour contemplate married 
women as full-time nurses, but they were keen to launch a specific campaign together in 
late 1946 to attract those lost to marriage and other domestic responsibilities. In a draft 
letter to its regional offices and medical and nursing officers, the Ministry of Health 
declared that it proposed that the two departments should take the initiative in launching 
part-time nursing campaigns in selected areas throughout the country. It was considered 
that a start should be made in areas where there was a serious shortage of nurses and 
midwives, and where at the same time there was a reasonable prospect of part-time staff 
coming forward-101 
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This approach encouraged home-making women to offer a service convenient both to the 
hospital and to the husband. For the nursing occupation itself, this was a new move from 
the selfless, dedicated, vocational role, and even by the mid-1960s recruitment films 
made a point of emphasising that marriage and nursing could work 'at least in the 
beginning', while there was the option of part-time or district nursing. This gave the 
implicit message that it was still rather unusual to be a married full-time nurse. Old 
values emerged with recruitment films in the mid 1960s with titles such as 'Not so much 
a training, more a way of life'. 102 
Part-time nurses were seen as only recruitable from within a small locality of the hospital 
in which they would ultimately work, in order to meet their home obligations. Their 
numbers were seen as being drawn from those who had left nursing and midwifery for 
domestic reasons, such as marriage or to care for aged parents or invalids. 103 Bevan 
highlighted the need to meet the requirements of such women in his interim nursing 
policy following the publication of the Wood Report in October 1947. He argued: 
, it is ridiculous to waste the nursing skill of married nurses willing to work, but 
hours and conditions must be made possible for them. "" 
Advice was offered to regional hospitals regarding the setting up of local part-time 
schemes with support from the Ministry of Health. 105 Towards the end of 1947 the 
Ministry of Health were claiming that some 12,600 part-time nurses were now in Post. 106 
The British Medical Association (BMA) surveyed the same 19 hospitals in the pre- and 
post-war era (see table 6.1). The MLNS recognised that this was not a large number, but 
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had no reason to doubt it was not generally representative of the staffing situation in 
nursing. 107 The figures clearly demonstrate the increasing numbers of staff, but the 
demand still progressively outstripped supply, as is shown by the number of unstaffed 
beds. The emergence of the part-time worker is a noticeable contribution to the overall 
workforce, with a clear absence in the immediate prc-war years. It remains unclear how 
unstaffed/unoccupied bed numbers were calculated. Staffing levels had risen by 1948, but 
the unstaffed/unoccupied bed figares had also increased. 
Table 6.1 Comparison of pre- and post-World War 11 nursing staff figures for 19 
hospitals selected randomly by the British Medical Association (BMA) in 1938. 
Red-. Staffed 
Year 1938 1948 
Occupied 6,236 6,001 
Unoccupied 1,373 813 
Unstaffed/ 
Unoccupied 
I 156 I 525 
Staff Fmninvi-d 
Year 1938 1948 
Full-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
Trained Nurses 725 958 129 
Student Nurses and Pupil 
Midwives 
1,652 2,139 Nil 
Assistant Nurses 205 193 72 
Other Nurses 124 81 17 
Midwives 325 116 21 
Ward Orderlies 63 306 36 
N- 19 hospitals 
NB: St Clements Hospital was included in the original data but was not Included in the above figures. 
Source: 'Total Figures for Group of 19 Hospitals Selected by the BMA Showing the Position in 1938 
and 1948 as Regards Beds and Staff of Various Grades'. PRO MH 55/2092 Nursing Statistics: 
Hospital Beds and Staff 1948-1959. 
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The Ministry of Health seized on the issue of male nurses with equal enthusiasm. In May 
1945, the then Chief Nursing Officer, Dame Katherine Watt, was emphasising that every 
effort and encouragement should be made to encourage hospital authorities to utilise the 
services of men discharged from the services. 108 Bevan was aware of the additional 
potential of men in nursing and turned for recruitment advice to the NAC. This had, from 
1945, extended its remit to be advisory to the health departments as well as the MLNS. 
The potential to increase the use of men in nursing had followed a House of Commons 
question regarding what steps were being taken to encourage their use as nurses. 109 H. 
Gaskell, the General Secretary of the Society of Registered Male Nurses, had seen 
Bevan's reply, but noted that the NAC had no male representation. Representation was 
subsequently sought and Gaskell attended the meeting on 26th October, 1945.1 10 
The GNC now agreed to a six-month remission period of state registration training for 
nursing orderlies with two years' 'good' nursing experience during the war, in hospitals 
under trained supervision. This was on condition that the matron of the hospital agreed. 
The future trainees also had to apply within six months of being discharged from the 
services. "' Gaskell was strongly in favour of equality for male and female nurses and 
suggested that the GNC should no longer accord facilities for the separate training of 
men. He concluded that there could be no disadvantage in the employment of a male 
nurse in any position for which there were trained-nurse vacancies. 112 
Subsequently, a Circular was sent to hospitals from the Ministry of Health in February 
1946, urging the greater use of male nurses. It concluded that, apart from mental 
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13 institutions, the employment of male nurses was the exception not the norm. 1 This 
memorandum was in fact a ftirther development on paragraph 20 of Bevan's 
memorandum 'Staffing the Hospitals' published in November 1945.114 By 1945 the 
GNC, being less open to male-recruitment issues and focusing on the female role of 
nursing, had less than 30 general hospitals in England and Wales approved for male- 
nurse training. " S By the end of 1946, with the push from the Ministry, a further 45 had 
been approved! 16 Bevan further emphasised his support for male nurses in his interim 
policy launched at the Middlesex Hospital in 1947, following the publication of the Wood 
Report. 
He noted that with the general manpower shortage the extent to which men ought to be 
directed to nursing was clearly limited. However, he believed that there was room for 
some expansion and this should be encouraged by extension of the field in which male 
'Cific 
117 Spe nurses were used in hospitals. I literature produced by the MLNS focused 
broadly on state registration for men, noting that assistant nurses had little prospect of 
promotion. ' 18 Industrial nursing was seen as an ideal area for male nurses, due to the 
presence of men and boys in the workplace. To further encourage men to train, special 
allowances at each stage of training were offered as incentives and included in the 
publicity. These were 10s per week in the first year of training, 8s per week in the second 
year and 6s per week in the third year and until state registration. ' 19 
The organisations which made up the nursing occupation remained less explicit regarding 
attitudes to men in nursing, but produced implicit barriers to recruitment. The presence of 
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a Society of Registered Male Nurses implied a lack of full integration into the nursing 
occupation, while the RCN denied full membership for some 44 years until 1960. The 
separate and low number of training facilities for men was compounded by nursing's 
obsession with attitudes towards gender roles and behaviour. Men in the post-war period 
were offered separate residency, while the financial restriction to hospital building in the 
late 1940s and 1950s resulted in often sub-standard accommodation. 
By 196 1, with the continuation of accommodation segregation for males and females, the 
Central Health Services Council (CHSC) raised the concern that men were not enjoying 
the same standard of amenities as female nurses. The NAC, formed under the NHS 
legislation, was charged with advising on questions referred to it by the Minister of 
Health, but could also initiate advice and publish reports. The Standing Advisory 
Committees, created under the NHS Act 1946, were in turn advisory to the Council on 
specific issues related to the health services. 120 The Advisory Committee noted that in 
some instances residency was denied to male nursing students, or only ward 
accommodation or dormitories were provided. It also noted that male students 
occasionally had to share patients' toilets and bathrooms. 121 
The recruitment of colonial nursing staff will be discussed in detail in the following 
chapter, but officially, this lack of accommodation was highlighted as one of the main 
reasons that men from the colonies were denied training opportunities at certain hospitals. 
However, there appeared a prejudice which stemmed back to the earliest colonial 
recruitment following World War IL The MLNS noted from the late 1940s the 
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difficulties in placing Caribbean men for general nurse training in the United Kingdom. 
Of the training schools in the London area, matrons of Hackney and West Middlesex 
County Hospitals were pleased to consider men from the colonies, provided 
accommodation could be found for them. The Welfare Officers reported that lodgings 
were extremely difficult to find in those areas, highlighting the racial prejudice. The 
Matron of St Hellier Hospital, Carshalton, stated she would be pleased to consider 
&colonial men' if she had a hostel for male nurses, but there was no hope of that at the 
present time. She did not wish to have them if they had to live out, as she felt they needed 
some guidance when off duty! It was noted by the MLNS in the mid 1950s that 'some 
hospitals will not even consider male colonial candidates. ' 122 
Despite the positive ministerial encouragement to British men, there is no evidence that 
the Ministry of Health saw the active recruitment of male nurses as a considered method 
to stabilise the nursing workforce, depleted by women leaving owing to marriage. Male 
nurses faced clear discrimination in the workplace with respect to promotion prospects, 
while the Ministry of Health took few active steps to correct this and encourage 
recruitment. There remain a number of letters between the Ministry of Health, specific 
male nurses and hospital boards regarding the lack of promotion of men to senior nursing 
Posts. 123 Of note was an enquiry that came to the attention of the Ministry of Health and 
was held at Northampton General Hospital in May 1949. This was regarding a male nurse 
claiming that less experienced nurses were promoted ahead of him for the post of 'ward 
sister'. Hospital authorities argued that certain administrative duties were more 
satisfactorily performed by female ward sisters. These were listed and included the care 
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of equipment, ward linen repairs, the preparation and serving of patients' food and the 
sympathetic handling of patients' relatives and of the bereaved. 124 Another male nurse 
wrote to the Ministry of Health claiming that the matron had informed him that 'male 
staff nurses could not work in harmony with female nurses on the same wards. ' 125 Male 
nurses often left the hospital to find satisfactory employment elsewhere. This suggests 
that discrimination was not uniform in all hospitals. 
The lack of decisive action by the Ministry of Health to correct this source of low morale 
reflected a policy with little semblance of planning. Promotion to 'ward sister' of male 
nurses appeared to go against the grain of local policy in some general hospitals, owing 
purely to the belief that women performed certain nursing roles more satisfactorily than 
men. "' The continued existence of the Society of Registered Male Nurses emphasised 
the discrimination felt by men. Perhaps this perceived prejudice was justified when 
significant figures such as Miss M. G. Lawson, the Deputy Chief Nursing Officer at the 
ministry of Health, declared in 1952 that she was at a loss regarding what to do to bring 
about the revolution they (male nurses) desired. She added: 
'Without being in the least bit snobbish, I think everyone would agree that male 
nurses in general are not, as yet anyhow, drawn from the same social stratum as 
the women who become leaders of the profession. There may be exceptions and I 
know that qualities of leadership need not depend on social rank, but, in the main, 
this is a fair gencralisation. ' 127 
The Ministry of Health staff held mixed views on the issue. G. T. Milne, Assistant 
Secretary at the Ministry, commenting on an individual case, viewed the reasons for such 
148 
a policy as indefensible. He reflected that such an attitude may have been fairly 
widespread and the Ministry should do what it could to convert hospital authorities to a 
more enlightened policy with regard to men. 128 He subsequently informed the 
department's nursing staff that he did not think there was any action that could be taken, 
the handicaps faced by male nurses being to some extent inescapable. 129 He felt that in 
time the male nurse might 'improve his position to some extent. ' 130 The Ministry clearly 
was not prepared actively to intervene in hospital policy. The use of men was once again 
a tentative policy as regards staffing within the hospital system. It had in part been driven 
by the large numbers of men who had undertaken orderly training during the war. 131 The 
GNC was subsequently persuaded to validate intensive one-year courses leading to state 
registration, designed for those orderlies with specified nursing ranks in the forces. 
Concessions continued until October 1953.132 
The practical use of the nursing orderly 
This issue of utilising nursing orderlies as part of the nursing workforce was a 
contentious one between the Ministry of Health and the nursing organisations, notably 
the GNC and the RCN. The government-initiated interim Athlone Report, which 
examined a variety of nursing issues including recruitment, training and registration, had 
suggested in 1939 the outlawing of any person nursing for gain, other than students, state 
registered nurses (SRNs) and those on the proposed roll of assistant nurses. This stemmed 
primarily from a public-protection issue of the rising numbers of unqualified nurses. 133 
The RCN, as a professional organisation requiring state registration for full membership, 
favoured an approach to move all nursing to a qualified workforce. This was seen 
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through their support of the Athlone Report and by 1941 initiating a committee, chaired 
by the eminent physician Lord Horder, to consider 'the proper control' of assistant nurses 
and their subsequent training syllabus, in anticipation of the supporting legislation. 134 
This was despite the fact that the report was not initiated by them. Their eagerness to 
draw up the guidelines for a group who would in effect undergo a training, albeit shorter, 
but who could without clear differentiation be a cheaper and more practical alternative to 
the SRN, was clear. The subsequent legislation occurred through the 1943 Nurses Act. 135 
The number of assistant nurses was extremely slow to emerge in the 1940s, with only 59 
nurses throughout the UK taking the initial examination, following two years of training 
in 1949.136 Those auxiliaries who chose to be placed on the roll by virtue of experience 
and recommendation from the matron were also slow to materialise. The final date before 
the only route to the roll would be two years of training and an examination had to be 
extended by the GNC from Yd February, 1946 to ultimately the Ist January, 1949, to 
encourage recruitment. 137 In addition, attracting pupil nurses (state enrolled assistant 
nurses in training to take the created examination) was difficult, with only about 100 
indexed by April 1946.138 
Those on the roll would experience many problems, which included a lack of 
promotional prospects. Assistant nurses could not progress to sister or matron posts 
because they were not SRNs. There was no fast-track process to registration, emphasising 
the GNC's view that all SRNs should be trained for three years, while training for the roll 
was only a year less than for registration. Low pay and close salary differentials between 
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auxiliary and assistant nurses made the post unattractive to many. Dame Katherine Watt 
declared in 1946 to G. T. Milne, Principal at the Ministry of Health, that it was the low 
rate of salary and poor prospects which were the real deterrents to recruiting pupil 
assistant nurses. 139 The Nursing Services Branch of the MLNS noted that it would take 22 
years of increments for an assistant nurse to reach the maximum salary of E160 per 
annum* 140 
In contrast, the use of nursing orderlies proliferated during the war. They were essentially 
untrained nursing assistants, but many appear to have gained a great deal of nursing 
experience, particularly in the services. By 1947, the Wood Report took the pragmatic 
view and called for the closure of the roll of assistant nurses and the use and training of 
nursing orderlies. 14 1 The report did, however, identify that their employment and training 
would require further investigation. 142 The Ministry of Health reviewed the need for this 
class of nurse in the light of the Report. It was considered that some extra 31,400 fall- 
time nursing orderlies would be needed over the following few years in England and 
Wales. 143 A figure of 30,000 was quoted in the final 1948 Report of the Ofji'ce Committee 
on Nursing Orderlies. 144 The figures were based primarily upon the need for the nursing 
orderly to take over 'repetitive' tasks from the qualified nurse, a term used and 
suggestion made in the Mood Report. 145 This would allow the latter to concentrate on 
more advanced nursing skills, for which they had been trained. The estimates for nursing 
orderly numbers were based upon duties to be taken from the numbers of staff employed, 
together with the staff still required for the service. These were primarily SRNs, state 
enrolled assistant nurses and those in training. The figure of 31,400 was therefore 
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calculated from the staffing numbers in the hospital statistical returns sent to the Ministry 
of Health for June 30th, 1947. The calculations were acknowledged by the Committee as 
approximate. 146 
Nursing orderlies offered many advantages for the Ministry of Health. There were large 
numbers who had gained nursing experience under the challenges of wartime. They were 
much cheaper in salary terms than qualified nurses and many may not have wished to 
progress to the more costly State Registration. Those who did, even if undertaking a 
shortened training course, which in itself may have aided recruitment, could be retained 
as part of the student workforce in the hospital system. Nursing organisations 
representing and favouring qualified nurses, such as the RCN, were unlikely to agree 
with the Wood Report's suggestion of a closure of the roll of assistant nurses in favour of 
this cheaper and unregulated form of labour. This was subsequently their view, arguing 
that the roll should remain open for at least another five years and then be reviewed. They 
suggested that there was a real need for this grade of nurse and deprecated 'the 
introduction of any such category of nursing orderly. ' Views were then given for the slow 
rise of the nursing assistant numbers. These included anomalies in pay making the 
position of 'ward orderly' (sic) financially more attractive, and the assistant nurse being 
used mainly with the chronic sick. 147 However, the Ministry of Health needed to act 
swiftly to avoid losing nursing orderlies to other civilian occupations. 
Before the nursing organisations had even commented on the recommendations of the 
report, the Ministry began examining the recruitment, training and terms of conditions of 
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the nursing orderly. 148 The naYvety of organisations such as the RCN was displayed in 
their taking several months to produce comments on the Wood Report, stating that they 
needed extra time for meetings to allow members of the local branches and sections to 
express their views. 149 Bevan was understanding of this, claiming he wished to know 
their various views before reaching a final decision on ftiture policy. He gave them 
additional time beyond the November 1947 deadline to the first week of 1948 . 
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However, their comments did not emerge until March. 15 1 Bevan had produced his interim 
policy to the Mood Report in the previous October. 152 Even initial comments may have 
influenced the immediate response the Ministry of Health took to avoid losing this group 
of workers. The Ministry set up both an official and a sub-committee to speed the work. 
It met initially on August 28th, 1947, held five meetings and reported in January 1948. 
To accelerate work the committees were small, with only ministerial staff included and 
occasional consultation with outside staff. These included Elizabeth Cockayne, Matron of 
the Royal Free Hospital, London, who had been part of the Wood Report, 'Miss Renton', 
Matron of the Victoria Infirmary in Glasgow, who had experience of using nursing 
orderlies, and 'Miss Barnett', a hospital nursing officer. The committee's aim was to 
produce a general grade of nursing orderly and to try to standardise the pay scales. 153 
Two grades were envisaged: a training grade termed Class I, which would normally be 
held for approximately one year; when the matron was satisfied with the level of 
competence of the individual, progression to Class Il would occur. The committee faced 
the general resistance of the nursing occupation to empowering what were seen as 
unregistered nurses. Dame Katherine Watt, Chief Nursing Officer in the Ministry of 
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Health, was highly protective of the SRN and made it clear that the class would have no 
statutory rights. 154 However, this lack of regulation through statute may not have been in 
the interest of public protection. Even Dame Katherine noted that this would result in no 
control over the nursing orderly's movements. 15' This in effect meant that he or she could 
not be prevented from working by removal from a register, but it did maintain the 
differential between the unqualified and the professional regulated nurse. Training was 
kept to a minimum, with a suggested two-week period in the preliminary training school 
and three months of practical training on the wards. The matron or another suitably 
delegated person would then assess the nursing orderly's competence. 156 The differentials 
and essentially the role as a speedily trained practical assistant to the nurse were made 
clear in the report by stating that under no circumstances should a written examination be 
given. The report produced in January of 1948 stated that each hospital would keep its 
own records, recording details of training completed and experience gained within the 
hospital. To tie in with the large recruitment drive for part-time nursing staff, the 
committee considered that many nursing orderlies would of necessity not be full-time 
workers. ' 57 
Essentially the Ministry of Health's lack of insistence on regulation, which in pragmatic 
terms would have taken time to consider and implement, meant that the nursing 
occupation continued to undervalue the nursing orderlies. Their role remained a 
somewhat polymorphic one, filling in as needed. Limited formal training continued, 
beyond unstructured supervision 'on the job. ' The sister or matron would employ men 
and women and their role could vary, and even change, between domestic and basic 
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nursing duties. This created difficulties for the MLNS, which would place orderlies for 
mainly domestic duties through the usual Employment Exchanges and those carrying out 
basic nursing duties through the Nursing Appointments Service. To the MLNS, the 
matrons appeared to see no differentiation. 158 A proliferation of terms ranged from 'ward 
orderly', 'nursing orderly' to 'nursing auxiliary'. Even the Official Committee decided at 
an informal meeting that they would use the term 'nursing auxiliary', as the term 'nursing 
orderly' was more synonymous with domestic work. 159 To reinforce this and compound 
the lack of clarity, by the early 1950s the Newcastle Regional Hospital Board went as far 
as to state that there was no such grade as a nursing orderly; it was purely a domestic 
post. For this board, nursing auxiliaries were seen as counting towards the 'nursing staff 
strength' and were paid E225 to E275 annually. 160 By 1949, the MLNS noted that the 
Association of Hospital Matrons was informing its members to call anyone in the 
gorderly' category a 'ward (rather than nursing) orderly' and to pay a domestic rate. ' 61 
This need by the hierarchy to denigrate those involved in basic nursing care and create a 
strong differential between the qualified and unqualified led the MLNS to complain that 
the matrons seemed to be unaware of the distinction in the roles for the purpose of MLNS 
placement. 162 
Establishing clear pay scales for the nursing orderly subsequently took time, and only by 
1955 did NAC Circular No. 44 outline the remuneration and conditions of service of this 
group of workers. 
163 This placed the nursing orderly, then termed an 'auxiliary', on the 
Whitley Council scales, much to the disdain of some RCN members. A variety of 
members wrote to the RCN during 1955. Notable and fairly typical was a letter from 
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Miss Gladys Goodchild, Matron of the Christie Hospital and Holt Radium Institute, 
Manchester. She ignored the practicalities of this much needed workforce and focused on 
the status of the qualified nurse. In writing to Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden, she 
declared a rethink 'if the whole organisation of nursing in this country is to be saved, and 
the care of the sick be protected from a second 'Sarah Gamp' era'. 164 She also wrote to 
RC`N General Secretary, Frances Goodall, who as Chair of the nurses' side of the Whitley 
Council focused on the issue of supply and demand in nursing. 165 This workforce was 
needed, had long existed and the move was merely giving a name to the 25,000-strong 
workforce. 166 Goodall, in a variety of correspondence to other irate matrons, drew 
attention to the close pay differentials and the ability of unqualified nurses to exceed 
these through overtime while they remained on the domestic staff scales. 167 Goodchild 
was not convinced and set up a series of meetings in the north west, terming this her 
4nursing crusade' and appeared to gain a good degree of local press coverage. Even the 
local clergy appeared to be praying for her success. 168 This all led an increasingly 
irritated Goodall to declare to the RCN's northern area organiser that it would be 'a very 
good thing' if Miss Goodchild's Hospital Management Committee 'could take her in 
hand. ' 169 
The reality, as Goodall noted, was that this grade already existed and was being ignored 
by nursing, although not by the ministries. While on the domestic scales, nursing 
auxiliaries were able to achieve large amounts of overtime pay. The auxiliaries were now 
to be paid E330 per annum, rising to E425. This still left many staff dissatisfied, as it was 
claimed that the auxiliary scales were only '... some E50 a year less than a staff nurse 
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who has worked hard in training. ' 170 Inevitably, a huge problem occurred trying to 
differentiate who was a domestic (ward orderly) and who was a nursing auxiliary. 
Placement on the Whitley scales was not compulsory, but roles needed clarifying 
primarily because of a difference in superannuation contributions of 1% between the 
domestic and Whitley scales, the latter being regarded as non-manual work. 171 
The roll of assistant nurses subsequently remained open for some 40 more years, as 
another recruitment route to nursing based upon a practical rather than the additional 
theoretically based preparation. Primary sources demonstrate the push from the Ministry 
of Health to utilise the skills of nursing orderlies, but the resistance to recognition by the 
GNC was strong, since it held a firm view that to be a SRN a three-year training was 
required. The sustained attempt to maintain a wide differential between qualified and 
unqualified nursing resulted in the GNC offering only a six-month reduction in training 
for those who had nursed as an orderly during the war while under the supervision of 
qualified nurses. 172 Application to train as a nurse had to be made within six months of 
leaving the forces. 173 The ability to qualify for registration through a year's intensive 
course was reserved for nursing orderly Class I in the army, and those who had also 
undertaken a detailed training programme for their role. 
By 1951 G. T. Milne, Assistant Secretary at the Ministry of Health, emphasised that the 
GNC had long been calling for an end to the year-long intensive courses, which they 
viewed as unsatisfactory, but that the Ministry would not accept this. 174 The latter's 
decision to end the course in 1953 occurred mainly because by this time applicants had 
rarely been recently discharged from the services. The flow of suitable candidates was 
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also diminishing and running courses for such small numbers was no longer viable. 175 At 
a joint meeting of the MLNS, Ministry of Health and representatives of both the services 
and GNC, it was clear that the latter remained reluctant to offer any concession to ex- 
servicemen. While all agreed that the year-long course should be discontinued, the GNC 
reverted to offering only a six-month training reduction for any ex-serviceman who 
would normally have been eligible for the one-year intensive course. 176 The service 
departments remained dissatisfied with the continued resistance of the GNC to offer 
concessions to orderlies, arguing that it took no account of the degree of training the 
wartime orderlies had received. 177 
The nurse recruitment campaigns of the late 1940s and 1950s can be seen as part of a 
reactive approach which targeted specific groups, based upon the social values of the 
time. Part-time nursing offered the opportunity to address the leakage of nurses leaving 
owing to marriage and other commitments, but allowed them to work locally and put 
home and family duties first. The issue of meeting the needs of the female workforce is 
complex, because it reflected conflicting demands and ultimately resulted in a 
compromised approach. 
What the Ministry of Health was unable to achieve effectively was to address the 
underlying issues that had led to such poor recruitment, despite relatively high initial 
interest, after the large publicity campaigns. As an example, for the period September 9h, 
1945 to October 31 "1 1946, the publicity campaign for London as a whole (for women) 
reported 4,894 inquires from 'all sources'. These would have included returned magazine 
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coupons and visits to the MLNS Nursing Appointments Service at the local Labour 
Exchange. They excluded juveniles (under 18 years), who provided an additional 1,142 
inquiries. From these numbers the total placed were one trained nurse, 414 students, 26 
pupil assistant nurses and 87 others. The latter were generally ward orderlies. For 
comparison, Liverpool in the same period reported 1,076 inquiries, 583 juveniles, with no 
trained nurses placed, 63 student nurses, no pupil assistant nurses and 20 others. 178 
Dingwall et al have discussed many of the factors leading to a low morale within nursing 
at this time. 179 Of these, the expense of salaries within the NHS budget led to a long-term 
decline in nurses' pay and is of particular significance. The pay of female nurses was 
13% above the average for women in the lower professional groups in 1955-6, but only 
2% above in 1960. The real value of a trained nurse's pay fell from E475 per annum in 
1949 to L418 per annum by 1958. In 1961 the Conservative Government imposed a 
freeze on pay claims by public-sector workers, producing widespread campaigns by the 
various organisations representing nurses. 
With extensive recruitment drives, nursing numbers had improved in a decade, with 
nearly 10,000 more trained nurses by 1962 in general services (see table 62). 180 Figures 
were less impressive in hospitals for the mentally ill (see table 6.3). The Ministry of 
Health believed that the figures had managed to keep pace with the expansion of the 
population in the post-war years, 
18 1 but the data does suggest only a limited improvement 
in supply meeting demand. However, the increased dilution of labour was clear. This was 
particularly in relation to the balance of state enrolled assistant nurses to nursing 
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auxiliaries, with the latter markedly increasing and a clear rise in the use of part-time 
staff. 182 Despite Dr John Cohen's condemnation in 1948 of nursing services being based 
on limited statistical analysis, 183 by 1961 the Ministry of Health still declared that much 
had been written on student-nurse attrition, but little available material was 'grounded in 
hard fact'. 184 The only factual information was derived from the GNC's Index of students 
leaving in training. 185 Dr Cohen will be highlighted in the following chapter. He was a 
psychologist from University College London, subsequently at Leeds University, and 
worked for the Cabinet Office. He had been part of the government-initiated committee 
chaired by Sir Robert Wood, examining the recruitment and retention of nursing staff, 
which was published in 1947.186 He felt unable to sign the report, producing his own 
Minority Report in 1948 also involving colleague Geoffrey Pike. 187 
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Cohen felt strongly that in planning nursing and other health services, there was the 
increased need for scientific study, rather than the traditional method of compiling reports 
through an exchange of views by doctors, nurses and distinguished members of the 
public, and supplemented by written and oral evidence. He felt that some of the 
recommendations, but not all, in the report chaired by Wood needed to based on the 
application of a scientific method and he felt that they were not. He also called for 
nursing problems to be examined in the context of the wider developments of the health 
service. 188 The Minority Report examined the use of scientific methodology in planning 
nursing and health services and the failure of 'opinion' as a method of problem solving in 
the nursing field. "9 It was a problem that continued to plague the health service in 
subsequent years. 
The issue of low morale had ultimately led to concerns, both in the Ministry of Health 
and in organisations such as the RCN, over the lack of recruits for senior nursing posts. 190 
This resulted in the Ministry of Health asking Brian Salmon to chair a committee of 
enquiry into these issue in the summer of 1963.191 Salmon at the time was the Chairman 
of JP Lyons Food, a large catering firm which had undergone recent managerial 
reorganisation resulting in increased profitability. He was also the Vice Chairman of the 
Board of Governors for the Westminster Hospital Group. 192 He was thus an appropriate 
choice to explore differing management approaches, particularly as the Committee's role 
was also in part due to concerns over the need to staff the expanding District General 
Hospital services planned for the 1960s. 193 It had already been noted by the Ministry that 
by the autumn of 1964 the Queen Elizabeth II Hospital in the new towns of 
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Welwyn/Hatfield had wards closed or never opened. 194 This hospital, opened over a year 
earlier by the Queen in July 1963, was the first new District General Hospital to be 
completed since the inception of the NHS. 195 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter has argued that policy analysis in respect of women in the 
post-war era produced contradictory arguments regarding both female social gains and 
the rationale behind the ministerial approach to workforce planning. Nursing has received 
little attention, and tends to be seen as part of the wider female workforce. Despite both 
acute shortages in industrial production and a shortage of nurses, a Control of 
Engagement Order was reintroduced in October 1947, but excluded nursing. Its primary 
aim appeared to be to keep workers in the essential industries. However, in the following 
four years only 29 orders were issued, 10 of those to women. 196 For nursing, both a 
Control of Engagement Order and the direction of labour were recognised as ineffective 
methods of workforce control. Primarily, this was because they were applied in the war 
with reluctance and merely resulted in the redistribution of an already short-staffed 
workforce. There remains little evidence of direction actively being applied in nursing. 
The suggested reasons for the abandonment of the direction of nurses within the new 
nationalised health service are explored. 
There were similarities between industrial and nursing propaganda for women, and these 
became particularly marked after the introduction of the NHS. In this there was a move 
from an emphasis on altruism, beneficence and being valued as part of a team as an 
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efficient and satisfied worker, to the practical gains of remuneration, superannuation and 
annual leave. Nurse recruitment, as with the call to women back into industry, was not a 
choice between the prevailing attitude to women as home-makers or child-rearers and the 
country's economic needs, but a compromise between the two. The refusal to use married 
women in nursing in any other capacity other than as part-time workers, and the call to 
men, are examples of this approach. 
The discrimination men faced in the workplace, and the inability of the Ministry of 
Health to issue any advice or Circulars to health authorities, mark the recruitment of them 
as a reactive policy with limited long-term planning. Improvements in recruitment were 
off- set by the end of the 1950s through a change in the division of labour and a marked 
decrease in available senior nursing staff. This element of low morale in the upper ranks 
was fast leading to a crisis, particularly with the expanding District General Hospital 
building plans. The Ministry of Health was powerless to dictate who should be present on 
Regional and Hospital Boards, an area which was seen to compound the low morale in 
the higher ranks of nursing. The Salmon Report represented an attempt to prevent a 
worsening recruitment crisis, to provide a clear career structure for senior nurses and to 
prepare staff for the new NHS plans. 
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Chapter 7: The Post-War Recruitment of Overseas Nursing Staff 
Introduction 
This chapter builds upon the argument that the post-war government workforce 
policy and planning for nursing was both reactive and essentially ineffective. The 
primary aim was to increase recruitment diversification by targeting a number of 
specific groups, including the young, part-time nurses, men and nursing orderlies. 
The interest created was large, but the ultimate numbers recruited into student nurse 
training remained small. Problems of attrition and salaries deteriorating relative to the 
cost of living were not rectified until the 1960s. Little statistical analysis occurred 
throughout this period with regard to both local need or the effects on the occupation 
of specific targeted groups. 
The use of nurses from the colonies and European volunteer workers (EVWs) 
presented additional target groups within a largely reactive policy. A variety of 
factors - some fortuitous, others deliberately manipulated by the Ministries of Health 
and of Labour and National Service (MLNS) - facilitated an active recruitment 
campaign within these groups. The chapter highlights the rising racial tension within 
both government workforce policy and planning and the public to black workers 
emigrating from the colonies to Britain. The use of white EVWs was therefore 
favoured by the government over colonial workers. However, the former were often 
filtered into unpopular ancillary jobs, supporting the nursing service. This can also be 
argued as primarily due to language problems. Nursing offered an opportunity to 
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place black women who entered the country into a respected occupation which 
cmphasised moral values through restrictions on work and private life. 
In the opinion of many historians, this period of time also showed the effects of a 
general 'laissez-faire' migration policy, allowing overseas workers to enter the 
country according to the general flow of labour demand (this has been seen to 
continue into the 1960s, until the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962). This 
view is challenged within this chapter. Within nursing, policy was poorly linked to 
any analysis of the numbers of overseas nurses remaining or returning to their 
homeland after qualifying. Although active campaigns began in 1945 to reach out to 
the colonies, no figures for colonial nurses were available until 1959, from either the 
hospital system or nursing's regulatory body the General Nursing Council (GNC). 
The recurrent issues discussed within this chapter can also be configured and 
conceived to operate around the concept of 'duty'. This helps encapsulate the view of 
the Ministry of Health, the MLNS and the Colonial Office that a British training 
would raise nursing standards in the colonies, and that the nurse's duty once trained 
and utilised by Britain's labour market would be to return home and disseminate this 
acquired knowledge. This ostensibly altruistic view was accompanied by a poorly 
monitored campaign, and a perceived notion that colonial nurses would not ultimately 
rise to the higher nursing ranks in Britain. When this latter fear was realised, colonial 
nurses were pushed into state enrolled assistant nurse (SEAN) training (the term 
altered to state enrolled nurse in the early 1960s), which held no promotional 
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opportunities. For colonial nurses, their own duty as young and mobile people, was to 
find a better standard of living for themselves and their subsequent young families, 
which their homeland did not offer. 
Post-war migration 
The immediate post-war era was a period of change in the migration of peoples 
within the United Kingdom (UK). In 1947 the UK assisted-package scheme was 
established between the British and Australian governments, with the aim of securing 
a white, Anglo-Saxon population in the interests of what the Australian Government 
termed 'national security'. ' The programme allowed British emigrants to leave for a 
new life for only LIO with government financial assistance, while their children 
travelled for free. 2 In addition, more recent histories have revealed successive post- 
war governments supporting legislation which encouraged the migration of children 
in care homes, both local government and charitable, to a new life in New Zealand, 
Rhodesia, Australia and Canada. 3 This is known to have continued until 1967 and in 
the post-war era resulted in an estimated 10,000 children being sent to Australia with 
the ostensibly philanthropic intent of giving them a better life. 4 As a policy this 
reduced expenditure, but only recently have the various forms of abuse, including the 
use of the children as cheap labour, resulting from the lack of regulation of the 
institutions and homes that they were sent to, been revealed. 5 
The Overscas Nursing Association (ONA), fornicrly the Colonial Nursing 
Association, had been involved in sending qualified British nurses to staff the 
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colonial Empire since its origins in 1896 .6 In the post-war years, when it might be 
expected that the figures of emigrating nurses would be lower as colonies moved 
towards utilising their own staff, the number of those leaving Britain with the ONA 
was at its highest in the organisation's entire 50-year history. 7 This may have 
reflected the renewed sense of opportunity in the post-war years, but may also be an 
indication of reaction to the low staffing and poor morale in British nursing at home. 
The feasibility of colonial (Caribbean) recruitment to Britain and nursing 
The issue of utilising colonial labour in the post-war period is complex. Box 7.1 (see 
overpage) offers a summary of the various factors that allowed for an increased use 
of this labour source within Britain. This section explores these factors in detail and 
argues, with regard to the nursing workforce, that the emerging 'New 
Commonwealth', with its emphasis on supporting colonial self-sufficiency operated 
to the clear advantage of the British nursing service rather than to the colonies. The 
term 'New Commonwealth' is generally reserved for the post World War 11 period. 
Although the Commonwealth had begun in 1867, with Canada being the first colony 
of the Empire to be a self-governing dominion, a status implying equality with 
Britain, it was the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 that led to the new 
term. This marked a watershed, changing the British Commonwealth over the next 
five decades to a multiracial association of sovereign and equal states. 8 
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Box 7.1 Factors favouring flie use of colonial workers in Britain. 
" The migration of white British people, usually young and of working age, to both the 
colonies and notably Australasia in the late 1940s, was actively encouraged by the British 
Government. This occurred during a period of a post-war workforce shortage. The 
primary aim was to ensure the predominance of the Anglo-Saxon race within the 
developing 'New Commonwealth', but this policy exacerbated the workforce shortage in 
Britain. 
" There was a worsening economic crisis in the British West Indies, which was 
compounded by an expanding population, a static industry (notably in sugar), high 
involuntary unemployment and no social support. 
" The US closing its borders to large numbers of migrants from the Caribbean in the post- 
war era. This was primarily through the 1952 US McCarran-Walter Act, which limited 
immigration to strict quota numbers of each nationality. The move to the US had 
previously been a traditional method to relieve the Caribbean economic crisis in the 
previous pre-war 30 years. 
" Colonials had been traditionally encouraged to regard England as the 'Motherland'. The 
country was viewed as both welcoming and supportive of its colonial workers. 
" There was a lack of immigration control on British colonial subjects until 1962 (the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962). 
" Other groups such as EVWs needed work permits and were required to stay in an 
allocated job on risk of prosecution. This point may have favoured England as a work 
destination for colonial workers, who held British passports, but created tension in the 
MLNS and Colonial Office, as it resulted in a lack of restriction and control of workforce 
direction for black workers. 
The 'New Commonwealth' still had a function for Britain, and, as regards nursing, 
benefits were far from reciprocal. The encouragement to use locally trained nurses 
throughout the colonies, rather than expatriate British nurses, aimed to stem the flow 
from Britain. Changes brought about by the 1949 Nurses Act now placed the 
emphasis on the individual, rather than through legislation in the colony itself to 
demonstrate a standard of training reciprocal with GNC standards. This had meant 
that under the 1919 Nurses Registration Act, for a colony to have nurses recognised 
by the GNC as state registered, legislation had to be in place with a statutory body to 
develop nurse training to the required standard. Under the 1949 Nurses Act it was no 
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longer necessary for the colony to have nursing legislation for this purpose, or for the 
various hospitals to conform to any specific standard. The emphasis was on the 
individual to demonstrate that he or she had achieved the specific standard to be 
accepted as a state registered nurse (SRN). This encouraged colonial subjects to come 
to Britain to train or to adapt their training to the British standard on arrival. This 
latter opportunity was new under the legislation. There was no encouragement, as the 
Colonial Office noted, to raise the general standard of nurse training within the 
colonies in order to qualify for GNC recognition. 9 The inability to produce figures for 
the number of colonial subjects who were returning home following nurse training in 
Britain until the 1960s may have demonstrated a lack of concern with how this 
apparently 'altruistic' approach to training colonial nurses impacted on the colonies 
themselves. 
Back-ground 
In the immediate post-war period the British Government increasingly recognised the 
worsening unemployment in colonial areas such as the British West Indies. A 
working party was subsequently set up in October of 1948 to examine the feasibility 
of employing surplus colonial labour in the UK. 
10 This was both with an eye to 
colonial responsibilities, and also with the need to staff specific areas within Britain 
such as nursing and the transport services. 
' I The working party reported the following 
July and such was the potential for recruitable workers, that it represented not only 
the Ministry of Health, the MLNS and the Colonial Office, but also the departments 
for Agriculture and Fisheries, Fuel and Power and the Home Office. 12 
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The report noted that in 1943 17.6% of Jamaica's experienced labour force of some 
505,092 had experienced involuntarily unemployment. 13 The figure had decreased 
slightly in the post-war 1940s, but still remained high. In other islands of the West 
Indies, 4.7% of the workers were reported as unemployed for the 1946 figures, while 
British Guiana and British Honduras recorded numbers as high as 20%. 14 The figures 
were due to a variety of factors, with the cost of living having almost doubled during 
the war, but with no social security or child allowance. The prospect of weathering 
periods of austerity were clearly limited. The main industries in the islands were 
agriculture and, notably, sugar production. Limited expansion of the market, disease 
and hurricanes meant that the growth of the population had now overtaken the 
employment opportunities available. 15 
Resulting emigration from the islands to Central America and the US had a long 
tradition some 30 years before the post-war period. Gradual restrictions limited the 
possibilities in the US, reducing numbers employed in agriculture from a peak of 
30,000 per year to just under 4,000.16 Subsequently, the 1952 US McCarran-Walter 
Act reduced further the immigration from many areas, including the West Indies. 17 
The act essentially allowed for immigration into the US based on strict ethnic quotas, 
and was very much a product of the racial suspicion and communist suppression of 
the Cold War era. In contrast, Britain's apparent 'laissez-faire' attitude to migration, 
based purely on workforce supply and demand, offered no restrictions to colonial 
workers throughout the 1950s. Fryer, in reviewing the first 10 years of post-war 
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Immigration of black people to Britain, regarded both the British Government and 
indeed everyone else as demonstrating 'utter complacency' to the plight of these 
settling colonial subjects. 18 This theme will be further discussed throughout the 
chapter in relation to the British nursing workforce. 
The 1949 working party considered three options to assist the colonies. Any potential 
for a reduction in the birth rate was seen as too long-term a policy, while the 
introduction of secondary industries did not appear to offer a huge scope of potential. 
Emigration was seen as the only feasible solution. The report concluded that at first 
sight it would appear that as long as any vacancies remained in any of the essential 
industries in the UK, a strong 'prima facie case' could be made for using a limited 
number of colonial workers. 19 However, the report is peppered with the possibility of 
anticipated racial tension from such an approach, and this had already ensued from 
colonials who had arrived as seamen during World War I and subsequently settled in 
the UK port areas. 20 
The pragmatic issue of utilising colonial immigrants for areas of shortage, such as 
nursing, remained. They were British passport holders, but, unlike EVWs arriving 
after the war, were not sub ect to labour controls. Concerns were therefore raised that 
if colonial workers did not like the industrial areas or were lonely, they would leave 
and drift to where a 'coloured' community could be found, notably the seaports, 
therefore worsening unemployment and overcrowding. 21 Hostels had previously been 
seen as a solution to the additional issue of accommodation problems, with landladies 
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reluctant to take colonial 'coloured' lodgers. Private lodgings were increasingly being 
used, but outside of the seaport towns this had proved a difficult issue. 22 
The accommodation issue is a significant factor, because it was generally available 
within the hospital system. This facilitated much more easily the use of colonial 
female nursing labour, but markedly limited the use of male nurses owing to gender 
segregation within nursing accommodation. The accommodation issue overall 
permeates the use of 'coloured' labour from the first gradual wave of post-war 
immigrants to its height in the 1960s. It was particularly noted when 492 Jamaicans 
arrived in Tilbury with no prior work arrangements aboard the Empire Windrush in 
June of 1948 . 
23 These were predominately skilled and semi-skilled men; welders, 
bricklayers, carpenters and so forth, emphasising the serious unemployment problems 
facing the West Indies at the time. Finding them work was not difficult, and all 240 
men were placed in employment within three weeks. However, finding 
accommodation took time, and the men had to be initially housed in the old air-raid 
shelter at Clapham South underground station. 24 
By the mid 1960s, surveys in six areas with immigrant minorities demonstrated 
discrimination in 45 out of 60 personal applications from West Indian callers to 
landlords, and in 74 out of 120 telephone inquiries. 25 Discrimination did not vary 
greatly, whether the applicant posed as a hospital registrar or a bus driver. It 
predominately took the form of the immigrant being informed that accommodation 
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had been taken, while later white callers were told it was still available; in a small 
percentage of cases, there were attempts to charge a higher rent. 26 
The relatively well-explored post-war era of migration to Britain from the 'coloured' 
colonies demonstrates initial numbers of immigrants never reaching more than 1,000 
arrivals a year until 195 1. This gradually increased throughout the 1950s. The figure 
dropped slightly in the middle of the decade as Britain moved into an economic 
recession towards the end of 1955. The rise in racial tension at the end of the 1950s 
mirrored an increase in the numbers of immigrants arriving. This appeared to be 
exacerbated by fears of immigration controls, which subsequently came into place in 
1962 with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act. This limited free movement to Britain 
from the colonies to those who could support themselves, students, or those 
possessing a Ministry of Labour voucher. The latter was issued to those with specific 
skills, a job to go to, or to a specified number who were looking for work. 27 From the 
beginning of 1961 to mid 1962 net arrivals amounted to 98,000 people from the 
Caribbean. 28 
The exploration of post-war immigration has centred around the generally held view 
by authors such as Deakin '29 Freeman, 
30 Sivarmadan 31 and Fryer 32 that it was dictated 
purely by market forces. This facilitated the movement of people as the British labour 
market demanded it; the 'laissez-faire' argument. Carter et a133 have somewhat 
convincingly, when the primary sources are reviewed, challenged this view in respect 
of the first Conservative Government of 195 1. Their argument focuses upon a 
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government concerned with the influx of 'coloured' people who could impair the 
apparent harmonious nature of British life. Such concerns can in fact be traced back 
to the arrival of the Empire 9,71ndrush in June 1948. While I. G. Cummings, 
Temporary Principal at the Colonial Office, was making his welcoming speech to the 
migrants aboard the ship at Tilbury docks, 34 11 Members of Parliament had written to 
Prime Minister Clement Atlee calling for controls on black immigration. 
'The British people fortunately enjoy a profound unity without uniformity in 
their way of life, and are blest by the absence of a colour racial problem. An 
influx of coloured people domiciled here is likely to impair the harmony, 
strength and cohesion of our public and social life and to cause discord and 
unhappiness among all concerned. 93S 
Attlee in his reply did not distance himself from the concept of seeing 'colourcd' 
migrants as a potential problem, but rather thought the numbers were too small to be 
significant. He essentially pushed what others saw as a problem under the carpet, 
with the Empire Mindrush being seen just as an anomalous example of Jamaicans 
being able to use 'exceptionally favourable shipping terms' and money from ex- 
service gratuities to come to Britain. Attlee felt the majority of Empire Windrush 
migrants were honest workers, who could make a genuine contribution to the labour 
difliculties being experienced by Britain. 36 
During the period October 1946 to July 1948 more than 163,000 foreign workers had 
been placed in British employment through the official schemes. Included in this 
figure were 64,000 displaced persons and 74,500 Poles. 37 The small number of West 
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Indian men aboard the Empire Windrush appeared to engender a wann welcome 
publicly by officials, but behind the scenes there was clear ministerial unrest. The 
reason is perhaps not overly complex and represents two concerns. There was the 
aforementioned issue of the disruption of British ethnicity which 'coloured' workers 
would bring and which would not be overly harmed through future generations by the 
use of 'white' Europeans. This was heightened by a fear of miscegenation. This latter 
term generally refers to people of differing human races producing offspring, with the 
term usually reserved to those who believe such mixing of races is inherently bad. 
Kathleen Paul, of the University of South Florida, frames this idea around a 'clash' or 
'dysfunction' between a formal nationality policy, which incorporated all members of 
the British Empire as British, recently confirmed by the 1948 Nationality Act, and an 
informal constructed national identity, based around the notion that 'real' British 
people were in fact white . 
38 The British Nationality Act had stated: 
'Every person who under this Act is a citizen of the United Kingdom and 
colonies or who under any enactment for the time being in force in any 
country mentioned in subsection (3) of this section is a citizen of that 
country shall by virtue of that citizenship have the status of a British 
Subject. 39 
In all that has been discussed in this chapter, the Act would seem to do little to 
discourage colonial people to come to Britain to look for work, and again in a further 
contradictory element it seems at odds with the growing racial tension. However, the 
Act rather like the emigration issue, was designed to maintain British influence 
through strengthening the 'New Commonwealth'. In examining British national 
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identity, and in support of the aforementioned idea, historian Richard Weight argues 
that the Act accepted that Commonwealth states could define their own citizenship, 
but at the same time made sure that this could not take place without reference to the 
UK. He argues that by codifying the concept of a far-flung family, the Act was in a 
sense the high point of British imperialism. 40 
Secondly, and a point again raised by Paul, 41 is the fact that the Colonial Office and 
the MLNS were concerned about 'coloured' workers coming to Britain of their own 
free will, which they had every right to do, rather than as part of a scheme where they 
could be controlled. Concern continued, despite 'coloured' immigration figures being 
low throughout the early 1950s. Only a few hundred West Indians arrived in 1950, 
about 1,000 in 1951 and 2,000 in 1952 and 1953. Figures did increase with the arrival 
of wives and children of men already settled in Britain, with 24,000 in 1954,26,000 
42 in 1956 and 22,000 in 1957 . The Conservative Government began collecting 
information regarding black people to support a draft immigration Bill in 1954. 
However, they had difficulty in finding clear evidence of any confirmed deleterious 
effects of the influx of 'coloured' immigrants, in contrast to other non-'coloured' 
groUPS. 41 There was a perceived need to ease any growing racial tension in the 
country, but not to the detriment of a much-needed workforce. 
In February 1953, the Working Party on 'Coloured' People Seeking Employment in 
the United Kingdom asked Lloyd Davies, Assistant Secretary in the MLNS's 
Overseas Department, to comment on the Possibility of 'preventing an increase in the 
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number of 'coloured' people obtaining employment in the UK, without placing any 
controls on their actually entering the country. 44 This was a request in the Chairman's 
papers and represents an attempt not to upset the colonies, through the UK not being 
seen as open to free passage, yet restricting the main reason 'colourcd' colonial 
people would be coming to this country. At that time, the number of relatives already 
here would have been fairly small. Lloyd Davies pushed for a non-discriminatory 
policy of employment on colour alone (sic), stating that in practice the only reason an 
appropriately qualified 'coloured' worker may not be put forward for a job by the 
MLNS was where the employer had indicated that he wouldn't consider 'coloured' 
workers. Somewhat ominously, he concludes that on the grounds of general policy 
and practicability, he couldift see how 'coloured' Commonwealth people could be 
prevented from taking employment once in the UK. 45 
The importance of this data lies in filling the historical void up until the 1962 
Commonwealth Inunigrants Act, which suggests the latter was purely a reaction to 
the growing ('coloured') immigrant numbers and the explosion of racial tension. 
Legitimised discrimination against 'coloured' workers had been sought when 
numbers were appreciably lower. This offers a useful background to the government 
attitude to the growing number of colonial 'coloured' nurses, which in fact was 
muted. it also frames the warnings to the hospital matrons in the mid 1950s from the 
Colonial office regarding the potential rising ranks of 'coloured' nurses. This may 
account for the gradual increase in such nurses being filtered into non promotional 
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state enrolled nurse (SEN) training, which is not clear in ministerial figures until the 
mid 1960s. 
Changing attitudes to the nursing services of the colonies 
In post-war Britain the shrinking of the colonial Empire was accompanied by a 
change in attitude to its indigenous peoples. India gained a state of uneasy 
independence in 1948, with continued tension between Muslims and HinduS, 46 while 
other colonies gradually gained self-rule. In 1959 Singapore attained self- 
government, with its first general election in May of that year and the island 
ultimately becoming an independent state in 1965 . 
47 Within Africa, Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi, Zambia, Gambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland all achieved their desire 
for independence from Britain between 1957 and 1968.48 
A changing attitude to the nursing needs of the colonies can be identified in this post- 
war era. This had a clear benefit to the struggling staffing needs of the new NHS. As 
the colonies developed, so did the need for expanding nurses' services, with British 
49 
nurse training seen as the standard benchmark. With an increasing demand for 
nurses in Britain itself, the Colonial Office viewed it as 'impossible', in the 
immediate post-war era, for the UK to meet the increasing nursing demand 'in whole 
or even in large part' within the colonies. 
50 In their 1945 report examining the 
training of colonial Nurses, the Colonial Office strongly recommended that for the 
future the move should be made for locally recruited nurses, trained in their own 
territories, to standards reciprocal to the GNC state registration. " Inevitably as 
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regards post-war recruitment in the UK, the government didn't wish to place 
obstacles in the way of colonial students coming to a hospital in Britain for three 
years to acquire the necessary nursing standards to take back home. 52 Yet generally it 
viewed subsequent post-registration courses as the rationale to come to Britain for 
nurse education. 53 
The push for locally trained nurses, as opposed to the usual expatriate staff, to take 
appointments in what were termed the 'more responsible nursing posts' continued 
into the 1950s. 54 Writing in 1950, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, James 
Griffiths, emphasised the fundamental approach of colonial policy now accepted by 
his Majesty's Government, of eliminating all racial discrimination in the appointment 
or promotion of persons in the public service. 55 Differing criteria for expatriate staff 
and colonial nurses with comparable training and qualifications were to be opposed 
as part of the continued move to a more self-sufficient colonial health structure. This 
approach appears as an almost sudden removal of racial discrimination, which 
essentially slowed the leakage of expatriate staff, who might otherwise further their 
careers abroad. The colonies themselves were generally in favour of the move, but 
the variability in the standards of local nurses perceived to be available throughout 
the colonies to facilitate this move was strongly felt. 56 
The apparent philanthropic attitude towards the growth of nursing in the colonies, 
might have been expected to place an emphasis on legislative changes within the 
1949 Nurses Act to strengthen reciprocal training programmes. In reality, the Act 
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strongly favoured the potential use of colonial Nurses to the benefit of nursing within 
Britain. The Colonial Office policy had always been to encourage the establishment 
of nursing legislation within the colonies to ensure nurses met the GNC standard for 
state registration. 57 Section 10 of the 1949 Nurses Act reversed this and it became no 
longer essential for any colonial territory to have such nursing legislation. The 
emphasis for a high standard of training was now placed on the individual and not on 
the colony. 58 The nurse needed to demonstrate that he or she had completed a training 
'in accordance with a scheme of training recognised by the council, ' and had been 'in 
an institution so recognised. 59 The Colonial Office expressed concern regarding this 
move, believing it would remove the encouragement to raise the general standard of 
training within the colonies. 60 
This concern, however, operated to the benefit of the struggling recruitment 
programmes within Britain. The previous legislation had resulted in only two types of 
potential recruits from the colonies: those coming to Britain to train as nurses, with a 
perceived belief from the MLNS that they would ultimately return home, 61 and those 
who could arrive and work as an SRN, having been part of a reciprocal training 
programme in their own colony. Section 10 now opened up the opportunity for a 
variety of workers termed a 'nurse' to make a claim to work as an SRN in Britain. If 
their training was not seen as being of a reciprocal standard, they could undertake a 
requested period of adaptation and then be placed on the register, thus widening the 
source of staffing recruits. The Colonial Office concern was that at the end of the 
1940s there was such a 
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6... strong desire on the part of almost all colonial people to come to this 
country ... that candidates would seek to train at the lower grade hospitals in 
order that they would be required to undertake further training in England to 
qualify for registration by the GNC. ý62 
Such changing attitudes to the nursing services in the colonies may have contained 
altruistic undertones, but the priority was probably the use of colonial labour to the 
benefit of the new and growing NHS. Box 7.2 summarises the changes that were 
occurring at the time, which favoured the use of colonial workers as nurses in Britain. 
Appendix 1. offers an expanded version of these factors. 
Box 7.2 Factors favouring the use of colonial workers as nurses in Britain. 
High numbers of nurses travelling from Britain to work in the colonies Via the Overseas 
Nursing Association (ONA) in the late 1940s. 
The active move away from raising colonial nursing standards through legislation within the 
colonies (the change occurred via section 10 of the 1949 Nurses Act). This opened an 
additional source of nurse recruits, who would actively come to Britain (through economic 
hardship) and gain adaptation, from their own colonial nurse training, to the highly regarded 
British state registration. 
No accommodation issues. The hospital system could offer a nurses' home, although often 
only to women. Although accommodation is highlighted as the main reason black men were 
discouraged, it was a somewhat convenient excuse, and letters from colonial men to the 
MLNS do suggest that those with appropriate and often very good qualifications were 
rejectcd. *'Mis may also however, have been part of a lack of understanding of the standards 
of overseas qualifications which continues today. The absence of post-war building of 
hospitals restricted the ability to create new nurses' homes. 
An arena of hospital institutional control. This ensured appropriate societal behaviour in both 
work and private life. 
The manipulation of selection procedures to encourage further migration in the mid 1950s. 
However, when the applicant standards dropped, a rapid reapplication of the colonial 
selection procedure occurred. This appears to mirror growing societal racial tension 
throughout the 1950s. 
Differing concepts of 'duty'. For colonial nurses this was to seek a better life for themselves 
and their young families, away from severe economic hardship. The ministerial expectation 
was a return home upon qualifying, after providing three years service. 
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Sources for box 7.2 (page 181) include: 
The Overseas Nursing Association 54'h Annual Report (for the year ended 31/3/50), p. 9. PRO CO 850/252/3 
Colonial Nursing Service. Revision of Fees Paid to ONA for Selection of Nurses for the Colonial Nursing 
Service, 1950-51. 
Report of a meeting between the Registration Council of the General Nursing Council and representatives 
of the Colonial Oifice and the Ministry of Health to discuss the administration of Section 10 of the Nurses 
Act 1949,8/12/49, p. l. PRO CO 850/252/7 Appointment of Locally Born Nurses, 1949-50. 
Letter: Isaac Popoola, Lagos, Nigeria to NILNS, 17/10/55 and reply MLNS, 22/10155, stating his standard of 
education was lower than that normally required for nurse training in the United Kingdom. Reply: Isaac 
Popoola to Nursing Services branch, NILNS, 28/10/55: 11 have spent seven years In the secondary grammar 
school where I took science up to school certificate, why then do you opine that I am unsuitable for 
training? I am holding a Nigeria Government recognised certificate, which has qualified me to serve in the 
Nigerian Civil Service as a clerk in the CPO, P and T headquarters, Lagos hitherto. ' PRO LAB 8/1804 
Applications from Colonials for Nursing Training: Procedure, 1949-57. 
Issues in colonial nursing recruitment 
Against this backdrop, the use of colonial nurses in the post-war era represented a 
reactive approach that was poorly linked to any immigration policy, primarily 
because the latter remained absent until the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. 
This mirrored in-land recruitment which was largely devoid of any statistical 
planning. This indeed was the very point that prevented Dr John Cohen of Leeds 
University from signing the 1947 report on the recruitment and training of nurses (the 
Mood Report), of which he'd been a part. He argued that its recommendations failed 
to take sufficient account either of the relation between the planning of nursing and 
other health services, and the planning of the country's manpower resources as a 
whole. He did not believe account had been taken of the extent to which methods 
employed in psychological research could provide a scientific basis for determining 
nursing and medical staff ratios, or the length of training periods for nurses. 63 He 
expanded on these points in his 1948 Minority Report. 64 A series of factors already 
discussed facilitated the use of overseas British subjects who offered no work permit 
requirements and were eager to migrate owing to increasing economic hardship. 
Active recruitment finally emerged in the mid 1950s with an increasingly evident 
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racist element within the core of employing matrons, which mirrored country-wide 
tension, ultimately leading to tighter colonial immigration controls by 1962. 
'Duty' to Care 
The concept of 'duty' is offered as a useful way to frame the role of colonial nurses in 
this time period. The general belief in the Colonial Office and the MLNS was that 
these nurses would staff the new NHS, gain a highly prized British training and return 
to their own countries to raise colonial standards. This accompanied a 'laissez-faire' 
attitude on the part of officials, who in turn failed to monitor the numbers of colonial 
nurses. This somewhat misguided belief resulted in little knowledge of the numbers 
of colonial nurses in Britain until the late 1950s, and ignored the implicit (and 
explicit) message in the colonies that Britain was the 'mother country', both 
welcoming and offering a higher standard of living to young colonial workers. 
Inevitably, the concept of duty remains somewhat speculative unless it had some 
reality for black workers themselves. Few studies examine the rationale for colonial 
6coloured' people coming into nursing in the 1950s. Vina Mayor's work is an 
exception and is uscftil in that it examines both the reasons and suggests a gender 
split. For men it appeared a pragmatic choice, a means to an end. Nursing appeared to 
offer the ability to travel, or to pursue the opportunity of higher qualifications while 
supported by a job. The general picture is an 'opportunistic' move into the 
occupation. 
"5 Afro-Caribbean women talked far more of the pride and values of 
nursing, but again focused on personal gains. This included the potential for life-time 
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employment and business opportunities . 
66 For both men and women, Mayor 
highlights the fact that cultural receptivity into nursing was shaped by socio-political 
and labour market factors, family resources and its projected value for material 
gains. 67 
Strong links with community organisations such as churches as an integral part of the 
colonial community do not emerge as a pull to return home with nursing skills. 
Instead, the respondents talk of transferable skills learnt in the colony through the 
church: team working, organisational skills, leadership and communication. These 
were fclt to be undervalued by employers in England, but the transferability of 
collectivism is seen in setting up professional networks once in England and sharing 
experiences with those new to the occupation. This is at the expense of individualism, 
which Mayor argues is necessary for career advancement. 68 Mayor's work therefore 
does not support the Ministry view that black nurses would want to return home and 
raise colonial nursing standards once qualified. Indeed, the alteration of the Nurses 
Act in 1949 encouraged individualism and not collectivism. 
The initial encouragement of colonial nurses to come to Britain had in fact occurred 
before the war ended with a Circular distributed to the colonies in August of 1944.69 
By early 1946 the source of potential recruits had transformed into an active 
campaign involving the Colonial Office and the MLNS. Mr Walker, of the Colonial 
off ice, advised a meeting of departments in January of 1946 that the Ministry of 
Health were considering ways and means of stimulating this area of recruitment. 70 
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Dame Katherine Watt, the Chief Nursing Officer at the Ministry of Health, had 
already consulted the Medical Officers of the Colonial Office. 71 Although Walker 
stated the Colonial Office welcomed the proposals on behalf of the colonies, the 
apparent philanthropic process which dominated the Circulars to the colonies was 
somewhat superseded within ministry meetings by the need to reduce the acute 
shortage of British nursing staff for the new NHS. 
'It is really immaterial whether the students remain here after qualifying or 
return home - it is generally to the benefit of all concerned that Colonial 
nursing students should be encouraged to come to this country for training. 
The great majority of students return home after completion of training. 72 
This comment is of interest because, by 1954, H. E. Chester, an official in the 
Employment Services Department of the MLNS, openly admitted that the 
Department did not know the number of colonial nurses who had returned homc after 
qualif ication. 73 The initial selection procedure itself, created by the Colonial Office, 
took approximately six months from the candidate's enquiry in their home country to 
arriving at a British hospital. 
74 The primary concern was to prevent unsuitable 
candidates arriving who had not been thoroughly vetted before setting sail for Britain. 
Matrons were actively discouraged from direct recruitment, which could result in 
unsuitable colonial candidates arriving and being stranded in Britain without a job. 
Matrons were provided with a Circular in February of 1948, with a sample letter to 
send to prospective candidates who had applied directly to the hospital re- 
cmphasising the procedure. 
75 The approach of the matrons is perhaps understandable. 
The official procedure took time, while they may have viewed ministerial 
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involvement from above as intrusive to the control of their hospital recruitment, 
where in the recent pre-war years they had been left to cope without ministerial 
interventions or help. 
The procedure had been reconfirmed through a second initial Circular sent to the 
colonies in June of 1945, emphasising that candidates must be submitted to a local 
selection committee. 76 Each colonial government was required to set up the 
committee to examine applications and conduct interviews. Candidates should have 
obtained their school certificate, matriculation, or an equivalent standard of 
education. 77 The completed successful form would then be forwarded to the Director 
of Colonial Scholars in London, who would consult the Appointments Department of 
the MLNS, and any other bodies involved in the selection of nurses for hospital 
training. It was felt that candidates should not be older than 30 years or younger than 
19; 20 was seen as the ideal age-78 The Rushcliffe Committee, which set national 
nursing salary scales, was consulted and students were offered an allowance of f. 40, 
L45, E50 and E70 progressively for each year of training. 79 It was recognised that 
training could be completed in three years. Emoluments were outlined, but were 
subject to deductions for health insurance and superannuation. " The net earnings 
were therefore inadequate to meet the personal expenses of the students and colonial 
governments were asked to supplement the students to allow a sum of fl. 5.0 a week. 
This equated to E34.8.0 for the first year through to E25.2.0 in the third year of 
training-81 
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In reality, selection evolved through to an intradepartmental selection committee. The 
submission and placing of approved applicants in training hospitals and institutions 
was the joint responsibility of the Nursing Appointments Service of the MLNS and 
the Colonial Office, following recommendations of this intradepartmental 
committee. 82 Documents from the committee were passed to the hospital and when 
accepted this file returned to the London Appointments Office. It would state on it 
when the candidate would start his or her training. This centralised approach 
essentially amounted to the ability to deploy direction of labour, as candidates were 
actively discouraged by letter from applying directly to specific hospitals, but were 
advised that they would be sent to one considered 'suitable 83 
There was some tension between the Colonial Office and the MLNS, much as had 
existed between the latter and the Ministry of Health with regard to inland nurse 
recruitment. The Colonial Office and the MLNS had discussed in the late 1940s a 
reduced role for the MLNS in placing students. The Colonial Office regarded the 
candidates as their 'own' students. The selection committee had met since 1944 at the 
MLNS with this ministry's own Principal Nursing Officer as the chairman. The 
MLNS were more than happy for the committee to be under the auspices of the 
Colonial office; however they wamed that there needed to be close cooperation 
between the two ministries, to avoid residents of Britain feeling that their interests 
were being prejudiced by people from overseas 'with unfortunate repercussions all 
s84 round . 
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By 1954 it had become clear that with increasing entry to the country by people from 
the colonies, candidates were bypassing the official procedure, arriving in the UK and 
applying to matrons directly at chosen hospitals. 85 This was also occurring in 
increasing numbers from those still within their own country. The official procedure 
was noted to be slow, and the MLNS believed that news had spread throughout the 
colonies that by ignoring the usual procedure, inherent delays could be avoided. 86 
Despite the caution in ensuring good quality candidates and preventing any hostile 
reaction to incoming, %vorkcrs, the continued shortage of nurses, hindered by this slow 
vetting procedure, resulted in the Colonial Office removing recruitment restrictions. 
In a decision described as a 'complete agreement' and one focused purely on the 
pragmatics of workforce supply rather than any anticipated racial tension, it was 
decided to suspend the role of the intradepartmental committee by December 31' 
1954.87 This meant that colonial candidates could apply directly to hospitals, with no 
need for an initial selection procedure via committees in the colonies. This they 
believed to be appropriate due to the willingness of hospitals to accept 'coloured' 
girls for nurse training and the increasing flow of unsponsored candidates. 88 
A small number of students would continue to be dealt with by the Colonial 
Committee approach in London, in cases where a colony wished to sponsor 
candidates for spcciric posts at home following their nurse training 89 These were, 
however, believed to be small in number. The decision effectively focused on the 
pragmatics of staffing needs, and freed up the flow of Colonial candidates at a time 
when those arriving via the unsponsored route were regarded as being of a 'good 
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calibre'. 90 The gates were widened even further by agreement that Colonial 
candidates should not be discouraged from applying for posts as assistant nurses or 
nursing auxiliaries-91 Dispensing with central vetting, placing and regulatory 
procedures, essentially delegated authority to localities and matrons of hospitals. 
However, delegating authority proved a risky decision. Within six months of 
suspending the committee procedure, an intradepartmental meeting at the Colonial 
Office with the MLNS was calling for a reconstitution of the selection committees 
within the colonies. 92 The exact reason is unclear. The reason given in an internal 
memorandum by G. T. Milne, Assistant Secretary at the Ministry of Health, was that 
some hospitals were inviting 'coloured' girls without sufficient verification. These 
trainees were apparently staying at the hospital for a few months, leaving and then 
becoming a problem for the MLNS. 93 It is an interesting point, because he claims a 
year previously that there were an estimated 3,000 colonial student nurses in Britain, 
with only 1000 arriving by the official procedure. 94 The majority arrived outside the 
ccntralised system, yet the matrons were now being blamed for encouraging 
unsuitable students, when removal of the official system may not have altered the 
situation greatly. The capacity to influence generally the flow of candidates into 
nursing, as well as their calibre, may have reflected the growing concern regarding 
the general rise in 'coloured' labour entering Britain by the mid 1950s. 
Overseas nurses at the grassroots level 
Literature specifically examining the experiences of overseas nurses as part of the 
expanding recruitment policies of the 1950s and 1960s remains sparse. 95 The 
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experiences of Afro-Caribbean workers in general has formed part of a gradually 
expanding body of knowledge, although as regards nursing it is still limited. 96 
Mayor's aforementioned study of 88 black male and female nurses who came to 
Britain in the period of this thesis suggests that, prior to Beishon et al's 1995 study 
for the Policy Studies Institute in London, most exploratory work had been based 
upon opinion or small samples. 97 She argues that in addition, studies had ignored the 
social and political context in which these nurses worked, together with their entry 
into nursing and how they negotiated their careers. 98 Mayor's work is still one of only 
a small number of emerging studies. 
Recent studies suggest that the NHS has displayed racist attitudes to black nurses and 
that in response, those studied adopted specific strategies to negotiate continued 
progression in their carcers. 99 This has included an assumption that not all negative 
experiences were attributable to racism, but to factors such as age, status and gender 
as well. Additionally, approaches have included the adoption of 'moral resistance'. 
This can briefly be described as interpreting the survival of challenging (racist) 
experiences as a confirmation of their own sense of moral worth, through not rising to 
or demonstrating similar behaviour themselves. 
' 00 
The first of these points highlighted in Culley et al's study of 14 male and female 
nurses, who arrived in Britain between 1954 and 1966, offers the implicit message 
that racism was probably present, but was interpreted otherwise by the nurses. 101 This 
lack of clarity regarding racist behaviour appears to reflect the character of racism 
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within ministerial documents. There was the explicit need not to be seen as racist, but 
a strong and covert racism operating underneath. The clear message centred around 
the need to remove any 'colour bar' to employment. By the mid 1950s the 
Birmingham Nursing Appointments Office was reporting to the MLNS in London a 
huge influx of West Indian nationals inquiring about nurse training. Irene Carney, a 
member of MLNS staff from the Birmingham Regional Appointments Office, visited 
the local Nursing Appointments Service. In referring to the situation as a 'coloured' 
problem' she declared: 
'So far this week, of 14 people interviewed, II were Jamaican, and in the 
previous two weeks, the proportion was 12 out of 35, and seventeen out 
of 39 - all unqualified, not of the necessary educational standard, and 
oflen above the age limit for nurse training.. On one occasion when I 
visited it, out of the applicants waiting for interview, three were coloured 
men, apparently casual callers. ' 102 
Carney again cmphasises the need to avoid 'all thought of a colour bar, ' yet stated 
that the ofliccr 'must definitely dispel any thought of nursing from the applicant's 
mind, whilst yet displaying a wide variety of vacancies. 103 H. E. Chester, of the 
Nursing Services Branch of the MLNS, sympathised. He was glad of the information, 
yet 'at the same time we heartily endorse the view that there must not be any question 
of bias in dealing with these people, particularly so when they are clearly unsuitable 
for nursing training and employment. "04 
However, along with the active recruitment and apparent need for discretion in the 
use of 'colourcd' labour, was the aforementioned demand for regulation through 
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legislation to prevent too high a flow of black workers into the country, responding to 
the call for labour. As the increase in 'coloured' workers was noted in the mid 1950s, 
Miss Udell, Chief Nursing Officer at the Colonial Office, warned in a speech to the 
Association of Hospital Matrons about the number of unsuitable colonial subjects 
who were taken for nurse training in Britain. 105 Udell estimated that 10% of student 
nurses in the country were from the colonies. Claiming that she had no objection to 
'these women' in all branches and ranks, she questioned whether all had the same 
view. If they could not accept these women as potential matrons, had they the right to 
keep using them as pairs of hands in the less senior positions? 106 
It is unclear whether Udell was suggesting that too few non-colonial nurses would 
seek positions of leadership, which as the previous chapter highlighted was clearly 
occurring by the end of the 1950s. Alternately, and possibly more likely, it may have 
been of concern that too many colonial nurses would rise through the ranks, with 
subsequent resentment from non-black colleagues. In support of the latter view, 
although at an earlier time point, Stewart does present data that the College of 
Nursing in the 1930s wrote to the Ministry of Labour raising qualms about refugee 
nurses from Europe entering nurse training, and ending up competing for jobs with 
British nurses. 107 
What appears clear is that colonial nurses seemed to offer a contradictory workforce 
solution, yet within an apparently growing problem affecting nursing. Udell's figure 
of 10% was drawn from Colonial Office estimates and GNC training numbers, which 
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again appear as approximate. 108 It again illustrates that although the Ministry of 
Health and the Colonial Office saw the recruits as a potential 'problem', enshrined in 
the very title of Miss Udell's speech: 'The Colonial Nursing Service, and the 
Problems of Bringing Colonial Girls to England for Nursing Training'; 109 until the 
early 1960s and Regional Hospital Board returns, they had no clear data to 
demonstrate how big a 'problem' it was. 
The experiences of colonial nurses and racist behaviour in nursing has to be set 
against an occupation that was highly hierarchical and regimented in both its training 
and practice. This makes it difficult to tease out whether behaviour exhibited to their 
students was derived from the general oppressive environment, or from attitudes to 
race, or a combination of the two. Conversely, however, the recruitment of black 
students also appeared to offer shelter from wider social censure. Accommodation 
was a problem generally for 'coloured' colonial workers, and for female students 
being subsumed into the world of nursing, it could be seen as a protective barrier 
against racism: 
, there were such things as nursing homes ... so we didn't have the trauma of 
having to look for accommodation and being rebuked and rebuffed and 
discarded. " 10 
Lack of accommodation was used as the reason for a much more limited recruitment 
of men (both black and white). It's therefore uncertain whether there was prejudice 
against men from the colonies, or whether they did not fit into the structure of what 
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could be offered, as well as the mould of the gendered recruit. Essentially, this 
supports Mayor's view that as long as blackness is constructed as a problem (the 
'colour' problem), then the approach to employment practices, service delivery and 
education and training remains as one coming from the perspective of their unique 
needs, perpetuating differences as being problematic. "' 
By the end of 1960 a range of large medical/nursing teaching hospitals declared that 
they had no colonial nursing or midwifery students employed on their staff. These 
included the Middlesex, St Bartholomew's, the London and the United Leeds 
Hospitals. 112 It could be argued that they traditionally would have had fewer 
recruitment problems. Conversely, by 1960 a large number of colonial immigrants 
were present in Britain, and should have been represented and indeed accepted for 
training amongst the white applicants. This lends support to the argument that black 
nurses were disproportionately represented in the Cinderella services such as mental 
health. ' 13 
The channelling of black candidates into SEAN (subsequently termed SEN) training, 
even though they held appropriate qualifications for a state registered course, has 
been highlighted in a number of studies. 114 This has also included the inappropriate 
use of the GNC entrance test, which when passed still allegedly resulted in the single 
offer of SEN training. 
' 15 Mayor has suggested through her own interviews that such 
student discrimination was recognised by respondents when reflecting back upon the 
options available to black candidates. The types of training available were couched 
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only in terms of general and mental nurse courses (Vina Mayor: personal 
correspondence). This marker of racist behaviour is useful as it can be cited 
independently of other explanatory variables, such as a traditional and generally 
oppressive work environment. 
Yet the figures from the early 1960s illustrating Commonwealth students who entered 
specific types of training do not appear to support a general trend to offer 
predominately SEAN training. 116 Table 7.1 (page 196) shows the figures for the end 
of 1961 for all Commonwealth nursing students employed collectively in the 
Regional Hospital Boards. These were students who were recruited after taking up 
residence in the UK. Table 7.2 (page 197) shows the distribution of Commonwealth 
nurses in training in five random and differing Regional Hospital Boards in England 
at the end of 1960. 
Within local institutions, the Joyce Green Hospital in Dartford had approximately 36 
students of West Indian origin training between October 1955 and December 1963.1 17 
Commonwealth recruitment increased at this hospital over the time period, with six 
of the 36 undertaking SEAN training, two in fever nurse training and 28 on the SRN 
course. Ten of the latter are clearly noted as leaving training for a variety of reasons, 
ranging from academic failure, domestic reasons or ill health. A small number are not 
confirmed as clearly passing the final examinations. 
118 
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Table 7.1 Nursing students from the Commonwealth: numbers employed in 
hospitals in the board's area/group at 31112/61 (recruited after taking up 
residency in the UK). Midwifery pupils are also included, but would be required 
to be state registered nurses prior to undertaking this training. 
Dependent/independent 
Commonwealth 
Countries 
Student Nurses 
(SRN training) 
Pupil Nurses 
(SEAN training) 
Pupil Midwives 
Barbados 615(64%) 253(26%) 95(10%) 
British Guiana 370(74%) 96(19%) 31(10%) 
Jamaica 1,706(67%) 565(22%) 265(10%) 
Grenada 63(58%) 33(30%) 13(12%) 
St Lucia 19(83%) 3(13%) 1(4%) 
Trinidad 552(78%) 117(16%) 41(6%) 
Federation of Nigeria/ 
Northern, Eastern and 
Western Region of 
Nigeria 
944(79%) 26(2%) 219(18%) 
Gambia 18(90%) 0 2(10%) 
Uganda 75(85%) 7(8%) 6(7%) 
Source: 'Nursing and Midwifery Students from the Commonwealth and the Republic of Ireland: 
Numbers Employed In Hospitals In the Board's Area/Group at 3/12/61 Who Were Recruited 
After Taking up Residence In the United lUngdom'. PRO MH 55/2527 Nursing and Midwifery 
Students from Colonial and Commonwealth Territories Training in the United Yjngdom: 
Statistics, 1959-61. 
At the Miller General Hospital in London, eight West Indian nurses entered SRN 
training between 1946 and 1955, with none apparently undertaking the SEAN course. 
Five were recorded as leaving before completion. 119 Approximately 252 students 
commenced training at the West Middlesex Hospital between August 1950 and June 
1953. Nine were black, but included West Indian, Nigerian and South African 
students and a black trainee described as coming from Lancashire. All were placed in 
SRN training, three were recorded as ceasing training. 120 
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Table 7.2 Colonial nursing and midwifery students in selected individual 
Regional Hospital Board hospitals at 31/12/60. Midwifery pupils arc also 
included, but would be required to be state registered nurses prior to 
undertaking this training. 
Line 1: Manchester Regional Hospital Board 
Line 2: Liverpool Regional Hospital Board 
Line 3: Wessex Regional Hospital Board 
Line 4: The United Liverpool Hospitals 
Line 5: Guy's Hospital, London 
Dependent/Independent Student Nurses Pupil Nurses Pupil Nfidwives 
Commonwealth (SRN training) (SEAN training) 
Countries 
Barbados 1 41 31 6 
2 4 2 3 
3 19 42 2 
4 1 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
British Guiana 1 3 0 4 
2 8 1 0 
3 0 2 0 
4 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
Jamaica 1 131 30 23 
2 11 5 4 
3 22 15 3 
4 3 0 0 
5 2 0 0 
St Lucia 1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
Trinidad 1 32 3 2 
2 4 2 
3 8 6 
4 4 0 0 
5 
1 
2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
(Continues) 
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irnntimied) 
Federation of Nigeria/ 86 2 29 
Northern, Eastern and 52 0 6 
Western Region of Nigeria 21 1 2 
1 0 0 
0 0 2 
Gambia 1 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 
3 1 0 0 
4 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
Uganda 1 0 0 0 
2 2 0 0 
3 3 0 0 
4 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
Source: 'Hospital Group Figures for Colonial and Midwifery Students at 31/12/611. PRO MII 
55/2527 Nursing and Midwifery Students from Colonial and Commonwealth Territories 
Training in the United I-3ngdom: Statistics, 1959-61. 
Clearly these figures are of interest because they are contrary to the aforementioned 
research which suggests that black candidates were inappropriately channelled into 
SEAN training. However, these are small numbers and there is a need to consider the 
practice over time, that is, did it increase in the 1960s and whether this small sample 
of hospitals and regional boards are representative of practice throughout the country. 
Teasing apart the individual records of hospitals does suggest the growth of implicit 
racism and gencralised attitudes, which one might expect to be expressed in terms of 
a downward turn in recruitment of black workers. By 1965, the Group Assistant 
Matron of the Westminster Hospital was investigating the recruitment and retention 
of Nursing Auxiliaries: 
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'You really need a housing estate with young married mothers, or older 
women whose family now goes out to work. There are a lot of coloured 
women in the fairly near vicinity, but they are not always of the right calibre 
for the job and we are already flooded with them in the domestic field. ' 121 
Her response was to place a few advertisements in the local press, but primarily to 
recruit from abroad. Of interest is her list including Switzerland, Finland, Norway, 
Canada, Austria, Denmark and South Africa, which would procure predominately 
white auxiliaries, her view being that those from Finland were the best. 122 
Contrary to the received view, the files examined show a tendency towards colonial 
students being placed in SRN training in the 1950s. This is only a very small number 
of hospitals and doesn't in any way suggest that individuals were not placed 
inappropriately into SEAN training. However, neither does it show a major trend at 
that stage towards this practice. Gaining figures at a later time point is difficult, as the 
end of specific archived files often falls into the 30-year closure period. One could 
speculate that the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation through the Race 
Relations Act 1965 and the Commonwealth Immigrant Act 1968 might paradoxically 
have pushed black nurses into the SEAN pathway, as rejection purely on grounds of 
colour was outlawed. This was notably the case with the latter Act, which impacted 
on employment. 
The concept of 'duty', the different perceptions held of it by officials and potential 
recruits provides an interesting concept with which to help frame the differing 
expectations from all sides of the increasing colonial migration into nursing. As 
199 
indicated throughout this chapter, the general view in the MLNS and Ministry of 
Health, with the emerging 'New Commonwealth' and development of the colonies, 
was that migrants would come to Britain, train as nurses and return to disseminate 
their skills at home. It remains unclear if the lack of monitoring by the Ministry of 
Health and Colonial Office of the numbers of colonial students in nurse training, until 
1960 when the Regional Hospital Boards returned figures, 123 merely reflected 
logistical difficulties or that black women in a respected occupation would not add to 
racial tension. However, as argued, a rising sensitivity to the 'colour' issue was 
emerging in Britain in the late 1940s. The alternative is a belief that the colonial 
nurses would not stay in Britain anyway and had a duty to their own country and 
family at home to share their skills with their native community. 
Those migrating into nursing, however, were young, single and - in the West Indies, 
given the economic downturn - motivated to leave by the presence of high 
unemployment. In the colonies, the message of the 'colonial family' was strongly 
promoted and many felt that Britain was their homeland and would be welcoming. 
This created a sense of a somewhat mythical Britain. Calypso singer Aldwyn Roberts, 
known colloquially as 'Lord Kitchener', sang on board the Empire Windrush to the 
waiting British Pathe newsreel team an extract from his composition, 'London is the 
Place for Me', referring to the mother land: 
11 am glad to know my mother country, I've been travelling the country these 
years ago, but this is the place I wanted to know, down in London, that is the 
place for me. ' 
124 
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The newsreels themselves publicly emphasised this concept of belonging: 
'Citizens of the British Empire coming to the mother country with good 
intent. ' 125 
'%Vc really believed that thing about, you know, fairness in Britain and erm 
..., and that we were really part of this thing called the Empire and the Commonwealth and that, and that we would be welcome. Because we 
thought, why would people come and invite you to come to their place, if 
they didn't want to treat you well. (Caribbean Nurse Manager, arrived in the 
UK 1957) 126 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter has explored goverment workforce policy and planning 
in relation to overseas nursing recruits, and notably those from the British colonies, in 
the immediate post-war period. A variety of factors facilitated the use of overseas 
workers in nursing, but many of these were manipulated and operated to the 
advantage of the British nursing service. It is argued that this was a continuation of 
the broad function of the colonies. A growing racial tension occurred, which framed 
attempts to restrict the increasing flow of 'coloured' workers entering nursing, with 
Colonial Officc warnings to the Association of Hospital Matrons to be wary of such 
recruits taking senior posts. Colonial recruits appear to have been ultimately filtered 
into SEAN training, although this does not seem to have occurred until the 1960s. 
Nursing appears to reflect in microcosm wider racial tensions, which were brewing in 
the aftcrmath of '1171ndnish' immigration in the 1950s and 1960s. What appears 
201 
fundamentally at issue was 'blackness', since the EVWs, discussed in detail in the 
following chapter, did not appear to present the same kind of 'threat' as their black 
counterparts - to the nursing leadership and to the authority relation in the NHS and 
hospitals in particular. What appears to have underlain such fears was the anxiety 
about white nurses taking orders from black nurses, and possibly on occasion, black 
female nurses giving orders to white male nurses. Although always hinted at or 
referred to in the most oblique and sotto voce terms, one can only extrapolate from 
other work, but the disruption to race, as well as general, relations was clearly a major 
cause for concern on the part of officials. Interestingly, there appears to be little 
objection or concern articulated through or on behalf of patients. The concept of 
'duty' promises a convenient flag to understanding the different functions that it 
performed and the differing perceptions held by proponents of colonial nurses. To the 
nurses themselves it consolidated and sealed relations with the &motherland'. For 
colonial officials, overtly it represented the 'gift' relationship between Britain and her 
colonies, by bringing training standards up to those of Britain through returning 
nurses, but was a 'gift' that operated very much one way. As already noted, the 
gradient of advantage was very much in favour of the NHS, a legacy that is still in 
evidence today with the use of overseas nurses. 
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Chapter 8: The Use of European Volunteer Workers (EVWs) in Nursing 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the use of European volunteer workers (EVWs) by Britain in the 
immediate post-World War II period, as part of a workforce strategy to help solve the 
severe shortage of manpower. Through a variety of voluntary schemes operated by the 
Ministry of Labour and National Service (MLNS), workers were selected from displaced 
persons camps across Europe, where they hoped for a better life and employment 
opportunities in Britain. Although many thousands arrived in the post-war period, nursing 
utilised a surprisingly low number. The reason behind this is explored; it was, at face 
value, based on language problems. However, this chapter suggests that the use of EVWS 
and the application of workforce restrictions were of clear benefit to Britain in filtering 
the workers into the more unpopular, often ancillary, jobs. 
A chapter is dedicated to this group of workers for several reasons. Firstly, the extensive 
use of white European workers, alongside government concerns outlined in the last 
chapter concerning 'coloured' colonial labour, offers an insight into the underlying racial 
themes of post-war workforce policy and planning in Britain. The chapter argues that 
EVWs could be easily absorbed into British society, with the landing conditions that 
aimed to restrict the workers to specific employment not always rigidly enforced. For 
nursing, the use of EVWs in part fulfilled Minister of Health Ancurin Bevan's post-war 
nursing policy to take more domestic duties away from the nurse. The EVWs could fit 
well into these proliferating posts. Landing conditions meant that the MLNS could select 
whom they wanted and this quickly became the young, often without dependents. In 
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addition, the workers were not British subjects and therefore their use avoided the 
concerns of unregulated 'coloured' immigration from the colonies. Despite their 
importance to British workforce policy and planning, the use of EVWs and the schemes 
through which they arrived in Britain have been poorly explored. A few histories exist, ' 
but generally the contribution of EVWs has not been well documented. The more recent 
emergence of black nurse heroines such as Mary Seacole*, her bust now resplendent in 
the headquarters of the Royal College of Nursing, may have resulted in other groups 
becoming subsumed or ignored when workforce history has been examined. 
The recruitment of European volunteer workers 
At the end of World War II there remained in Europe a large number of people of 
working age who were termed 'displaced persons'. These were primarily Eastern 
Europeans, taken from their occupied homelands to work in German industries and for 
the war effort, but who were now unable or unwilling to return to their native countries. 
2 
Some were survivors of concentration camps, others were 'eastern workers' known as 
'Ostarbeiter'. The latter were people from the Ukraine, forced to work in German 
factories and farms, while other displaced persons had fled to Gcrtnany to escape 
Communist rule. 3 The displaced persons lived within camps which were chaotic. This 
was in the sense that they contained a mixture of People, including former enemies and 
*Mary Seacole (1805-188 1) was of mixed Scottish and Jamaican race. She was bom in Kingston, Jamaica 
and travelled extensively as a nurse, having learned her skills from her mother's boarding house for invalid 
soldiers. When in England in 1854, the War Office refused to send her to the Crimea, so she travelled there 
herself, nursing soldiers near Balaclava. She was ultimately awarded the Crimean Medal and the French 
Legion of Honour. Her place in British nursing history had been virtually non-existent until the 1970s, 
attributed by many to the colour of 
her skin. Her own book 77; e Wonderful Adventures of Mrs Seacole in 
Many Lands was finally reprinted in 1984.4 
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allies, many of whom had only the remnants of official documentation to say who they 
were or where they had originally come from. 5 For the victors of war including Britain, 
the United States (US), Canada and Australia, they were both a problematic group, but 
also a potential 'non-coloured' solution to the workforce shortages. 
In July 1948, the US Immigration Bureau announced that 205,000 displaced persons and 
17,000 orphans would be permitted entry to the country under the 1948 Displaced 
Persons Act. 6 By 1951, another 170,000 displaced persons had emigrated to Australia. 
These were mainly Estonians, Latvians, Hungarians, Poles and Yugoslavs. This influx 
was significantly the first large group of non-British immigrants allowed entry into 
Australia, since the Chinese migration of the previous century. 7 Writing in 1984, Viesturs 
Karnups, the subsequent General Secretary of the Latvian Social Democratic Workers 
Party, and himself a Latvian-Australian, argues that despite being non-'coloured', the 
European immigrants met significant difficulty on arrival in Australia. This included 
having been misled by information given in Europe by Australian Immigration Officials. 8 
Many who had expectations of continuing in professional careers met with closed doors, 
with the result that a large number of them were forced to take unskilled jobs. 9 
In Britain, three schemes operated from 1947 by the MLNS to utilise EVWs. The 
Westward Ho, Blue Danube and North Sea schemes covered British-controlled zones in 
Germany and Austria. 10 The Westward Ho scheme was probably the most extensive 
scheme in terms of geographical recruitment area. This recruited from all three Westem. 
Zones of Germany and Austria, while a small number were also taken from Denmark, the 
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Middle East and Africa. By March of 1949, the scheme had recruited 57,000 men and 
18,000 women for the British workforce. " Progress was affected by the availability of 
accommodation, with difficulties in keeping families and dependants together in the same 
allocated camps in Britain. The primary aim was for the camp to be near the worker's 
employment, with the risk of fragmentation of the family, at least during the working 
week, a fact made clear to volunteers in publicity literature. This quickly restricted the 
recruitment field to men and women without dependents. 12 
The Blue Danube scheme aimed to supplement the supply of women from Austria to the 
textile industries. 13 The MLNS noted that the Austrian Goverment restricted recruits to 
limited categories of their unemployed workers, only raising the recruitment ceiling to a 
figure of 2,000 people allowed to leave under the scheme. 14 The North Sea scheme 
recruited German women to the same industries. However, post-war hostility to Germans 
meant that by 1949 only in some areas of Scotland had there been a willingness to accept 
the women. 15 
The relevant schemes would be brought to the attention of displaced persons through the 
distribution of leaflets while they were in the European camps. 16 A meeting would then 
be held with a visiting MLNS official to discuss and clarify issues with interested people. 
This had to be planned carefully, as many displaced persons were in fact already 
working. When a number believed to be about 20 to 30 had volunteered, private 
interviews usually with the same official would take place. This would ascertain the 
suitability to work in Britain, their skills and the type of employment they would be 
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suited to. This was linked to a list of labour shortages, which also offered conditions of 
pay and training and which would be the same as for British workers. 17 
It was made clear in a MLNS memorandum that their officer should not disclose to the 
volunteer an account of the type of work that appeared most suitable. 18 This ensured the 
understanding that the person, as part of their workforce restrictions (the 'landing 
conditions'), would be prepared to take 'any kind of work to which he is sent by the 
Ministry of Labour-'19 A medical examination would be undertaken and had to be passed 
if the volunteer was to continue in the scheme. It was clear that Britain did not want the 
sick, the elderly and, subsequently, those who presented placement difficulties due to 
dependents. EVWs would then wait at this camp before selection to be placed on the next 
final embarkation 'nominal roll' to set sail for the United Kingdom (UK) . 
20 Before they 
left the transit camp, five shillings would be given to allow the EVW to buy small items 
in the shop on board. No sums in excess of 40 marks could be taken, since it was 
regarded as having no value beyond Germany. Clothing and men and women's boots 
were held at the transit camp for those who weren't suitably dressed for the journey. 
21 
InevitablY, this group arrived to work in Britain as the almost complete definition of the 
destitute, and an easily pliable workforce. 
The advantages of the European volunteer workers schemes to workforce policy 
and planning 
The clear advantage of the EVW schemes was the ability to direct labour to specific 
industries and jobs, and the ability to deport EVWs if they left their work without local 
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MLNS permission. EVWs were housed in camps near their work, where they paid a 
nominal fee whilst employed. A sum of 24s. 6d. was also paid to each worker on arrival in 
the UK as a -'scttling-in' allowance. 22 This was something which did not appear to be the 
case for colonial workers. EVWs were required to pay the usual contributions for 
unemployment and health insurance whilst employed. 23 The previous chapter has 
suggested that 'coloured' immigration was seen as problematic by the Labour and 
Conservative governments almost as soon as the first colonial workers arrived following 
World War Il. Certainly Carter et al support this assertion with evidence of the two 
governments beginning to racialise black immigration at an early stage. This the authors 
define as the state taking a major role in constructing black immigration as a 'problem' 
and in doing so reinforcing a conception of Britishness grounded in colour and culture (as 
expressive of ColoUr) . 
24 White Europeans in contrast, may have been seen as settling more 
easily with the British public, ultimately being absorbed into and maintaining the white 
race. 
Carter et al suggest that active measures were taken in the late 1940s to demonstrate the 
invaluable contribution of EVWs to the British economy, which did not occur with 
colonial 'coloured' labour. 25 This can certainly be seen in propaganda, such as the release 
by the Central Office of Information in 1949 of a film designed to show the British public 
that EVWs were really just ordinary people like them. 26 The film reinforced the idea that 
they could be a valuable and not alien part of British society. Although acted, it followed 
the lives of EVWs Stefan and his fianc6e Olga. He works in the mines, while she is 
employed in the cotton industry. The approach was to present a variety of views from 
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British people that were generally derogatory, offset by those presented as wiser, having 
worked with the EVWs. The script continued: 
Young Yorkshiremans's Voice: 
'I get on all right with Stefan. Some don't like these EVWs, we're not sure 
where we are with them ... will they take ourjobs? Just the same, they're still 
chaps without a real life and nowhere proper to live ... except a hostel. v27 
Shots of the hostel, with men sleeping in dormitories and a few personal belongings, 
notably photographs of family and loved ones, were used to reinforce how much the 
EVW had sacrificed, and to reinforce the commonalities with British people. 
European volunteer workers in nursing 
EVWs inevitably appeared to offer an advantageous workforce solution, which would at 
least ease the nurse recruitment problem. In fact it proved mainly problematic. Under the 
Blue Danube scheme the Austrian Government sanctioned the recruitment of only 100 
women to train as nurses. 28 This was a ridiculously tiny figure compared to the workforce 
shortage. The NHS began with an estimated 53,000 nurse vacancies and 65,000 unstaffed 
beds . 
29 However, Austria took nine months to provide only 50 women. This was partly 
due to the recurring issue of the language problem as a barrier to working in the UK, 
which generally was not a problem with recruits from the British Colonies. The majority 
of EVW women were subsequently to be found in the textile industries and areas such as 
hospital domestic work, 30 where they were not dealing directly with the public. Limited 
English language would inevitably not be such an issue as it would be in nursing. 
Austrian nursing also had such low pay and conditions that there was little incentive to 
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train and return home. 31 The Westward Ho scheme fared slightly better. By 1949,166 
men and 567 women had been placed in nursing. However, many had to be initially 
filtered through the role of hospital orderly due to the aforementioned language barrier. 32 
The North Sea scheme, recruiting German women, secured 126 as nursing students or 
orderlies by the same time point. Generally, hospitals reported favorably to the MLNS on 
the Gennan recruits. 33 
The proportion of female EVWs recruited to Britain for domestic work compared 
unfavourably to nursing. Under the Balt Cygnet scheme, the forerunner of the Westward 
Ho scheme, 2,575 women entered hospital domestic work. 34 Under the Westward Ho 
scheme itself, by 1949 a further 103 men and 1,164 women were placed in hospitals in 
this role. 35 In part, this demonstrates the prominence and persistence of a language issue, 
but it may also be seen as building on the policy adopted by the Ministry of Health to 
enhance the hospital domestic role. This was based on the 1947 government-initiated 
Wood Report's recommendations for nurse recruitment and training. The increased use of 
domestic staff would allow qualified nurses to attend to the skills they had been trained 
fo r. 36 
The language barrier and the landing conditions had a declared ability in MLNS 
memoranda to overrule any recommendations of the initial interviewing officer in the 
European camp. 37 This could produce an easy government method to push desperate 
people into unpopular jobs. Whether this actually occurred, as was claimed in Australia, 
must remain speculative. Certainly, Miss Russell Smith, Under Secretary in the Ministry 
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of Health, was asking her counterpart in the MLNS Appointments Department whether 
more EVWs in holding camps in Britain could be persuaded to train as nurses in 
February of 1948.38 G. J. Nash's prepared reply focused on suitability, with nursing 
mainly needing young, single women with a good education and able to speak a 
reasonable amount of English. The number of such EVW women was seen as few and at 
that time was claimed to be almost negligible. 39 Only through oral histories as a method 
of examining EVW experiences can claims of any filtering of suitable nurse recruits 
away from the occupation begin to be substantiated. Such research is currently lacking. In 
examining the wider social policy, Webster of the University of Central Lancashire has 
argued that the EVW women facilitated the national role of white British women. 40 This 
was through the EVW meeting at least part of the demand for labour and allowing 
indigenous women to concentrate on family and domestic life, a role, as highlighted in 
this thesis, that was enshrined in the Beveridge Report. 
The use of European workers in nursing was not unique to the post-World War Il period. 
John Stewart has studied refugee nurses in Britain during the late 1930s and early 
1940S. 4 1 Again, a similar pattern emerges with a utilisation of white European labour to 
perform the less desirable jobs. During this period the GNC did not recognise overseas 
nursing qualifications and there was a severe restriction on entry into nursing. He quotes 
only 215 nurses of all nationalities taken on as probationers or post-graduates during 
1935-37. In contrast, 20,000 pre-war refugees were employed as domestic servants. 
42 
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Although overseas nurses were divided into 'friendly' and 'enemy' aliens depending 
broadly on their country's association with the Nazis, the use of refugee nurses increased 
during the war. However, female doctors being pushed into midwifery training and male 
doctors into ancillary posts again illustrates the use of white foreign workers, who were 
experiencing desperate times, being used to shore up gaps in the British workforce. 
However, sympathy was in general extended to refugees in wartime, with a voluntary 
body, the Nursing and Midwifery Department, working with Home Office officials to 
find refugees suitable nursing employment. 43 
The government was keen to encourage EVWs to grasp the English language as quickly 
as possible and become a more integrated part of British society. From 1947 Local 
Education Authorities and voluntary organisations provided English classes. 44 This was 
hampered by the rapid movement of EVWs from holding camps to various allocated jobs, 
together with the variability in intelligence, educational background, age and knowledge 
of English . 
45 By the spring of 1949, a report by the Ministry of Education into teaching 
English to foreign workers highlighted the fact that there were now some 80,000 EVWs 
in Britain. It claimed that thousands of them knew 
I ... little or no English, and thousands more know only sufficient to 
do a little 
shopping, in spite off the fact that many have been 18 months in this country. 46 
This subsequently led to a Ministry of Education memorandum being distributed to those 
providing hostel accommodation and employment to EVWs, on how best to enhance a 
grasp of English, through teaching and social interaction. 47 Despite the report claiming 
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that in many areas strenuous efforts were being made by Ministry officials and others, 
there remained a great deal to be done. However, it believed that the principle difficulty 
was with the EVWs, who although demonstrating considerable enthusiasm on arriving in 
Britain to learn English, had now rapidly fallen away from attending classes. 48 A whole 
series of reasons were given for this. These ranged from variability in language services, 
middle-aged men whose rote memory is 'not as retentive as it may have been', to a lack 
of incentive for EVWs to speak English due to interpreters being present in the hostels. 49 
The issue of dealing with those who breached their landing conditions is of interest, as it 
sheds some light on the underlying racial discrimination which Carter et al suggest was 
informing the early post-war attempts at government immigration legislation. 50 The 
management of EVWs who moved between employment was far more relaxed than the 
restrictions presented to them on agreeing to come to Britain. This places them in terms 
of absorption into British society as somewhere between the indigenous white man and 
woman and the black colonial worker. Certainly the unions had more or less accepted the 
EVWs, but fears that they might be used to undercut wages led to an agreement with 
employers that they would restrict the number to 10% in any textile Mill. 5 I Tension did 
still exist in relation to foreign labour, with Tarrant, Assistant Secretary of the MLNS's 
north western region, informing Goldberg, holder of the same post in the Labour Supply 
Department in the surnmer of 1949, that it might happen soon that the unions would want 
to abrogate agreements for foreign workers generally. He added that there wasn't a 'dog's 
chance' of the unions agreeing at that point to the introduction of Icoloured' labour. 52 
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Webster particularly focuses on this idea of EVWs ultimately being subsumed into the 
white British race, whereas black workers never could be. She sets this against the fear of 
miscegenation of black and white people. 53 The primary data do present this longer-term 
idea that EVWs, while being restricted and used to man short staffed and usually more 
unpopular jobs, would ultimately add to the British race. By July 1948 an internal report 
by the MLNS was claiming that: 
'all these Poles and displaced persons have been accepted on a long-term basis 
and it is a reasonable assumption that practically all will choose to stay 
indefinitely. ' 54 
By October, a Home Office memorandum declared that the MLNS had agreed that 
EVWs would be released from their landing conditions on marrying a 'woman of British 
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stock'. Inevitably, it was decided that a public announcement of the change in policy 
would not be made-56 This reduced the loophole of EVWs avoiding any form of direction 
of labour. In a note from Goldberg in November 1948 to the MLNS's Deputy Secretary, 
Sir H. Wiles, it was suggested that the Home Office could not be persuaded to take 
deportation action against EVWs who left approved employment without permission. 
This was as long as they took up other approved employment elsewhere. The argument is 
presented that in the early days of using EVWs it may have been possible to have applied 
the landing conditions 'strictly and ruthlessly', but handling of the cases had been lax. 
57 
By the end of 1948, it was proposed that all that could be done was to instruct the local 
MLNS off ice to reprimand EVWs who left employment without permission, with a threat 
58 of police action if they did it again. Within the Ministry itself there remained confusion 
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regarding punishment. Worsted spinners Speak and Son Ltd were infuriated that three 
female EVWs had left without permission after 18 months of service, to take up weaving 
at another mill found for them by the local MLNS. 59 The local MLNS office appeared to 
support the company, then acted against their own initial judgement, because G. S. 
Christie of the MLNS in London argued that the women were promised the same 
conditions of service as British workers. He suggested that after this period of 
employment at the same mill, to deprive them of the prospects of advancement would be 
seen as less favourable conditions. He argued that it may also have affected future EVW 
recruitment and could encourage accusations from the international community of 
treating the workers as slave labour. 60 
In reality, movement tended to be allowed between approved industries, but did little to 
appease employers who had invested time and effort in training EVWs in short-staffed 
areas. Discussion of deportation did occur for those EVWs who refused chosen work and 
decided to find their own employment. However, the practice was generally reserved for 
those regarded as unsatisfactory workers and unwilling to be repatriated . 
61 These 
included small numbers convicted of various offences (24 German EVWs in 1950), and 
those stating they would prefer to return to their country of recruitment if they were not 
allowed to take employment of their own choice. Many were deported rather than being 
repatriated on the technicality of being in Britain for over 18 months. They were 
therefore not permitted to re-enter occupied zones of Germany by any other method. 62 
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The period of landing conditions generally extended to two years, or three years for 
63 
nursing students. As long as the EVW worked satisfactorily and desired to stay, an 
extension period seemed fairly automatic. By 1952, the MLNS was emphasising its 
continued support for the use of white European workers as part of British society. A 
notice was released to Austrian, German and Italian women recruited under programmes 
such as the Blue Danube and North Sea schemes. They would now be eligible after four 
years continuous residence to be allowed to stay permanently in the UK. 64 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter highlights the fact that a small number of histories regarding 
British EVW labour do exist, but, considering the numbers that were involved in the 
various schemes, it has been poorly explored . 
65 The process generally appeared to benefit 
both parties, the British employers and those who chose to come to Britain. Once the 
period of landing conditions expired, after approximately two years, workers could settle 
in Britain. The workers were treated under the same conditions as their British 
counterparts, and this appears to have produced discrepancy in how far the landing 
conditions could be applied, particularly to those workers who wished to better 
themselves and move to more lucrative jobs. 
For nursing, the benefits were minimal. This was partly due to the language barrier, and a 
subsequent filtering of staff into ancillary roles. Whether Britain behaved in a similar 
fashion to Australia, as highlighted by Karnups, 66 and directed skilled people into lower 
skilled jobs, remains unclear. However, the number of EVWs who became nurses does 
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not appear to be large. The significantly low numbers of nurses in the post-war years and 
the diversity of the ministries' workforce policy would, it could be suggested, have 
addressed any potential recruitment prejudice if there was felt to be an unfair restriction 
to nurse recruitment from these workers. It is clear that further research within this group, 
both generally and in nursing, is needed. 
The developing trend to record black nurses' experiences could possibly be at the 
expense of 'white' European nurses recruited through schemes such as the Westward Ho 
programme, although this is speculative. EVWs appeared to be at a greater advantage 
over their colonial counterparts, in the sense that although directed to specific labour 
areas based upon their skills, the landing conditions appear not to have been enforced 
once they took genuine steps to seek employment to better their situation. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
This final chapter draws together and analyses the key issues which have emerged from 
the analysis of workforce policy and planning in nursing during this time period. It 
concludes that the governmental workforce policy and planning for nursing, from the end 
of the 1930s until the late 1950s, remained highly reactive and opportunistic. Nurses were 
differentiated mainly as the qualified and unqualified, with a series of hierarchical ranks 
characterised by the Whitley pay scales. Through this the qualified nurse emerges as 
either a general nurse dealing with physical illness or one caring for those with mental 
illness. Ministerial policy used this static model to focus predominately upon recruitment, 
attempting to gain enough staff, initially to meet anticipated air-raid casualties on the 
home front, and then to ensure the success of the new National Health Service (NHS). 
Three ministries were used with differing responsibilities to support the government 
workforce policy. The responsibilities of each can be divided into three 'Rs'. The 
Ministry of Labour and National Service (MLNS) was concerned, at least until 1957, 
with 'recruitment' in a health service severely starved of nursing staff. The Ministry of 
Health was concerned with staff 'retention' and conditions of service, and this was 
notably by maintaining pay negotiations through the Whitley Council. Finally, the 
Colonial Office enriched the issue of diversification in recruitment by 'replenishment', 
through utilising workers from the 'New Commonwealth', who were regarded as British 
subjects. 
In examining the time period of this thesis Dr John Cohen's Minority Report published in 
1948 and based upon his work with Geoffrey Pike, remains the period's most powerful 
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critique of workforce policy and planning'in nursing and health care. ' It emerged from 
the authors' dissatisfaction with the approaches and subsequent conclusions in the 
government initiated report into the recruitment and training of nursing staff (the Wood 
2 Report). The Minority Report pointed to all the major flaws of workforce planning, 
calling for a move from Committee opinion to a greater use of statistical analysis of 
workforce needs, and a rational organisation of the nursing service within the wider 
context of health service developments and the national economy. 3 To this end, Cohen 
(Pike had sadly committed suicide prior to the report's publication) advocated a social 
research organisation to provide government departments with the necessary data for 
workforce planning. 4 
In the light of this report, this thesis supports Rafferty's final chapter in her analysis of 
nurse education in the immediate post-World War II period, that it appears doubtful 
whether Cohen's analysis was ever taken seriously by the planners of the new health 
service, or indeed by nursing organisations, in pressing for research resourceS. 5 In fact, 
the term 'doubtful' seems an under-estimation because what continued to pass for 
workforce policy and planning, remained purely reactive. Any semblance of planning 
appeared only to occur in wartime and as a matter of expediency. It did not translate into 
long-term planning of any significance in the post-war era. There appeared to be little 
attempt to co-ordinate workforce policy and planning across ministerial departments. 
However, the roles of the ministries can still be divided into three 'Rs', but to 
characterise these divisions as a conscious policy would be overstating the case. Such 
workforce policy and planning deficits, as highlighted by Cohen, remain issues today. 
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The Basis of a Reactive Policy 
During World War 11, workforce planning for nursing had to be instigated rapidly and 
followed a period of increasing low morale and unrest within the occupation. This 
stretched back into the 1930s, leading to more radical involvement from the unions and 
the emergence of differing groups claiming to represent nurses' interests. The lack of 
interest from the Ministry of Health and MLNS resulted in no statistical data regarding 
numbers or distribution of nurses to advance a wartime workforce strategy. This resulted 
in a strategic U-tum in workforce planning in preparation for anticipated casualties on the 
home front. 
A series of hurried and poorly thought-through measures emanated from a Ministry of 
Health that seemed unused to the professional aspirations of organisations such as the 
Royal College of Nursing (RCN). The initial lack of involvement of interested parties in 
workforce planning created the possibility of a lack of cooperation from both the RCN 
and the unions. This occurred in much the same way that Fenner Brockway had believed 
in 1930 that his altruistic intentions to introduce legislation to regulate working hours, but 
with no consultation with nurses' organisations, would be warmly welcomed. 6 Such 
approaches demonstrated a lack of understanding of the differing aspirations of those 
representing the occupation, and for the MLNS it led to a need to work with these ideals 
to ensure a greater compliance with workforce policy. The resulting NAC was as hybrid 
an entity as the occupation itself It would have been more practical to use the vast 
number of Labour Exchanges to augment hospital recruitment. However, the 
Appointments Department, which was created in wartime to deal with professional 
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groups, was chosen, despite the fact that initially it did not seem to share the professional 
ideals for nursing that organisations such as the RCN held. 
The measures focused on a recruitment campaign to join the Civil Nursing Reserve 
(CNR) and a dilution of labour, which was to become a major post-war issue. Higher 
salaries for CNR nursing staff, compared to those in civilian hospitals seemed to be based 
on the simplistic view of augmenting recruitment during a time of national crisis. The 
approach was compounded by a lack of statistical data regarding national nursing 
shortages and poor understanding of the consequences of offering higher salaries, as 
compared to the cash- and staff-strapped hospital service. The inability to anticipate when 
air-raids would occur left nurses idle in the CNR, while depleting the hard-working 
nursing services in the civilian hospitals. 
As war progressed, the ministries struggled to gain control over the management of the 
workforce, where previously non-involvement had been the rule, and a series of poorly 
managed workforce strategies ensued. It seemed that much early effort was wasted 
hoping to appeal to the patriotic fervour of women to answer the call to train as nurses, 
return to the profession, or offer untrained nursing skills. This was all in the hope that it 
would offset the inability to quantify the true problem and to know the extent of 
workforce numbers and distribution. Inevitably, while recruitment campaigns rumbled on 
throughout the war, it was not until three years after the outbreak of hostilities that 
compulsory registration occurred. 
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Direction was disliked in all areas of the country's workforce, but notably in nursing, 
which was seen as vocational, reinforcing the 'ministering angel' view. This dislike of 
control meant that the workforce policy relied on recruitment and a Control of 
Engagement Order. This was introduced by using the Nursing Advisory Council (NAC) 
to test nursing opinion and to placate the occupation, rather than as a primary policy- 
planning tool. Controls rather than direction only served to frustrate the employers of 
nurses, notably the matrons, as they were unable to draw from newly qualified staffi 
Nurse members of the NAC were sympathetic, notably to the training hospitals from 
whose members they seemed to be drawn, and rejected questions from the Chairman, 
Malcolm McCorquodale, regarding the need for four-year training contracts. The gradual 
erosion of the Order to allow increasing areas to draw from the new recruits, who were 
now required to enter specific short-staffed areas for a year, meant that these areas did not 
feel a great benefit, while many others were starved of new staff. The acute shortage of 
nurses to meet the demand resulted in a 'treading water' cffect, with the workforce 
recruitment situation as bad as it had ever been by the time the NHS was launched in 
1948. 
Change Versus Continuity 
It is of value to contrast what aspects changed and what remained the same in terms of 
government workforce policy and planning during the time period. Until the advent of the 
7 
Report of the Committee on Senior Nursing Staff Structure (the Salmon Report) , 
government policy primarily focused upon diversification of recruitment sources as its 
short-term goal. White argues that structures such as the Whitley pay scales maintained 
the rigid nursing hierarchy, fitting posts to grades, rather than the reverse, which the 
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Salmon Report began to advocate. 8 The flat structure that the Whitley Council offered the 
occupation did not offer salary leads to encourage development of any specialist role or 
groups to meet health service needs. Leads were only offered to those areas of acute 
shortage, that is, to encourage recruitment. What did change in the post-World War Il 
period was the move from a more centralised policy planning in health care services to 
regionalisation. Its effects on the nursing occupation have been analysed elsewhere-9 War 
had brought a centralised control of nursing, unheard of in the 1930s. Standardised pay 
scales emerged through the Rushcliffe Committee and were the first clear policy signs of 
this change. 10 This was partly to increase remuneration and aid recruitment, but primarily 
it allowed nurses to be moved more easily to areas of staff shortage. The Nursing 
Advisory Council (NAQ within the MLNS was influential in policy making, involving 
nurse representatives in national decision making, but this was arguably to validate 
relatively pre-determined decisions and to diffuse these to the nursing workforce. 
The advent of the National Health Service (NHS) reduced the war-time approach of a 
centralised control of health services. A regionalised system of health care emerged 
through the fourteen Regional Hospital Boards (RHBs) in England and Wales. " This 
brought with it noticeably less control and influence over hospital management decisions 
for the matrons, and control over national policy issues for the two NACs (one for the 
MLNS and the other advisory to the Ministry of Health). By 1957, the influence of 
regionalisation and cost constraints was such that the NAC for the MLNS was 
terminated, much to the concern of organisations such as the RCN. 12 Recruitment would 
now be under the control of the Ministry of Health, who the unions and RCN could see 
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were structured around RHBs with little nurse representation. Minister of Health Aneurin 
Bevan's scheme for nationalising the health service envisaged the maximum degree of 
delegation to the new local administrative bodies under the control of the RHBs. The 
former emerged as the hundred and thirty seven hospital management committees 
(HMCs). 13 This does suggest that the involvement of nurse representatives in workforce 
policy and planning was an exception during wartime, although Chief Nurses remained in 
the ministries. Such a view is strengthened by the paucity of clinical representation in the 
structure of the RHBs, beyond the medical profession, both in the NHS White Paper itself 
and once the service was underway. 14 The RCN and the Royal College of Midwives were 
among groups informed that their rightful place was on the advisory committee of the 
hospital authorities, rather than on the boards or management committees. 's The frequent 
requests by groups such as the Association of Hospital Matrons for greater RHB 
representation continued throughout the time period studied. 16 
Diversification of Labour 
Within nursing, diversification of labour sources offered a solution to a severe workforce 
shortage. The increased use of men and part-time nurses, produced far less tension within 
the ministries of health and the MLNS than the nurses who advocated the RCN 
philosophy of a professional female calling. The issue of colonial 'coloured' labour 
produced clear concern within government workforce policy and planning. This was 
between the need to staff nursing and other public services, but a growing government 
concern regarding the societal effects of increasing 'coloured' immigration. 17 European 
volunteer workers (EVWs), an alternative source of immigrant labour, were dealt with by 
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the MLNS. This was because they emerged from the displaced persons camps of war-torn 
Europe and not from the colonies. They were not British subjects and were therefore 
subject to workforce controls. 18 Although any form of foreign labour did appear to cause 
unease amongst employers and trade unions, 19 the use of 'white' European labour 
appeared more amenable and was fully exploited, with large numbers arriving in the 
immediate post-war era. 
One of the primary concerns to government was the inability to control the flow of black 
workers, who were British subjects, into the country. Nursing itself remained a clear 
example of the ability to control the use of colonial labour. It was a socially respected 
occupation, it was female-dominated and could be used to legitimately limit the flow of 
Gcoloured' men, without offending the colonies in an era of 'New Commonwealth'. This 
is speculative, because although the use of colonial men in nursing was clearly unusual, 
this was frequently cited as being due to a lack of suitable hospital accommodation, 
which was not mixed-sex and in fact affected white male nurses too. The occupation also 
moulded recruits into being not simply a worker, but one maintaining professional 
standards both inside and outside the hospital. Some colonial men's ability to achieve this 
may have been questioned. 
Nursing eagerly utilised female colonial nurses and this thesis suggests that the filtering 
of such workers into posts that prevented career progression, such as state enrolled nurse 
(SEN) training, did not noticeably occur until the early 1960s. This is an unusual finding 
because it runs counter to other research and does invite further analysis. In fact, it may 
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reflect changing attitudes due to increasing colonial immigration. During the period 1960 
to 1962 more immigrants arrived in Britain than in the whole of the century. 20 This has 
been attributed to the threat of immigration controls which occurred in 1962 with the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act. In addition, there clearly were concerns raised by the 
Chief Nursing Officer of the Colonial Office during at least one meeting of the 
Association of Hospital Matrons, of the possible effects of the increased use of 'coloured' 
nurses who may ultimately gain higher-grade posts. 21 The reason for concern is unclear, 
but may centre around the hierarchical issue of white nurses taking orders from more 
senior 'coloured' colleagues. Nursing concerns may have reflected those of society as a 
whole. The initial 'coloured' arrivals, until the mid 1950s, were small and represented 
skilled and semi-skilled workers from urban areas. As numbers increased, so did the 
proportion of unskilled people from poorer rural backgrounds. 22 This may have created a 
self-fulfilling prophecy of the character of colonial workers within British society. 
The ability of EVWs and other groups such as Polish immigrants to be absorbed into the 
$white' British workforce was perceived by the government as an advantage . 
23 Workforce 
restrictions did not always seem to be enforced as strongly as they might have been in 
these groups of workers, 24 raising the underlying issue that 'Britishness' was essentially 
constructed by 'whiteness'. However, many EVWs were filtered into ancillary roles and 
not into nursing. This fulfilled in part, Minister of Health Aneurin Bevan's workforce 
policy, following The Working Party on the Recruitment and Training ofNurses in 1947, 
(the JVood Report), of removing domestic chores from nurses. 25 It appears that the more 
undesirable roles were offered to European labour largely because of language problems, 
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with nurses' work involving direct dealing with the public. However, it could be argued 
that a workforce unused to the culture in Britain and desperate for a better life offered 
little resistance to being filtered into jobs inappropriate to its skills. Kamups, 26 in 
examining the use of this workforce in Australia in the post-war period, has made this 
suggestion, but the experiences of EVWs in Britain has not been greatly explored. This is 
an area that requires much greater investigation, perhaps through oral testimonies as one 
method of understanding the life experiences of this group of workers. 
Collaborative Working 
There appeared to be no conscious policy of collaboration between the three ministries. A 
natural division, which this thesis has suggested, occurred between the ministries, with 
the three 'Rs' of 'recruitment', 'retention' and 'replenishment'. It is suggested that there 
were points of conflict as each defined their individual contribution to the nursing 
workforce. There had been some tension regarding the need for two nurse advisory 
committees from the MLNS and Ministry of Health, once the NHS legislation was in 
26 
place in 1948 . One notable issue was the continuing tension amongst 
hospital 
authorities who resented the frequent visits of MLNS technical nursing officers 'of one 
sort or another', presumably to assist with issues of recruitment . 
2' The matron had 
previously been allowed to deal with this matter on her own, and indeed in the pre-World 
War Il years was given no choice, due to the lack of government involvement. Once 
recruitment had improved by the mid 1950s, and this still remained an on-going issue, the 
Ministry of Health was happy to back the Treasury's concerns of the extra expense of a 
separate ministry dealing with nurse recruitment, and take over this responsibility. 
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Key Issues 
What this thesis has demonstrated is the need to consider the complex interplay of a wide 
variety of factors affecting ministerial workforce policy and planning in British nursing. 
This is both during the period under study and subsequently. One of the key points is how 
the ministries viewed nursing, and how this affected their workforce planning and the 
choice of implementation. This view of nursing may not be a static concept and is 
strongly affected by issues such as the dilution of labour. The recognition by the MLNS, 
augmented by discussions with John Wrigley and Kathleen Watt of the Ministry of 
Health, that qualified nurses saw themselves as a class above those who used the Labour 
Exchanges, 29 resulted in the use of the specialised Appointments Offices. These aimed to 
ensure compliance with the recruitment campaigns. The alternative Treasury view that 
such an approach was playing to the 'dignity of the profession' resulted in the decline of 
the service from 1957 . 
30 Differing philosophical views on nursing as a profession, 
espoused by the RCN and a workforce best accessed by vast recruitment campaigns, 
required a representative Council as a filtering mechanism to mould MLNS policy to 
appeal to the occupation. The hybrid nature of nursing and debate regarding the exact 
role of the qualified nurse, demanded this unique approach. 
The 1947 Wood Report was asked to explore this latter issue regarding the proper task of 
the nurse. 31 Despite subsequent Committees, resulting in publications such as the 
Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust's Goddard Report in 1953, which argued that the 
question had not been answered '32 it remained an issue which still affects the occupation 
today. The RCN's document published in 2003, which aimed to define nursing is a clear 
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example 
33 and continues to result in various organisations' claims to best represent 
nurses' interests. Nursing's attempt during the period of this thesis to move away from its 
hybrid nature, with the RCN finally supporting the idea of legislation to control 
unqualified assistant nurses, 34 together with a lack of clarity regarding the role of nursing 
auxiliaries, are issues still permeating through to current nursing practice. The RCN's 
final agreement in 2001 that health care assistants (HCAs) (and nurse cadets) could join 
the RCN is a more current example. 35 This was restricted however to associate 
membership and to those HCAs who had successfully passed National Vocational 
Qualification (NVQ) level 3 studies. The latter, by definition, involves the application of 
knowledge in a broad range of varied work activities performed in a wide variety of 
contexts, most of which are complex and non-routine. 36 Thus, the hybrid nature was 
reduced, but drew in those who may be compared in many ways to the previous SEN 
status. 
It is interesting to note that a separation between registered nurses and other members 
may be seen once again with the RCN Council's view in 2004, that all qualified nurses 
should be at degree level. 37 The importance of how government departments and the 
public view nursing would suggest, however, that this desire may never be realised if the 
history of nursing workforce and its pattern of dilution is assessed. Perhaps recognition of 
this has resulted in universities offering a variety of access routes to achieving a nursing 
degree and the opportunity of honours and non-honours awards. The emergence of 
foundation degrees, 38 which appear to fit more with diploma-level practice, may 
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ultimately form part of the dilution process to achieve this long desired homogenous 
workforce. 
The historical analysis of workforce policy and planning in Britain may continue, with a 
need to make explicit key elements which in a detailed inductive approach can bring the 
study nearer to reality. Yet this in itself is a debatable point, with 'reality' itself subject to 
negotiation and reinterpretation. However, the recognition of the various players' 
attitudes, organisations' and ministries' beliefs and influences, and wider social variables, 
ensure that history could inform current policy and planning. 
A programme for future research might therefore include the continued realisation of the 
various factors which influence policy planning and implementation in nursing. Even if 
studied in isolation, their contribution to the over-all policy planning process needs 
investigation. Oral histories continue to offer an insight into the lived experience of 
policy making decisions, both those affected and those making the decisions. What may 
be termed fashions in history tend to result in significant groups disappearing, perhaps 
influenced by societal attitudes towards such groups. Mary Seacole has reemerged, with a 
growing interest in nursing history involving the experiences of the black nurse. 
However, looking in detail at all of the characters influenced by a specific subject area 
can help prevent significant contributions, such as the post-war European migrant 
workers from disappearing. The histories of EVWs and their role in the post-war nursing 
and general workforce remains remarkably poorly explored. Such issues form part of the 
research agenda which emerge from this thesis. However, the key question remains 
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whether the workforce planning strategy within the Department of Health has advanced 
very far beyond Cohen's analysis in the post-war period. This involves considering the 
evidence base for planning and the issue of international recruitment which continues, it 
would seem, unabated. 
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Appendix 1. 
Factors favouring the use of colonial workers as nurses in Britain (expanded version). 
High numbers of nurses travelling from Britain to work in the colonies via the Overseas 
Nursing Association (ONA) in the late 1940s. These were the highest figures in the 
organisation's 50-year history. 
The active move away from raising colonial nursing standards through legislation within the 
colony (the change occurred via section 10 of the 1949 Nurses Act). This purposeful 
manipulation allowed an increased use of colonial-trained 'nurses'. This is because it gave 
responsibility for achieving the GNC nurse-registration standard to the individual, not to the 
colony. This meant that those who did not meet the standard on application to the GNC, 
could undertake an adaptation programme allowing them to be registered in a shorter amount 
of time. This situation still exists today. This opened an additional source of nurse recruits, 
who would actively come to Britain (through economic hardship) and gain adaptation, from 
their own colonial nurse training, to the highly regarded British state registration. Although 
there appears to be a paradox in preferring white Europeans to black workers in the 
workforce, the former presented language problems when entering a service dealing with the 
public. The manipulation of the Nurses Act could encourage individuals, and notably women, 
to come into a specific occupation, rather than emigrating with the hope of some kind of 
employment 
No accommodation issues. The hospital system could offer a nurses' home, although often 
only to women. Although accommodation is highlighted as the main reason black men were 
discouraged, it was a somewhat convenient excuse, and letters from colonial men to the 
MLNS do suggest that those with appropriate and often very good qualifications were 
rejected. *This may also however, have been part of a lack of understanding of the standards 
of overseas qualifications which continues today. The absence of post-war building of 
hospitals restricted the ability to create new nurses' homes, but no practical solution was ever 
offered to encourage colonial men into nursing. 
An arena of hospital institutional control. This ensured appropriate societal behaviour in both 
work and private life. 
The manipulation of selection procedures to encourage further migration in the mid 1950s. 
However, when the applicant standards dropped, a rapid reapplication of the colonial 
selection procedure occurred. This appears to mirror growing societal racial tension 
throughout the 1950s. 
Differing concepts of 'duty'. For colonial nurses this was to seek a better life for themselves 
and their young families, away from severe economic hardship. The ministerial expectation 
was a return home upon qualifying, after providing three years service. 
Sources include: 
The Overseas Nursing Association 54th Annual Report (for the year ended 3113150), p. 9. PRO CO 850/252/3 
Colonial Nursing Service. Revision of Fees Paid to ONA for Selection of Nurses for the Colonial Nursing Service, 
1950-51. 
Report of a meeting between the Registration Council of the General Nursing Council and representatives of the 
Colonial Office and the Ministry of Health to discuss the administration of Section 10 of the Nurses Act 1949, 
8112/49, p. l. PRO CO 850/252/7 Appointment of Locally Born Nurses, 1949-50. 
Letter: Isaac Popoola, Lagos, Nigeria to MLNS, 17/10155 and reply MLNS, 22/10/55, stating his standard of 
education was lower than that normally required for nurse training In the United Kingdom. Reply: Isaac 
Popoola to Nursing Services branch, MLNS, 28/10155: '1 have spent seven years in the secondary grammar 
school where I took science up to school certificate, why then do you opine that I am unsuitable for training? I 
am holding a Nigeria Government recognised certificate, which has qualified me to serve in the Nigerian Civil 
Service as a clerk in the GPO, P and T headquarters, Lagos hitherto. ' PRO LAB 8/1804 Applications from 
Colonials for Nursing Training: Procedure, 1949-57. 
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